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SPECTRUM

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Volume 2, No. 4, July 1974



Urban Insurgency in South-East Asia

The International Terrorist

Sarawak: An Insurgency in Retreat

South-East Asia's Global Strategic Context

ANZUK and the Security of Singapore and Malaysia

An Asian Viewpoint on the Status of Straits

The First Indo-China War

SPECTRUM

Volume 2, No. 4, July 1974

Contents

Page

SPECTRUM

Volume 2, No. 4, July 1974

Contents:

Page:

URBAN INSURGENCY
Urban Insurgency in South-East Asia 1
by F.P. Serong
The International Terrorist 18
by Richard Clutterbuck

COUNTER-INSURGENCY
Sarawak: An Insurgency in Retreat 26
by Douglas Hyde
WORLD POLITICS
South-East Asia's Global Strategic Context 38
by Frank Mount

DEFENCE
ANZUK and the Security of Singapore and Malaysia 53
by Robert L. Rau

LAW OF THE SEA
An Asian Viewpoint on the Status of Straits 64
by Phiphat Tangsubkul

REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE
The First Indo-China War: Political versus Military Strength? 77
by S.D. Campbell

Notes on Contributors 92

Published by the —

South-East Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO
Headquarters, P.O. Box 517, Bangkok, Thailand.

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SPECTRUM

Volume 2, No. 4, July 1974

Contents:

Page:

URBAN INSURGENCY
Urban Insurgency in South East Asia 1
by F.C. Strong
The International Terrorist 10
by Richard Clutterbuck

COUNTER INSURGENCY
Burundi: An Insurgency in Reverse 28
by Douglas Hyde

WORLD POLITICS
South East Asia's Liberal Socialist Centre 33
by Chris Mount

DEFENCE
ANZUK and the Security of Singapore and Malaysia 53
by Andrew L. Ross

LAW OF THE SEA
An Asian Viewpoint on the Status of Straits 64
by Chyuter Tangsubkul

REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE
The First Indo-China War: Political versus Military Strategy? 77
by S.D. Chapman

Notes on Contributors 92

Published by the —

South East Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO
Headquarters, P.O. Box 811, Bangkok, Thailand

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URBAN INSURGENCY (1): *The security/development consultant to the Saigon Government writes that the ingredients for serious urban insurgency are present in many South-East Asian countries and that the catalyst would be a policy decision by Communist Parties to re-direct ongoing rural insurgencies towards the cities. But he maintains there is still time for vulnerable governments to limit by prescribed measures the economic and security risks of rapid urbanization.*

Urban Insurgency in South-East Asia

F. P. Serong

IT may be true that "there is nothing new under the sun"; and certainly with respect to urban combat operations in political dissent, there has been ample historical precedent in Europe. For South-East Asia, however, deliberate and sustained dissent, as distinct from outbursts, has been almost consistently a rural manifestation, working its eventual way to the city, as centre of administration, only as a climax—and sometimes as an anti-climax.

But politics is people; and political dissent must go where the people can hear it and—it would hope—join and sustain it. Rural dissent therefore becomes decreasingly relevent with a demographic trend of urban drift. The people, increasingly, are in the cities; and if insurgency wants a popular base, in the cities it must operate.

New or old, the subject of urban combat operations has lately surfaced for fresh consideration amid confusions of both terminology and motivation, each resonating against the other and producing amplified confusion.

The reasons are far to seek—they lie in South America. Armed political dissent in its current context has become by default almost exclusively the prerogative of Communists, whichever the breed. The deepening economic distress of the less favoured elements on the South American political scale screamed for action of some sort. The Communist giants may have been expected to respond, but neither Moscow nor Peking, and more particularly Moscow, had any intention of unbalancing evolving global strategy by an over-extension to an unsupportable distant operation, itself arising from conditions not of their making. The Russians and Chinese are pragmatic people. The new boy, Cuba, did make an effort—a response less attributable to political solidarity than to operational naivete; failed; and lost Guevara—a passing singularly unlamented in the power centres of World Communism, however much it may have distressed Western adolescents. The dissenters, partly surfaced and therefore partly identified, were left to fight alone. They were without resources of any kind—money, equipment—but, more important, they were without organization and without doctrine.

It is this latter factor that has given rise to the confusion in nomenclature. The first writings (both descriptive and doctrinal) have fallen into the practice of calling the dissenters "guerrillas". It is understandable. The term is Iberian in its origin, where it is a title of honour, and one which if not self-bestowed is certainly warmly accepted. And indeed in the context of South America it is most probably the right word. Their unco-ordinated mess of small-scale operations does fit the word "guerrilla" in its historic context, and is as surely doomed to the historic guerrilla outcome—operational failure, or appendage existence to an eventual larger project, with no share in the fruits of victory.

It may have been the documentary weight of the South American operation which influenced the choice of title, "Urban Guerrilla Warfare",

by Robert Moss, in his ground-breaking studies of the subject (1).

Moss covers the global display of urban guerrilla operations in an overview which most capably collects and critiques the scant available data. The subject, where he has left it, is still broad, lacking as yet the precision of definition which would arise from specific local studies.

Dennis Duncanson has brought it into somewhat sharper focus, pointing to the implications of urban drift as both an economic response and a security response, and to the possibilities for Communist insurgency should it choose to enter this (for South-East Asia) new field (2).

This paper follows the line of thrust developed by Moss and Duncanson and aims at narrowing the review to South-East Asia in the present and mid-term future—in the areas of probable Communist action based on their known capabilities, and in the areas of government response. It is not a study of techniques, offensive or defensive. That is for later consideration in a more detailed work. Rather, it is an review of the climatic conditions—military, political and economic—in which action and counter-action may be expected—and its aim is to provide broad guidance to the authorities concerned in the vital preliminary operation of "preparing the battleground". It will however use the term urban "insurgent" (and "insurgency") rather than the term "guerrilla". This is more than a semantic device—it is a choice of words intended at this early stage in the dialogue to emphasize the significant difference between the isolated, uncoordinated, limited and politically vague operations of South America—to whose exponents we can indeed concede the title of guerrillas—and the much more sinister prospect of a positive and purposeful re-orientation of the already existent Communist insurgent machinery from rural to urban operations, bringing with it organization, equipment, doctrine and a coherent strategy.

* * * * * * *

THANKS to Moss, we can look quickly at the South American experience and pass on. It appears to lean heavily on the concepts of the late Carlos Marighella, whose much-read "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla" rates there as a textbook of sorts (3). One may at first be tempted to dismiss the Minimanual as a juvenile primer with no message for the serious insurgent; but that could be a mistake. It is juvenile; it is a primer. But so was Infantry Training, Volume II, 1934 (4). IT II and Marighella's work both were a response to the primitive state of the art as they found it. Anything more sophisticated would have been indigestible in the operating context.

It does however contain one serious weakness which may well have cost Marighella his life in that 1969 Sao Paulo police ambush: "Any single urban guerrilla who wants to establish a firing group and then begin action can do so and thus become a part of the organization .... This method of action eliminates the need for knowing who is carrying out which actions, since there is free initiative and the only point is to increase substantially the volume of urban guerrilla activity in order to wear out the Government and force it onto the defensive." One can imagine Ho Chi Minh turning in his grave or more likely smiling at the foredoomed efforts of these clowns whose operations would make a screen behind which he could build his own purposeful, disciplined apparatus. As with Che Guevara, one wonders how much Marighella's death was due to police action, and how much to far-planned betrayal. He had served his purpose.

We can pass over the exhortations to achieve skill in marksmanship, physical fitness and certain specialized expertise. We note the direction to base financial support on "expropriation" of bank funds, and combat equipment on expropriation of government military stocks, where accessible. And we may well commend the advice to develop a logistic system which emphasizes holding combat expendables for the absolute minimum time prior to use so as to avoid detection.

The Marighella paper ranges through suggestion lists for types of operations—sabotage, armed propaganda, terrorism; to types of targets—credit establishments, police stations, jails, government property, mass media facilities; some hints on raiding banks; specific direction to hit North American firms and property; street combat tactics; strikes; executions; kidnapping; liberation of jailed prisoners.

There is much on what to do, but little on how to do it. One leaves with the impression that the writer was a theorist rather than a practitioner, and that his second edition, had he lived to write it, would have been very different. But such books have positive uses. They provide a common initial philosophy of operations, though it may well later be modified or abandoned in practice. They are something to read and discuss clandestinely (and the act of clandestine discussion is more significant than the absorption of the content). And, in the absence of a codified available literature, they (and this one particularly) do fill a gap. Much that has happened in Ireland could be traced to readings of Marighella.

More recently there has surfaced another manual of some note—"Organizing Urban Guerrilla Units" by one Raul Estremera, which appears to have influenced the thinking of the so-called Symbionese Liberation Army in the Hearst kidnapping.

Very little of this has any application to South-East Asia, where there is no shortage of weapons, men who can use them, and an already existent infrastructure which has long been doing thoroughly the very things of which Latin America is now sniffing at the edges. The machinery exists; the question is whether or not to use it in an urban context. And from that the derivative questions come—does the change go all the way, everywhere; or if not, how much here, how much there? What should be the rate of transition? How would the fact of transition be concealed until the new emphasis is ready? What then of the rural operation? What of doctrine? Tradition? Reputations?

Different solutions for different areas, probably. Certainly a strategy planned tomorrow for Thailand would be very different from one for Vietnam. And for Singapore, different again.

* * * * * * *

BUT first, let us consider the problem from the Hanoi viewpoint of the eleven men of the Politburo of the Lao Dong (Workers') Party Central Committee, the successors and legatees of Ho Chi Minh. The problem briefly and crudely, is "to stay on course, or to switch".

What is the course? The course is the doctrine of guerrilla warfare first articulated and successfully implemented by Mao Tse-tung: rural operations; use the countryside to surround the cities which then fall like ripe plums; live with and on "the people", who are the water in which the guerrilla "fish" swims. There is much more to it than that, of course, but those are the basic elements. The doctrine, without saying so because the fact was self-evident, postulates an environment with a massive rural demographic preponderance, and indeed an Asiatic rural population density. It furthermore postulates a type of economy which is almost pure subsistence. This has the advantage of making the peasant independent of the economic consequences of his political actions; and has the further powerful advantage of allowing the political *provocateur* to proceed without local economic responsibility—all the painful problems remain those of the central government while the eventual political pay-off goes to the insurgent. The scenario depicts a peasant who grows rice; feeds himself thereon; is helped by his buffalo which eats rice straw; who diversifies his economy with some local barter; and can proceed from one generation to the next not caring for, and indeed often not knowing of, the capital administration. The administration can be made to appear—too frequently is — a subtraction from the peasant's well-being; and those who organize to contest it have no great problem in appearing as local defenders. If they can arrange for cross-border support to sweeten the pot a little, so much the better for them. If the central administration can be made to identify with faceless foreigners who commercially exploit the peasant, better still. There will in such a context most certainly be some element of local support—the *provocateurs* are probably local boys come home from training abroad; they have some local sympathy—and the body of support can be progressively augmented by selective terrorism. Then the counter-action starts. This is the key; this is what the *provocateur* has aimed for. Because, whatever be its political or economic theory, the physical impact of counter-insurgency is inevitably coarse-grained, clumsy, and painful—indeed frequently lethal—to the resident individual. So, the base of popular support grows, and the fish has the water he needs for his swimming.

It worked in North Vietnam. And for a time

it seemed to be working in South Vietnam. Then something went wrong. Without ever achieving the status of a formal articulation as policy, certainly never being consciously conceived as a strategy, the water dried up, and the fish were stranded, gasping. It happened from two unrelated causes.

First, there was the move—sometimes spontaneous, sometimes directed—of isolated rural dwellers into neighbouring hamlets, and later the abandonment of entire hamlets considered indefensible, with the group displacement of the occupants. Almost inevitably, these moves had a seemingly gravitational orientation towards the next largest urban aggregation in the rear—village, district town, province capital, regional centre, and eventually Saigon itself. Interestingly, they never moved forward, to the "liberated" areas, nor often sideways to neighbouring locations-neighbours are something less than neighbourly in these parts; and anyhow they have their own troubles.

Second, by coincidence, there was the impact of mechanization on agriculture. Partly in a search for increased cost-effectiveness, partly in an essential mechanical replacement of war-slaughtered farm buffaloes, the peasants nearer the urban areas went over to light tilling machinery—rotary hoes for a start and, later, tractor-drawn ploughs. Gradually the idea spread outwards, and gradually the mechanical concept was diversified in its application—the motor of the hoe or tractor was used for pumping water for dry-season irrigation, and a second crop was produced. So also was the small-boat engine which replaced sails and paddles in the delta.

But the motors needed fuel, and the second crop needed fertilizer, and both had to come along the established commercial networks—which were and are, of course, the lines of control of the central administration.

And so the peasant, who had up to now been almost self-sustaining, found himself dependent upon the flow of commerce, which was itself dependent upon the effective conduct of administration by the Government-the forces of the *status quo*. The operations of the insurgents, aimed at weakening the Government, bore fruit in a diminished well-being for the rural dwellers on whom they relied for popular support. The insurgent became unpopular, particularly with the rural women who, even in the hamlets, were now gaining access to attractive consumer goods, and who wanted the money to buy them.

With each of these two elements reinforcing the other, the water dried up. The "fish", who earlier had displayed an elegant dexterity, both military and political, in a "water" environment of good quantity—wide and deep, and indeed at the risk of labouring the analogy, pleasantly warm enough in places—now found themselves limited in their freedom to manoevre, starved for indigenous logistic support, unable to recruit, and—most important—constricted in the availability of operational intelligence.

* * * * * * *

NATIONAL surveys of the insurgencies in South-East Asia beginning with Indo-China, offer the following perspectives.

South Vietnam: As a rural insurgency, the Communist operations ground to a halt in defeated disarray during 1971. The indigenous insurgency was finished, even as the concurrent withdrawal of the US forces gathered momentum. The new war, the outright invasion of 1972, to which Hanoi committed its entire field army, was not an insurgency. It was a simple conventional military operation, conceived as such, conducted as such, and, by the time it was frozen in place momentarily at the January 1973 Cease-Fire, defeated as such by the equally conventional forces of the South Vietnamese Air Force (RVNAF). Since then, it has remained as the unacknowledged Army of Occupation of a significant proportion of the South Vietnamese territory, and of a lesser and not insignificant proportion of the population. And, from its politically-secured forward position, it now conducts economic, political and combat operations against the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) with a view to eroding popular support for the latter, and consolidating its hold in the area of its occupation. The present status appears to be a stand-off, with the outcome dependent less upon the operations of the local antagonists than upon global pressures among their super-Power supporters. Meanwhile, Hanoi is providing some "water" of its own by the importation of migrant family groups, settling them in the highlands astride the North-South line-of-communication. And Saigon,

in a move of ultimate necessity but of present questionable wisdom, is planting what it hopes are politically reliable elements in forward areas—cold water perhaps for northern fish.

Cambodia: Almost untouched until 1970 by American commercial input in support of Khmer force operations, Cambodia was at least ten years behind South Vietnam in the development of the dual-pressure manifestation leading to strategic urban concentrations. As a consequence, with the exception of an emergency refugee concentration in Phnom Penh itself, the countryside is still demographically and economically rural. It is therefore still water in which Mao's fish may swim. And they do with all the political advantages inherent in the basic rural concept. Except in occasional disaster pockets there will be no starvation in Cambodia—unlike South Vietnam where it is a current possibility because of the newly acquired dependence on technology. And so there will be no directly obvious catalyst for a surge of unpopularity against the *Khmer Rouge* insurgents, though their Communist Vietnamese allies may be seen as foreign bandits.

Rural insurgency remains valid in Cambodia. Current operations maintain their momentum. The continued existence of the *status quo* government is almost entirely due to the cosmetics of its capital's geographic placement in the nation's heartland, where it is held in position by external aid applied as direct injections from external sources—by river and air. If the capital had chanced to be a coastal port (say Kompong Som) as are most of its neighbours, its isolation would have become so obvious, both to the nation and the world, that internal and external political support would long since have dissipated.

Laos: One cannot avoid mention of Laos, because it does indeed exist. But in the context of this discussion the nature of its insurgency is irrelevant. It is, in fact, not an insurgency but a display of military economics. It determines nothing, because it has no outcome—and that because no outcome can be permitted; it must wait upon Vietnam. An earlier decision in Laos even by accident would produce an unprogrammed confrontation between North Vietnam and Thailand. That cannot be accepted—yet. The fate of Laos will be determined by the fate of the Vietnams. It is not a part of the rural/urban insurgency dialogue. Nor is the "coalition government", formed on 5 April, the end of the strife—it simply shifts the battle temporarily to a new venue.

Our consideration now moves to those nations of the region whose insurgencies are of lesser magnitude—at least in the eyes of the world, however they may be regarded at home.

Burma: Here is a political/economic anachronism preserved, at least temporarily, in fossil form by an ill-conceived and poorly executed attempt to cut off its people from knowledge of the world by decreed isolation. What appears at a distance to be a sovereign State is in fact a small territorial nucleus (the valley of the Irrawaddy from Mandalay to Rangoon and the Delta) in reasonably effective control by the central Government. For the rest, the former federal States, later forcibly incorporated into the Union, maintain a fiction of administrative connexion through a bureaucracy and a military deployment in the States' capitals, while the effective connexion is the commercial channel to the appropriate neighbour—China for the Kachins, Laos and Thailand for the Shans, Thailand for the Karens and Mons and, until the recent upheaval in Bangladesh, East Pakistan for the Arakan. Rangoon's harem is being cuckolded on a massive scale, and the regional decencies require the facts to pass without internal or neighbourhood comment.

The demographic and economic results have been a modest urban drift at far below the regional average and a dispersed commercial orientation which flows away from, rather than towards, the centre. In the circumstances, the beneficiary neighbours are in no position to build up the economies of the border States, from whatever motivation, and so the people remain substantially a subsistence peasantry. As such, they therefore remain potential, and indeed actual, rural insurgents; and Rangoon is not yet a likely candidate for urban insurgency.

Thailand: Here we have the antithesis of Burma in almost every respect: an extrovert nation, welcoming development capital, and accepting pragmatically if not joyfully most of its implications; a centralized unitary State making an effort to decentralize, with no history of colonialism—even economic and until recently the assured protection of the US via SEATO; a not severe incidence of insurgency, though increasing.

Development capital arrived at what one may perhaps call a normal rate. In the absence of accelerator factors this has produced an impact of technology on culture and industry which, in its political and security manifestations, makes of Thailand almost a development laboratory—a sample for observation and clinical study. Thailand is South-East Asia's case-book of normality—unless such judgement be invalidated by noting that being the only "normal" case is a strange form of normality and by a probable Thai complaint that they would prefer assistance with their problems rather than clinical observation of how the problems develop. Perhaps a more apt word would be "median".

There is agricultural mechanization. There is urban drift (though not security-generated). There is border insurgency in a rural context. And there has been as recently as 14-15 October 1973 a well-remembered student uprising which in its magnitude and results, if not in the development and expertise of its techniques, must qualify as urban insurgency.

We shall hear more from Thailand. It has an urban insurgency potential.

Malaysia/Singapore: If Thailand is "median", Malaysia with Singapore is classic. Consider the data: recovered from its own long Communist insurgency, in which the defeated enemy were the indigenous Chinese—who are still there; Singapore now separated off into a sovereign city-State—separate in the eyes of the two constitutional governments concerned, but very much one in the minds, hearts and pockets of the Chinese section of the demography; the Chinese essentially urban, the Malays rural; Peking's star rising.

The Malaysia Chinese potential for political domination—we withhold the word "threat"—until recently has been checked by the heavier potential of a possible pan-Malay movement launched by a protective Djakarta and accepted by a frantic Kuala Lumpur. But now, with the diminished status of the US and SEATO, Peking enters the game. And Peking carries weight. That penny dropped when Communist China took over the Paracel Islands on 20 January. So the Overseas Chinese of the Malay Peninsula are once more a factor to be reckoned with. They have numbers, money, energy, a Big Brother if they chose to invoke him (Lee Kuan Yew regardless)—and they are urban.

Apart from the built-in potential of the urban Chinese for self-generated action, or for action promoted from Peking, the urban-rural economic imbalance now straining with the consequences of the current energy crisis produces a ready-made *casus belli.* In this, the Malaysia Chinese may feel themselves forced into an insurgency in sheer self-defence against government protected, economically distressed rural Malays. Singapore's Chinese community could hardly remain indifferent to Malay-launched pogroms, whatever the overt diplomatic position of Lee Kuan Yew. In such a case, the threat of constitutional dislocation would quite probably be greater for Singapore itself than for the cities of the Malay peninsula, and in the ensuing action on both sides of Johore Strait the frontier would be a very porous barrier.

Singapore and the Malay peninsula, separately and together, must be considered candidates for urban operations. On the other hand, the pattern of political and economic pressures in East Malaysia, particularly Sarawak, is still primitive rural. And the long land border with Indonesia's Kalimantan would deter a deliberate (though possibly not an accidental) initiative by the indigenous Chinese. They could not ignore the prospect of Indonesia's taking the area under its "temporary protection"—an action which would completely change the colour and the nature of any concurrent operations in West Malaysia.

Singapore: The city-State however has problems in its own right, which may perhaps be the other side of the coin. They derive from the need of Peking to pre-empt Moscow. With the reduction of the US presence and with the now-assumed availability of Singapore's support resources to the Soviet Navy (perhaps only on a cash-and-carry basis, but useful) Peking's move into the Paracels, itself a pre-emption, is read in Singapore as an indication of further moves.

The Singaporeans see a logic that inevitably points to Singapore itself as the only credible target. Knowing their fellow-Chinese, they do not see Peking coming in a formal military context, but rather in an armed clandestine political presence designed to manipulate economic difficul-

ties. That translates as "urban insurgency"; and if it does involve skipping spaces in the regional game, it is only a name change from dominoes to checkers.

Lee Kuan Yew's Government would be well advised to give prime attention to a posture of readiness; and neighbouring Malaya should look to the possibility of being unzipped from South to North.

The Philippines: The major clinical interest in the Philippines security status comes in its diversity and consequent confusion. To oversimplify, it can be described as manifesting residual rural insurgency in the main northern island, now largely contained by the new Martial Law policy of President Marcos and religious/ethnic insurgency in the predominantly Muslim Malay Sulu archipelago in the far south. This also is rural. However, in both cases the rural initiative has quickly developed urban implications. In Luzon, it was the need of the Administration to pacify the cities, including Manila itself, that produced Martial Law (5). The overt insurgency was in the countryside, but the derivative lawlessness in the urban areas, resulting from rural emphasis in deployment of the Constabulary, so weakened Marcos's ability to respond that he had to "tidy-up" in the rear. This military/political operation has, on the one hand, brought a sigh of relief from the harassed population; but on the other hand has shown the insurgents where the real vulnerability lies—in the cities.

Sulu is a different though related matter. There, the individual islands are so small that the initial insurgency (considered in some well-informed quarters to have oil overtones and Libyan funding via Sabah) when seeking security for its key elements was forced to locate them among fellow ethnics in the urban areas, and to bring into town the rural rank and file to join them for the critical street fighting. Jolo town itself, the administrative centre, then in January 1974 became the object of government clearing operations. Aircraft were used on the periphery, giving rise to the story that "Manila had bombed Jolo". Interestingly, in their refugee movements to avoid the fighting, the Christian element fled northeast to the province capital of Zamboanga, and the Muslim element fled south-west to Malaysia's Sabah, whose Chief Minister just happens to be Sulu-born!

Responding to the realization by Philippine insurgents, potential and actual, that the city is their vital ground in a new political/economic context, there has come now a connexion between the rural and urban workers—previously poles apart. Both elements are linked in the Communist infrastructure and the Administration response has been a long-delayed but effective acknowledgement of the well-formed linkage between urban trade unions and Montemayor's Federation of Free Farmers (FFF). Montemayor, for years in the political wilderness, now sits at Marcos's side, and his farmers are now Marcos's men, ready to help their urban associates at call—an interesting role reversal because the FFF concept was originally formed as a gesture of help to distressed farmers from sympathetic urban elements.

Apart from nuisance-level ethnic operations such as in Sulu—and they can become critically serious if action simultaneously intensifies elsewhere—it would appear that the Philippines prognosis is for a blend of urban and rural insurgency, with urban setting the pace, and the rural component providing a degree of support—the reverse of past procedures.

Indonesia: There are similarities between the Philippine condition and that of Indonesia. Both experienced an initial rush of urbanization due to security problems, followed by a lesser but steady input with the impact of technology and Western-sponsored development programmes. In both countries, the political centre of gravity is one major island, and the outer islands as a result have tended to become depressed areas. Also in both, but more particularly in Indonesia, there has been a third element projecting urban drift--hunger. A series of crop failures, partly the product of bad planning, has driven starving Javanese from the countryside to the outskirts of the major cities. The economic and political impact of this movement became so severe that the Administration has been forced to restrict severely, by decree, the previously assumed "right" to move house and take up urban residence.

That action however, has probably come too late. Already the major West Java cities are surrounded by rings of shanty slums, and these *kampongs* are developing their own pattern of threat to the cities they could eventually strangle.

Bandung, Bogor and Djakarta itself in the West, and Surabaya in the East, are now critically vulnerable. There have been transparent attempts to relieve the pressure, one by diverting it onto the residual Chinese minority (not entirely blameless, it is true) and now more recently by pointing to religious (Muslim) provocations–also with a degree of justification.

The Administration's record suggests that it has the capacity to handle this growing threat if it remains an isolated problem. But if it should be coupled with a regional warlord's revolt, particularly on the island of Java itself, or if it should combine with a display of external pressure, perhaps from Peking in a further development of its territorial claims in the South China Sea, the joint impact may be too much.

In essence, the unhappy people–the hungry ones–have made their move. The remaining rural dwellers have land, and so can eat; they are no threat. The long-time urban dwellers are in commerce and the bureaucracies; they are the entrenched "establishment." The new urban element–suburban more accurately–are potentially explosive, and their location determines the explosion's position. Indonesia's possible future troubles are most likely urban.

Summary: In regional overview, we have a median case in Thailand; Burma, Laos and Cambodia still headed for rural insurgency; Indonesia and the Philippines with a double-edge situation leading into an urban operation; Singapore and Malaysia potential urban insurgency cases. And Vietnam is the most interesting situation of all–a failed rural insurgency, but one whose leaders may opt against changing horses in mid-stream, hoping to make the far bank with one final (largely conventional) lunge.

* * * * * * *

THE major lesson of the Vietnam war is only now making its proper impact. The lesson is that the tactical operations--the techniques of insurgency and counter-insurgency--are almost irrelevant when the super-Powers are involved. The outcome is dependent entirely upon how far the sponsoring super-Power is prepared to support its forward proxy. And the derivative lesson, presently painfully evident to Saigon, is that the degree of support cannot be assumed to be constant and uni-directional.

What may to Saigon appear as regional strategy, to Washington and Moscow is only global tactics. The early emphasis accorded by the United States in support of the succession of Saigon Governments was an expression of its global strategic domination--a *status quo* it aimed to maintain on its own behalf and on behalf of the economic system of the Free World on which America was increasingly dependent. At the same time, that domination made it not too difficult to launch, to build up, and to sustain the operation.

Meanwhile Russia, having learned its own lesson in the discommoding Cuba confrontation, set about ensuring no more Cubas; and far from discouraging the US effort in Indo-China, took every possible step to ensure that the operation continued and grew. Under cover of that diversion, with America spending an eventual $28,000 million annually on the Vietnam war, Russia built up its own armed forces, both nuclear and conventional, to the point where these became fit to challenge the might of America.

China meanwhile found itself unwillingly but positively involved in the mechanics of the US-Russia struggle. With Russia raising the stakes in Vietnam by increasing–both in quantity and sophistication–its supply to Hanoi, China was forced to go along, in quantity at least, lest a proportionately reducing contribution be construed as abdication of a co-Big Brother status. It sought frantically to keep the race in bounds by a sustained policy of advice to "stay in guerrilla warfare status." The advice was ignored. Hanoi, with willing Russian help and unwilling Chinese help, then upgraded its operation to high-grade conventional. Guerrilla warfare was not forgotten but was certainly suspended. Peking's advice was only partly doctrinal in origin. In major part it was pragmatically based on consciousness of a limited capacity to match the sophistication of the Russian input, and the discomforting possibility of a Russian satellite on its southern flank to match the Russian troop concentration to the north.

The United States began to display the symp-

toms of its own malaise. Whether it be indigestive flatulence or terminal cancer will be for the historians; but whatever the nature and status of the disease, its manifestations have now evolved a clear pattern. Consider:

* The first phase of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT I) in which Washington accepted a position of present and future disadvantage, at a meeting in which Washington put its nuclear cards on the table, and Moscow was allowed to withhold its own data. (The Russian data at SALT I was what Washington "thinks" is the Russian status!)

* A three-to-two quantitative disparity in personnel and most of the relevant material areas.

* The Nixon Doctrine, which tells the Free World that from now on allies will be helped with supplies but cannot assume a troop commitment.

* The Vietnam Cease-Fire, in which a winning position for South Vietnam was parlayed by Washington into a device for extracting American prisoners.

* The Middle East Cease-Fire, in which a winning position for Israel was parlayed by Washington into the opening of the Suez Canal to the Russian Navy, and a phased abandonment by Israel of its hard-won strategic depth.

And most recently--

* Communist China, after a brief honeymoon, turned back to anti-Americanism.

* A failed Kissinger SALT II mission to Moscow, brutally told that Moscow demands not only its already confirmed quantitative superiority, but now an acknowledged qualitative equality.

Now, at this date (April 1974), consider the recent small-print announcement of a further reduction in the numbers of US installations at home and abroad, among them the disbanding of USARPAC (Headquarters of the US Army in the Pacific) formerly located at Honolulu. The justification is that its function is now so reduced that the US Army formations in the Pacific can be controlled from the Continental United States; and indeed the move is quite realistic in that strategic context.

In essence, the Region has been abandoned by the United States, and is now being fought over by Russia and China. The palliative words of continuing commercial interest, Nixon Doctrine material support, and the exercise of modest leverage by playing off China against Russia in Dr Kissinger's triangular diplomacy are, like the earlier British withdrawal, devices to cover the extraction of assets (commercial and material) in the least disadvantageous way. Could anyone, even four years ago, have contemplated the nature of Washington's position statement on the Paracels? For that matter, could anyone have contemplated a Chinese operation there? Today, Indonesia contemplates one on her doorstep, almost a thousand miles further south.

The point of the foregoing is that, as it has been with rural operations, so for urban operations, the tactics and techniques will again prove to be almost irrelevant. The determining factor will be the degree of emphasis that the sponsoring super-Powers are willing and able to accord the combatants.

In that regard let it be recalled that the Russian concept of insurgency has remained essentially urban, and the Chinese still is rural; that Russia's approach to the Region is maritime, and the Chinese land-wise; and that, in the present context of the developing Sino-Soviet confrontation, the Russian interest for the moment appears to lie in support for the *status quo*.

We may therfore contemplate a scenario in which China considers itself to be stuck with supporting the rural concept, certainly where rural operations are currently ongoing. And Russia, while perhaps not replacing America as the protector and provider for the Establishment, could yet find itself in the invidious position of being forced to make clandestine preparations (which carry only limited political kudos) for an urban insurgency timed to snatch the final prize from the jaws of a rival Chinese-backed rural insurgency.

The operational picture for the Region during what remains of the 'seventies therefore shows the United States in withdrawal, though not yet

in disarray, Russia moving into the consequent vacuum wherever and whenever occurring, and China stabbing at the flank of the Russian intrusion, seeing that intrusion as the long arm of a southern encirclement.

The nations of the Region, for their part, hope for regional neutrality-though that appears to mean different things to different spokesmen. Whatever be the final evolution-if any-of this neutrality concept, it can be assumed that both the contesting super-Powers, Russia and China, will seek to suborn or erode it to their individual advantages, and that this process may well provide the climate determinant in which the new insurgency game is played.

There are other ingredients in the mix-the various regional groupings (the Association of South-East Asian Nations — ASEAN, the Asian and Pacific Council — ASPAC, the Five Power Arrangements), with each nation wondering how to survive by grasping the nettle of "who will lead"; Japan, a toothless tiger chafing in self-imposed, luxuriant impotence, and now fearful for its own economic future-perhaps for its very independence. But these are secondary. The primary consideration is the operational climate created by the manoeuvrings of the super-Powers.

As seen from within the Governments of resident nations, the situation in the target Region calls for: super Power support-and none will come, only competitive intervention; collaborative response machinery-and such cannot now be agreed even to handle a commercial threat from Japan; and the matching of whichever of the Communist duality predominates locally with a unified effort-and SEATO has lowered its profile. The future prospects for the region are, to say the least, interesting. Urban insurgency is high on the list of those prospects-higher for some nations than for others-with the unique twist that it may run concurrently with a rival rural insurgency.

Both forms of insurgency may be racing competitively in a sequence the last numbers of which would be economic chaos, resulting from circumstances well beyond the control of the resident nations. The current oil embargo/price hike suggests the type of situation in which such chaos may evolve. Indeed it is possible that this crisis may be not a preview but the beginning of a new era whose motif is a scramble for the world's now-evidently limited resources of raw materials.

It is not the purpose of this study to prognosticate urban insurgency on a scheduled basis for the nations of the Region. Rather, having sketched a strategic outline in which such an operation could (not to say will) evolve, it is now proposed to examine the patterns it would most likely take. Attention is again invited to two factors. First, that if a switch from one technique to another is involved, there are considerations of timing and style which are far removed from the basic elements of local conflict. Second, that unlike the recent Red versus Blue struggle, with the sides and the aims fairly clearly defined—if not always acknowledged - this possible struggle could be Red versus Red with the incumbent authority wishing a plague on both houses but perhaps feeling forced to accept one or other as bed-mate.

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FROM the brief, sordid history of past, recent and current operations in or near urban areas, there has evolved a rich assortment of techniques most of which are in the zone of political blackmail. The key operations are aircraft hijacking and executive kidnapping for ransom. Ransom may be in cash or political concession or both. It frequently involves the release of political prisoners. And the operations are slanted to capitalize on the softness of "civilized" nations who have for their domestic political convenience deprived themselves of effective forms of legal reprisal, most particularly capital punishment. In their present stage of development the techniques can hardly be described as "insurgency," but they do certainly qualify for the label of "terrorism." which itself is an essential early step in evolution towards an insurgent posture and organization.

The strength, and in another sense the weakness, of the present type of operation is that it lends itself to a "do-it-yourself" concept. Any small gang, of whatever group motivation, can find without trouble the ingredients for isolated operations. Such operations are essentially one-shot; then the gang sets to and builds its resources for a fresh job. The smallness, the absence of fixed logistic establishments and of

a communications net, contribute to group security. That is the strength. The weakness is in the minor-scale results to which those operations are limited; and then, with that realization, the reach-out for like-minded associates. They exist. They may be contacted. Then the trouble starts in struggles for leadership, producing confusion and betrayal. For these and related reasons, isolated group operations should not be taken so seriously as to distract the security forces from a constant vigilance against major operations from sources with real potential. These, currently, are limited to the proxies of the two major Communist groups, and those in the pay of the Arabs.

That of course does not mean toleration; quite the contrary. It does mean the utilization of the political climate of fear generated by these politically inept terrorists to gain acceptance of legislation which is essential for effective security operations. To name some vital factors:

* Restoration of the death penalty where it has been removed from the statutes.

* Proscription of ransom payment in any form by any person or organization, including the government.

* International sanctions against nations which refuse to accept an international protocol outlawing terrorism. (Several "third-world" nations refused to accept such a protocol when proposed in the UN because it was considered restrictive of "legitimate political expression.")

* Drafting and continuous updating of emergency legislation for constitutional sanction when necessary.

With those essential elements in the national and international legislative armoury, ongoing security measures against unco-ordinated terrorism can be used to develop the tactics and techniques for the bigger operations to come.

They will also serve to alert the government forces to the onset of the major operation, because at an eventual stage in the insurgency's development, the groups and the Communists will be feeling their way towards each other-the groups in a last gasp for organizational survival under government pressure, and the Communists in a posture of take-over when the local climate is appropriate.

There has already appeared a pattern in the evolution of urban insurgent groups, which bears a resemblance to the urban gang-warfare of the US--larger devouring smaller, crises of leadership, maintenance of momentum or the loss of it, and conflicting ideologies. A likely prognosis for that symptom is that the field will finally be left to two major contenders, both leftist though not necessarily Communist at that stage.

The gang warfare scenario breaks down at this point. Where past history saw an Armageddon between the two finalists with the civil police then moving in to wipe out the remnants, the future will more likely see the locally dominant Communist power-in some places it will be Russia, in others China-coming at the penultimate moment to ally itself with the weaker of the two contestants, giving that ally just enough temporary strength to enable it to overwhelm its antagonist, and yet leaving the exhausted victor in a condition of such weakness that Communist domination is not difficult and may even be welcomed. Communist control would certainly have been a condition, either stated or implied, of support for the local group.

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THE CHINESE ANGLE: Any Peking strategy for South-East Asia is torn by conflicting pressures. This applies to their angle on the possible use of an urban insurgency. Consider these elements:

First, as one month follows another, the Chinese are more deeply committing themselves to a "good neighbour" policy--at least in words if not in deeds. Their talks in early February with Thailand's representative Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya, point to this (6). Second, in apparent anomaly, they have grossly violated that developing image by their operation against Saigon in the Paracels. Third, the Paracels operation was necessary to distract internal attention from rising political problems which could break loose on the pattern of the unlamented Cultural Revolution. Fourth, the Paracels operation was possible only because of the weak-

ness of China's new partner, the United States, which although helpful for this operation casts a dubious light on the value of the US as support against Russia. Fifth, the major Chinese operating element in any urban insurgency has to be the Overseas Chinese as in Singapore and Malaysia. These are still unresolved in their allegiance between Peking and Taipei. And finally that irresolution, and a corresponding doubt within the regional governments, is being enhanced by the growing Russian presence in the area–so much so that bets are now being placed on the date of eventual arrival of a Russian military mission in Taiwan; no bet goes beyond 1985.

In witness to the anguish of Peking's decision-making process, we now see it encouraging a reluctant America to stay in Asia. Not from any love of the Occidental presence, to be sure; but rather from the certain knowledge that Russia can fill the consequent vacuum quicker than China.

Beyond and above all this is the pre-existing commitment to rural techniques. That is no longer just a commitment based on conviction of effectiveness; rather it is the achievement record and the status symbol of a hard-pressed and ageing power elite. China, in such a context, may resort to a middle course--targetting the provincial cities rather than the national capitals. It would make sense, especially if taken in conjunction with a revived expansionist programme against bordering neighbours, and revived Chinese territorial claims.

Such an operation conducted for example in Thailand, could have the following features:

* Recognition of present and growing Russian pre-eminence already gained among Thai Communists in the South, between Bangkok and the Malaysia border, and consequent concentration of Chinese effort north of Bangkok.

* Maintenance of a low profile in Bangkok itself, lest the students be disturbed, and the Russians invited to help.

* Maintenance of the momentum already generated by the rural insurgent operation in Northern Thailand, linked logistically with Yunnan by the almost completed road through Laos. (The current proposal for supply of crude oil by a pipe-line which would follow much the same track could, if followed through, reverse Thailand's orientation industrially and demographically.)

* Emphasis on development of Overseas Chinese commercial operations, and supporting bank infrastructure, in major provincial towns.

The Peking banking operations in Asian capitals have been well enough exposed to result in their curtailment and sometimes expulsion. These were major intrusions into the economic and political balance of the countries concerned, conducted at national level, and within the national capitals.

Less visible, and rarely acknowledged even where known, are the provincial banking operations. Myitkyina in the Kachin State of northern Burma is an example. There the locally established Communist Chinese bank advanced attractive loans on one condition: the borrower's son would go to China for his education. Such arrangements emphasized, but were not confined to, local residents of Chinese extraction — the same people who handle the regional network of commerce which transcends national boundaries and national policies.

Having regard to its own elements of strength, and its interior lines posture, China's purpose would perhaps best be served by a strategy of provincial urban insurgencies supported from the adjacent countryside — a speed-up and a telescoping of the present rural strategy. The Philippines operation in Jolo shows the way: suborning of some local officials; key elements emplaced inside the town, sometimes being the officials themselves; logistics inside the town also; and finally the mass manpower brought in from the rural areas for the kill. The aim is a single swift blow which would seize the apparatus of administration, and challenge the government to dislodge the insurgents. In the Jolo operation, the government response has gone close to becoming the classic case of "destroying the town to save it." This, while not so welcome an outcome as immediate local victory, is an acceptable second-best for the insurgents, because it can be manipulated at home, in the Region and throughout the world to produce sympathy. Sym-

pathy in turn translates into resources for them, and denial to the government; and the eventual outcome is political recognition for whatever *de facto* administration the insurgents are able to establish. Such recognition is generally cumulative; few insurgencies having been so accorded and later failed are ever downgraded by their sponsors (most commonly after a failure the act of recognition simply becomes non-operative).

China's angle would therefore appear to be to derive the maximum mileage from a combination of the ongoing rural insurgency techniques with a new element based on commercial suborning of provincial officials, the whole operation being conducted at a profile level just low enough to avoid forcing the government to invoke US or Russian assistance. The degree of risk in this latter element would vary with: the distance of the target province town from the capital (therefore varying within the country); the quality of the increasing Russian presence in the area (therefore varying from one country to another); and the quality of the residual US presence in the area (again varying from one country to another).

In the case of the selected example, Thailand, we could expect to see targetted the province capitals, as far south as and probably including Korat. Bangkok and the province capitals further south would not be targetted in any Peking-sponsored operation, however. At this point it should be explained, and it will certainly be obvious to those who know Thailand, that none of the provincial capitals, even Chiang Mai or Korat, are now of a population and area that would qualify them for potential urban insurgencies. They, and indeed every town in South-East Asia other than the national capitals (except perhaps Surabaya) are as yet too small. But they will soon grow; partly as a response to the technological and demographic pressures mentioned earlier, and partly as government response to a foreseen national strategic need. Of that, more will be said later.

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THE RUSSIAN ANGLE: Russia's operating method — tactics and techniques — will be an outgrowth of her strategy for the Region, itself an outgrowth of her global strategy. Consequently, it may bear little resemblance to Russian-sponsored methods in other places or in earlier times. We remind ourselves that the first post-war insurgencies in Malaya and the Philippines were Russian-sponsored, and were rural.

Russian strategy in South-East Asia is to build the southern arm of a double envelopment of China. This is a combination of follow-up of the withdrawing US presence, and a move of Soviet naval power into the Indian Ocean. For the latter, bases are needed for sustained maritime operations, and for entry to the hinterlands of the littoral States with commerce, politics, and, in due course if necessary, troops. But these potential bases, heritages of the colonial past, are in almost all cases sea-port capital cities. And the establishment of a "presence" means, at least temporarily, the maintenance of the *status quo*, and indeed the support of the *status quo* authority — a wry turn of events for Moscow, but one which their developing sophistication and continuing pragmatism seem well able to absorb.

Russia's strategic philosophy would therefore appear to indicate emphasis on developing for itself a position of influence in the national capital, in which its traditional areas of operation — trade unions, academic organizations and cultural bodies, plus individual personnel of the communications media — would even here present the best prospects. Russia's dual aim in according priority to these operating areas would be to build a "good guy" image (which would cost them little) and to ensure the exclusion of the rival Chinese, who would later seek to occupy the same areas. The Russians' "good guy" posture would also serve to gain them at least limited entry to the bureaucracies, and most specifically those agencies concerned with internal security — police, communications, transport, information, education and public health. A helpful posture in those areas, particularly in a climate of diminishing US economic and increasing Chinese political pressure, could hardly fail to find reciprocation in administrations under mounting tensions deriving from internal circumstances over which they have less than effective control, and external circumstances of which they are the helpless victims.

We may therefore expect to see elements in the unions, academic institutions, cultural bodies and politics which are formally indoctrinated and organized, and indeed trained in readiness for rapid urban action in a moment of crisis. Such a moment was the Thai student effort of October 1973, but the organization to develop it did not exist. We can hardly expect that such a lapse will be allowed a second time. The Russians will be acutely aware that if they are not ready to move in, the Chinese will at least try.

The essential elements are organization, training, equipment and funds. The organization can be expected to proceed in the long-proven effective areas indicated above. It will almost certainly be low-profile, the degree of exposure (clandestine, pro-Communist, or overt Communist) depending upon the development of Soviet strength in the region. Great care will be taken to avoid premature exposure, and hence possible destruction as in Indonesia in 1965. Training would most likely be off-shore, and restricted to key personnel. Equipment and related funding provision would be facilitated by a parallel policy of aid equipment to government agencies. We would expect the Russians to avoid the major pitfall of American policy which made all such equipment local national property on arrival. There would most likely be an agreement permitting Russian depots to exist from which stores could be drawn for the needs of the local administration, but which would also serve the needs of Russia's political clients.

Switching from US to Russian military support is apparently less traumatic than some strategists have believed. It has been done (back, forth and now back again) in Indonesia, and very recently in Peru. Burma switched from British to a mixture of Yugoslavian, American and other. Several of the African States show a careless diversity in their choices of munitions supply provided it is free or nearly so. Closer to home, Vietnam survived a transition from French to American suppliers, and could transfer back again in the future.

All the foregoing would be lubricated by a planned Russian policy of cultivating selected local officials, having regard to the position and vulnerability of each. As in Jolo, such officials could even (at least initially) be part of the operative structure of the eventual urban insurgency. Their presence, and the need for Russian aid, could effectively conceal the dimensions and possibly even the existence of the operation, with those responsible for national security being unable to see, or unwilling to see, or partners in the Russian project from venality, or perhaps from a genuine conviction of its necessity.

The operation as outlined above would be quick, relying for its effectiveness on sound insurgent preparation and a degree of local sympathy. It would be aimed essentially at the capital city. Involvement of provincial cities would depend upon their size and the sophistication of national communications; the smaller the cities and less sophisticated the communications system, the less need for provincial involvement. Again using Thailand as example, there would be no need for a provincial operation in that country's present situation. And indeed the more the need for action in the provinces, the less the prospects of success for this variant of the operation. We can therefore expect Russian interest, and advice and aid, to be directed towards a greater urban emphasis favouring the national capital and making a single target for a rapid operation vulnerable to their own conceptual need.

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THE UNITED STATES ANGLE: It is difficult to visualize plausible US response to either the Chinese or the Russian styles of operation. Several negative factors influence the US position. First there is the now evident US withdrawal from the area (policy statements to the contrary regardless). This has developed a momentum of its own. Perhaps it is not irreversible, but there is no potentially reversing element in sight. Second, there is the expressed desire of Washington's restive new associate, Peking, for the US to stay in Asia to avoid an accelerated Russian entry. There is nothing in the current US posture which suggests that any re-thought "stay" technique would contain the ingredients of an anti-Chinese position in support of a local government; rather the contrary. With what is left of US aid focussing on development, oriented through banks and swinging wildly away from any project that could be labelled "security," Washington is only helping to ripen the fruit for

someone's later plucking. Third, the US position of *detente* with Russia, giving Moscow relief in the West while it turns against China in the East, exposes South-East Asia to a Russian strategic drive now about to be made fully possible by the US-engineered opening of the Suez Canal. Washington has taken the weight off NATO, and allowed it to fall on a harassed SEATO which is trying hard to regroup and assume a new role and a new posture. It can be argued that there is inconsistency between the Chinese arm of US strategy and the Russian arm. Unfortunately the evident inconsistency does not remove the fact. Fourth, the world's developing nations, now dreaming that they hold in their raw material resources the key to the world's future, are making an understandable but critical error. Led by the oil-producers they are raising their prices to a level which is forcing the US back on its own resources, of which it still has enough, as has Russia, thereby removing the only remaining incentive for a continued US presence, i.e. commerce. If the nations of any region want to keep the US around as a hedge against Russia or China, they would be well advised to keep the price of their commodities right. The future for them otherwise is unsaleable products, and consequently no development, leading to attempted reversion to subsistence economy, failure of the attempt because of expanded populations, starvation, political disaster, and Communist take over.

Unfortunately, there is already sufficient evidence to indicate that Russia can and will continue to provoke the Arabs to maintain their oil prices after reinstating oil supply to the West at the new high price levels. This will have a domino financial effect, the most probable outcome of which is the grim sequence outlined above.

Also unfortunately, with the Nixon doctrine of no troop presence, and US Congressional antipathy to support of police and related operations, the internal security status of the Region comes under serious threat to which the only visible answer is "go it alone" or call for one Communist to help against the other. "Go it alone" has a poor prognosis. Moreover, it is unlikely to be accepted as a regional policy by all the nations concerned. And one break in the front would be enough.

The angle of the United States insofar as the nations of South-East Asia are concerned would appear to be to regard them as expendable in the broader and more significant context of Western security. Any serious effort to resist either a Russian or Chinese initiative is not on the cards. On the other hand, development aid may continue, though not as a planned response to the situation here under review. We have referred to it as ripening the fruit; but, if wisely handled by the local governments, and given time for its economic benefits to work into the political fabric, it could yet form a significant security contribution. There is still a place for the US in South-East Asia-if it will accept it.

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IT is becoming evident that the problem for local governments, particularly with South-East Asia continuing to suffer from the impact of the Vietnam war on international politics, is not so much the handling of a possible urban insurgency, but rather how to do it within the constraints, both real and imaginary, that will temper the nature and degree of preparatory and counter action.

The problem is easing somewhat with the attention of the media turning elsewhere, and with a growing realization that sensitivity to US public opinion may have been a critical element in the days of US aid measured in tens of billions and applied direct, but that now, with minor aid and indirect application (via regional banks, etc) there is little pressure a US ambassador can apply. We can therefore expect the regional governments to handle these problems with gloves off, and with a measured disregard for world opinion-at least its Western variant.

On the other hand, we should not expect an immediate and radical departure from the tactics and techniques of internal security developed in an earlier era of American aid. The agencies will, at least in the first phases, be hostage to their equipment, doctrine and training-all largely US in origin and rural-oriented. Much of these, with minor adaptation, are reasonably applicable, certainly when applied in the context of the primary counter-insurgency maxim that "the only good counter-insurgency operation is one that never needed to start." Prevention is better than cure.

Prevention, in the presence of externally supported subversion, assumes an alert anticipation, which requires an effective political intelligence police-apparatus (Special Branch, in the British idiom) with a credible counter-action capability. And that, in turn, must run with an acceptable economy, which does not mean affluence but rather an evidently fair distribution of necessities.

Those two elements are fundamental. They can however only be expected to develop and work effectively in a feasible climate. And concrete jungles are not that. The difficulties, and hence the expenses, of urban security operations, after a certain point (which for South-East Asia can be taken as 500,000), increase not in direct but in square proportion to population growth. With high populations, and more particularly with high population densities, urban security can become impossibly expensive. Budget limitation then tempts authorities to short-cuts, which inevitably take the shape of calculated risks or unconstitutional diversions. Both are potentially disastrous.

The solution, fortunately within the achievement scope of all the governments concerned except Singapore, is to limit the growth of the national capital, and to plan for regional development. This simultaneously limits the success prospect of a single major urban insurgency, and lowers the threshold of politically dangerous economic distress. While thereby keeping at bay the Russian ploy, as we described it above, it does however tend to maintain a degree of vulnerability to the Chinese ploy.

There is no obvious course which protects against both the Russian Scylla and the Chinese Charybdis. The degrees of lean, one way or the other, must be estimated (one can hardly say calculated) by the governments concerned at the appropriate times. But it can be said now that emphasis on the development of regional population centres is a course which leaves the elements of the situation at manageable dimensions and in the government's own hands, while the acceptance of a *laissez-faire* growth of the capital will produce major economic and hence political pressures whose manipulation by outside forces is readily possible and unacceptably dangerous.

Let us assume that the regional decision has been made. What of the implementation? There are immediate and apparent advantages: the government has a visible (and one must assume viable) project; it has momentum; and hence it has the initiative in its own area of responsibility. This is formidable leverage, not least because in the time-frame of a typical national operation (say five to eight years) it confers upon itself a political period of grace, a "wait and see" status, in which it is increasingly difficult for an insurgency to gain and maintain public interest in a programme of its own, except by terror which, though standard insurgency procedure, is yet counter-productive.

Using its grace period, and the more relaxed conditions of the provinces, the government can plan and implement urban development projects which would be quite impracticable in the capital zone. Specifically, settlement and building regulations can be drafted which would render new housing and industrial projects tactically controllable. Buildings can be sited and designed with defence and administration in mind. Services (telephone, electricity and water) can be made selectively controllable. Tops can be cleared for helicopter landings, ground levels raised on piles and left open for visibility and fields of fire. Major apartment blocks can be organized as administrative and commercial units. All this, and other like measures, can be done by a government in its own time, its own way, rather than allowing uncontrolled urban ghettoes to develop by default.

In summary, the action programme for the concerned government is:

* adapt the political security techniques of rural operations to urban operations,
* prepare emergency legislation and hold it in reserve,
* limit further growth of the national capital,
* emphasize provincial urban and industrial development programmes.

* seize the initiative-political and economic-by announcing and implementing a national-level development programme of several years duration.

Meanwhile, within the capital zone itself, steps should be taken to reduce the operational risk by recognition of threat areas (both geographic

and functional) and working quietly to reduce them. Specifically: obvious targets should be unobtrusively strengthened-banks, media facilities, transportation control points and operational headquarters; existing ghettoes should be cleared by resettlement in suburbs; road access to danger areas should be improved for fire-fighting and police reinforcement; sports fields should be multiplied-they are useful for emergency troop deployment facilities and helicopter landing sites; and, most particularly, a thorough tested plan and organization should be developed to cope with areawide arson and roof-top gunfire. With the decks thus cleared, constitutionally and physically, the government would be in position to act effectively.

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THE proposals outlined above can be implemented by a government as overt security measures. They can also be implemented as a genuine plan for economic and social development in the areas concerned. The latter policy may be somewhat slower, but it is better and surer, and in the climate of this day, there is probably still time. The former policy on the other hand, while faster, carries with it risks and uncertainties which are better avoided.

The formulation of foreign policy in respect of relations with Russia, China, the United States and regional associates need not delay decisions on recognition of the problem, and appropriate action. The steps outlined above, in their political/economic aspects, can be initiated without compromising or predisposing any national position. Such a project, even if begun this year would not emerge as a significant political factor until 1977. By that time the geopolitical writing now forming on the world's wall may be readable to almost all-time enough, then, if necessary, to take the alignment decisions which would determine the final shape of this operation.

It is appropriate to restate the caveat that this paper does not purport to be a study of techniques; rather it is a review of the conditions in which urban insurgency may be expected and counter-insurgency conducted. The aim has been to demonstrate that, given the essential stability of a competent internal security apparatus-which includes police and military components- the onset and the handling of a potential urban insurgency situation is more a matter of social economics than of weapons. The problem, even when externally generated, can be anticipated, minimized, contained and eventually eradicated by a well-prepared national economic operation planned with the security aspect built into the concept formulation.

There remains one final point. We referred earlier to the South American experience, and accorded it a credible "guerrilla" if not "insurgent" status. We have observed recently a rash of incidents in the Americas and in Europe which have kept the Press and the police occupied and we have learned of attempts by some of the hostile elements to unify for combined action. We must here repeat our initial warning: for South-East Asia, these symptom displays do not point to the major threat. The real danger for this Region is a re-orientation of existing Communist machinery, of either breed, into an urban-insurgency posture; and the point to watch for its onset is Singapore.

URBAN INSURGENCY *(11): During the past two years Bangkok and Singapore have witnessed armed operations by non-indigenous agents of the Palestinian cause. These terrorists – and those attacking their own homelands – can call upon a wide international network for support and sustenance.*

The International Terrorist

Richard Clutterbuck

DESPITE the kidnapping incident in Singapore in February 1974, South-East Asia has so far seen less of the international urban terrorist than have Europe, North and South America and the Middle East, where political assassination, hijacking, kidnapping of diplomats and hostages for ransom or for political ends, and the time bombs and fire bombs have become almost commonplace. One reason for this may be that South-East Asia has for 30 years been the main theatre of activity of the *rural* guerrilla, and traditions die hard even in the revolutionary world. A stronger reason, however, may be that to the international terrorist the pickings – both financial and political – seem less tempting (7). At the same time, South-East Asian countries have the reputation – whether deservedly or not – of being more ruthless in dealing with violent political criminals than most other countries.

It would nevertheless be unwise to be too sure that this relative immunity will continue. Urban terrorists (if one includes the aircraft as an extension of the urban environment) operate more and more on an international scale, and the innocent victims and countries involved often have no connexion whatever with the terrorists, or with their political movements, or with the Governments they are trying to coerce, or even with the segment of world opinion they are trying to influence.

This became apparent as early as February 1969, when the Palestinian Freedom Front selected Switzerland, the very prototype of a peaceful and neutral country without political rivals or enemies, for one of its earliest attacks on an aircraft at an international airport. The only credible explanation of this choice was that – for these very reasons – the Swiss were lax in their airport security and could be expected to be gentle and humane if they captured the terrorists – as proved to be the case. They even arrested and tried with scrupulous fairness a security guard who killed one of the terrorists. This humanity and justice has not, however, given Switzerland immunity from selection as a stage for further incidents.

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IN assessing whether it will spread more into South-East Asia we must ask ourselves first whether international terrorism is really increasing, or whether its magnification in the media simply gives a false impression that it is; and secondly, if it is increasing, why this is so.

Whether violence as a whole is increasing is arguable. From the viewpoint of a historian the killings by individual political terrorists in the 1960s and 1970s will seem small compared with the killings in the limited and civil wars (in the Middle East, Nigeria, the Indian Sub-Continent and Vietnam) in the same period and these in turn will seem trivial in comparison

with the legalized slaughter of the First and Second World Wars, and the great genocides in Russia and Germany in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. And there are many places (in Burundi, for example, in central Africa) where tens of thousands of people have been killed without attracting more than passing attention in the world's Press.

All this slaughter, massive and loathsome as it was, falls into a different category from the international terrorism we are now concerned with. International terrorism differs from war in that the killers are small groups of individuals who enter the day-to-day activities of the public - boarding aircraft, waiting for buses, going to work or shopping in the streets - usually masquerading as ordinary members of the public and then suddenly turning upon them to shoot or kidnap or surreptitiously to plant a time-bomb and leaving it to blow up whom it may. This may be neither more nor less reprehensible than impersonally dropping a bomb from 30,000 feet or firing a shell from a 155 mm gun many miles away but it is different in its psychological effect and in its effect on society.

International terrorism of this type has undoubtedly increased and is likely to go on doing so, chiefly because it is so often seen to pay. A government which, in a conventional war, would scorn a demand for surrender knowing that the subsequent bombardment would kill thousands of its citizens will readily surrender to three or four urban guerrillas rather than allow a hostage to be killed in cold blood, and public opinion - irrationally - often demands that it should so surrender. The surrender may be made even more readily if the country concerned has no vital interest in either the terrorists or their targets - as when the Austrian Government submitted to such blackmail to close the Schonau Transit Camp for Russian Jews *en route* for Israel in September 1973. This is one of the factors which makes the international stage so much more attractive to the terrorist than the target country itself - especially if that country is as tough as Israel.

Governments, however, are often tougher than commercial firms in resisting demands for money ransoms for kidnapped hostages. The US Government has made it clear that no ransoms will be paid, and out of 27 foreign service officials kidnapped 10 have been murdered - though without this firmness the total number might well have been much larger. By contrast, *Exxon* paid $14.2 million for one of its executives in April 1974 to the Argentinian "ERP" group, which is reputed to have extorted $30 million in ransoms in all."

Such fantastic pickings as these offer a lure to criminal as well as to political groups. There is already evidence of collaboration between them, both in the USA and in Latin America, and there is at least a suspicion now that some of the groups have no real political motivation at all and are just in the business for cash.

Another reason to expect more growth of international political violence is that it brings publicity to its cause out of all proportion to the effort involved. At Munich in September 1972, eight Arab terrorists, kidnapping and later killing eleven Israeli Olympic athletes, probably had an audience of 500 million people glued to their television screens, hooked by satellite from all around the world. Even though 99.9 per cent of those watching were probably filled with revulsion, many were probably made aware of the Palestinian cause for the first time and perhaps a tiny percentage in each country actually felt some sympathy. Even 0.1 per cent of 500 million is a lot of people.

A further reason for growth is the readiness of the Libyan Government to support guerrilla movements whose activities are likely to weaken, embarrass, coerce or disrupt nations which they regard as unfriendly - or which maintain relations with Israel. This makes a great many countries potentially vulnerable. More will be said later about this kind of foreign support, and also about a different kind of foreign support - the provision and exchange of facilities, weapons, instructors, money etc. by other guerrilla groups. This too contributes to the increase of international terrorism.

Coupled with this is the growing ease with which revolutionaries of all kinds can travel - to undergo training, to provide expertise or simply to help and gain experience and ideas. Ideas travel more easily too, through the media and through the distribution of literature (like the *Anarchist Cookbook* which gives do-it-yourself instructions for making guns, bombs, fuses etc.). Foreign governments are again ready to help with

this distribution, but no less important is the spread of ideas quite innocently by radio and television news and current affairs programmes.

Finally, perhaps the strongest reason of all for the spread of urban guerrilla violence is that urban society becomes ever more vulnerable to it. The most obvious example is the jet aircraft, whose passenger-carrying capacity becomes bigger every decade. The power in the hands of a gunman in a "Jumbo" jet is more horrifying than in a *Boeing-707* and that in turn much greater than in an old unpressurized *Dakota* which could limp home with half the fuselage blown out. The same applies to public utilities in a city; a generation ago an electric power stoppage was little more than a nuisance. Now it can quickly spread chaos, disease and death.

In many respects the cities in the developing world are more vulnerable than the older cities in the developed world, because their newly constructed and rationalized utility systems are more interdependent, and because the effect of their disruption is compounded by a tropical climate. Moreover, the drift to the cities is making world society more urban and more insecure. It is significant that the continent most plagued by the urban guerrilla is Latin America, where all these trends are most marked. Ominously, the same trends are apparent in the vast and growing cities of South-East Asia.

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BEFORE examining how the international terrorist organizations work, another question must be asked: why is it that they so often operate outside not only their own countries but also outside their target countries?

In the case of Palestinians this is explained largely by the ruthless efficiency of Israel in countering them, and in controlling the (still substantial) Arab population in Israel itself. As a result, even the Palestinian Arabs living in the occupied West Bank give little or no support to the guerrillas. Since the Palestinian guerrilla movements have made the Bedouin community in Jordan as much their enemy as they have the Israelis, they have no haven there either. If they operate across the Israeli border (as they did when they killed 18 Jews in a block of flats near the frontier on 11 April 1974) the reprisals against their bases in the Lebanon may cost them more losses than they can bear. The Palestinian terrorists usually, therefore, operate a healthy distance away from Israel and its neighbouring countries. In recent years there have been operations in Japan, Singapore, Africa, Europe and the Americas – many more than in Israel.

This trend may spread to other terrorist groups – for the same reason that the Palestinians chose Zurich in 1969. Target countries will increasingly react by tightening their security, so terrorists will attack their aircraft in far away places or try to induce other countries – themselves not vitally affected – to influence the target countries. Cities with large international airports, such as Djakarta, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Saigon, Hong Kong and Manila, may be increasingly regarded as ripe plums.

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THE incident which began in Singapore in February 1974 is as typical as any of the pattern of the modern mixture of international terrorism. The facts of the case will be well known to South-East Asian readers. A mixed group of Palestinians and Japanese terrorists attacked an oil refinery on an island off Singapore. Though they failed to do serious damage they captured some hostages and held them afloat in a ferry. The Singapore Government stood firm and kept the ferry under surveillance so the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine switched the pressure to two other countries by occupying the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait, holding members of the staff as hostages. The Japanese Government responded by providing an aircraft from Tokyo to fly the terrorists from Singapore to Kuwait. The Kuwaitis initially refused them permission to land but gave way in the face of a threat to kill the Japanese Embassy staff.

Perhaps the most disturbing in its implications of all urban guerrilla incidents was that at Lod Airport (Tel Aviv) on 30 May 1972, not only because it again demonstrated the extent of the international terrorist collaboration but also because it was a reminder of the existence of quasi-religious fanatics, ready to kill indiscriminately for no motive which was comprehensible to ordinary people, and a re-

minder that the Palestinians were ready to employ such men to do their work for them. All three were Japanese and the only one who survived- Kozo Okamoto - gave a full account of his actions, claiming justification and expressing no regret.

Okamoto had joined an extreme left-wing organization in Japan in February 1970. This was called "the United Red Army Organization" and was dedicated to the destruction of "bourgeois society" by wholesale slaughter, which its members are willing to do not only to their own people but to anybody anywhere in the world.

In September 1971 Okamoto agreed to help the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and began to study their organization. In February 1972 he flew from Tokyo via New York to Paris, familiarizing himself with the security arrangements in an *El Al Boeing 707* on the way. He then flew on to Lebanon, where he joined two other Japanese (also members of the Red Army) and they received intensive training in the use of Czeck *Kalashnikov* assault rifles and also of explosives and grenades. On 16 May they were warned for an operation to take place in the airport at Tel Aviv.

On 22 May they flew to Frankfurt where they were issued with forged passports. They then went on to Rome, where they were each provided with a suitcase containing a *Kalashnikov* rifle, ammunition and grenades. On 30 May they boarded an *Air France* aircraft, into which their suitcases were loaded without search. In the baggage hall at Lod, they collected their suitcases, removed their guns and indiscriminately shot down 101 men and women of whom 24 were killed. Most of these happened to be Puerto Rican pilgrims on their way to Jerusalem. Two of the Japanese killed themselves or each other and Okamoto was arrested. At his trial in Israel, he exalted in his deeds and expressed a desire to die, but was sent to prison for life. In a "political testament" to the court, he gave some vague clues as to his motives; such as

> Revolutionary war is warfare for justice, which I define as creating a society with no class struggle. War involves slaughtering and destruction. We cannot limit warfare to the destruction of buildings. We believe that the slaughtering of human beings is inevitable..... The Arab world lacks spiritual fervour, so we felt that through this attempt we could probably stir up the Arab world.

In the mounting of this operation, guerrilla or revolutionary groups evidently played an active role in four countries - Japan (for the terrorists), Lebanon (for the training and organization), Germany (for the forged passports), and Italy (for the guns). The guns came from Czechoslovakia but presumably these were bought. There were probably also staging organizations in other cities, including New York and Paris. Whether these organizations were manned by immigrant Arab workers or students, or by indigenous groups such as the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany is uncertain.

The other forms of international terrorism are rather more traditional. The Palestinian Black September movement has attempted a number of straight political assassinations - as usual, far from their own country. In their first ever operation in London in 1971 they tried and failed to assassinate the Jordanian Ambassador; later in Cairo, they did succeed in assassinating the Jordanian Prime Minister. Meanwhile diplomatic kidnappings (such as that of the British Ambassador to Uruguay, Sir Geoffrey Jackson) seem to have declined in favour of the kidnapping of commercial executives, probably because, as described earlier, their ransoms are easier to get.

Bombing and fire-raising are more commonly used by terrorists operating in their own countries, like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) - though during 1973-74 the IRA began to switch to attacks in England.

When they are operating inside their own countries, urban terrorists tend to follow the philosophy expounded by the Brazilian, Carlos Marighella, before he was killed in 1969. Marighella defines the aim as being to provoke repression, by making it impossible for the government to govern without repressive methods, such as curfews, searches, arrests and detention without trial. At the same time the terrorists make a concerted attempt to render the normal process of law unworkable by intimidating (and sometimes killing) witnesses, juries, magistrates and judges, so that they dare not give evidence or convict. The general public becomes incensed

and, to prevent a violent backlash - with vigilante groups taking the law into their own hands - the government is forced to introduce more arbitrary forms of law. At the same time the terrorists bomb and burn so that shops and factories are closed, and unemployment grows. The overall effect is to make life for ordinary people, in Marighella's words, "unbearable." This is designed to create sympathy for the guerrillas and also to increase the number of their recruits. The final stage is the creation of a "climate of collapse" in which the government gives way. Thus a terrorist group pursuing the philosophies of Carlos Marighella provides troubled waters in which foreign governments may find it profitable to fish.

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THE support of urban guerrilla activities - whether in the target country or elsewhere - has now become one of the commonest methods whereby governments exert violent influence without actually making conventional war and is likely to remain so as it offers a much higher dividend at lower risk than the threat of straightforward invasion - by uniformed soldiers, tanks, aircraft or ships. There is nothing particularly new about supporting guerrillas operating internally in an enemy country. The technique has long existed as part of bigger wars - especially in the form of encouraging resistance to armies of occupation. The original *guerrilla* in Spain in 1808-12 was fostered by the British against the French army of occupation. The British again supported the resistance movement in France and other countries occupied by the Germans in 1940-44, and the British and the Americans armed and supported guerrillas fighting the Japanese all over South-East Asia. Communist guerrillas in South-East Asia since the Second World War have had the same kind of foreign support, though this time it has come from Communist countries and has generally been aimed at fostering the overthrow of governments of independent States rather than against foreign armies of occupation. In all these cases the guerrillas - almost entirely rural guerrillas - have been operating in their own or in immediately adjacent countries.

Elsewhere in the world the guerrillas operate mostly in or from urban areas but they also receive support from foreign governments, notably from Colonel Ghadafi's Government in Libya which seems ready to support any guerrilla movement from the extreme right to the extreme left. Colonel Ghadafi is not short of money, and cares little whether the guerrillas operate in their own country (like the IRA) or predominantly outside it (like the Palestinians).

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FOR the urban guerrilla, the fraternal support he can get from other sympathetic revolutionary groups may be even more important than the support he gets from foreign governments. These groups may be indigenous or immigrant, and may include not only those in the target country, but also groups in other countries through which the terrorists pass on the way - as was described above in the example of the Japanese at Lod Airport. The services such groups provide range from the supply of guns, ammunition, explosives, and detonators, all of which may be more easily acquired by theft inside the target country than smuggled in from overseas; forged papers; stolen cars with false number plates; guides; and - above all - a Safe House from which to operate. This may consist of no more than a small room or apartment, and possibly a garage or shed in which cars can be loaded and bombs prepared. The Safe House often offers the police intelligence services their best opportunities for detection of an intended operation - particularly if the guerrillas have links with the normal criminal network for the provision of explosives or stolen cars.

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MORE often, however, international terrorist groups operate independently of the criminal network and this makes them much more difficult to detect as the police may have no leads into their organization. The fraternal groups which offer Safe Houses may consist of immigrant students, immigrant workers or tourists whom the police have no reason to suspect. The number of such temporary residents is now enormous—in 1972, for example, there were 30,000 Arabs in Germany of whom 3,000 were Palestinians. Alternatively the Safe House may be no more than a small back-room temporarily occupied by a group of indigenous students or ex-students. Many students dally with

extremist philosophies at university but the great majority of them put these behind them when they get out into the real world. It is probably a healthy thing for them to get these out of their systems and suppressing them at university will merely increase the number in whom such philosophies take more lasting roots. The number who carry them on into their adult life is minute and the worst thing for a society to do is to increase their number. While the remaining needles in the haystack are hard to find, they will not be made any easier to find by increasing the number of needles—and this would inevitably follow from oppressive policies either in universities or afterwards. Such oppression is just what Carlos Marighella taught his disciples to provoke, with the precise purpose of helping his revolutionary organization to grow.

Understanding the psychology of the terrorist or of the people who give him shelter is as important as understanding his philosophy. In this respect the former British Ambassador to Uruguay, Sir Geoffrey Jackson, has made a major contribution with his book *Peoples Prison* (8). Held by the Tupamaros urban guerrillas in a tiny dungeon for eight months, he was thrown into close and prolonged proximity with his guards, who shared his cellar in shifts of three for three weeks at a time. Speaking fluent Spanish and with a remarkable sense of humour, he got onto human terms with almost all of them by the time their three weeks were up, despite the fact that they wore hoods and he could only see their eyes. Of the 30 or so who guarded him, all but two were students or young graduates. By making them laugh and thereby helping them to endure their own boredom during their three weeks of co-incarceration, he broke through the hard crust which had been formed around their adolescent personalities by Marxist indoctrination, and caught a brief glimpse of the human being who was still just alive inside—only for the chink in the armour to snap shut again at the entry of a third person, or with the click of a rifle bolt at the call to stand to for an emergency. The conclusion was that the superimposition of Marxist indoctrination on a certain kind of idealistic personality can induce a virus which is both poisonous and vicious. Where possible, during school and university, this combination must be avoided. Failing that, the human being must be helped to eradicate the poison before it forms a permanent crust within which the humanity withers and dies—leaving a Frankenstein committed to terrorist violence.

Amongst those whom their society, their parents, their teachers and their friends fail to cure before it is too late, the majority may hitch their violence to a discernible political aim. Others like Okamoto may espouse terror almost as a religion in itself. Either may be ready to die for their politics or their philosophy, so normal deterrence may be ineffective. The greater threat, however, lies in the Okamotos, whom the political terrorist is willing to employ to do what he may not dare to do himself. It was, of all people, the Russian delegate at the United Nations who in 1972 drew attention to the horror of someone like Okamoto getting his hands on a nuclear device.

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THIS Russian comment does illustrate the light at the end of what is otherwise a dark tunnel. This light may still be far away, but it is encouraging that both Russia and Cuba (9) have within the past two years come out strongly against hijackers and have refused them sanctuary. Even more encouraging is the recent swing of the Arab countries in the same direction—especially since their discovery of the much greater power of the oil weapon. Again and again in 1973 and 1974, Palestinian hijackers found every Arab runway blocked against them—even the Libyan runways. In December 1973 the terrorists who had killed 33 people in Rome and Athens while hijacking an aircraft eventually had to bump down in the desert alongside the blocked runway in Kuwait—where they were promptly arrested.

Eventually, as in the case of piracy at sea a century or two ago, air piracy and associated international terrorism can be cured by concerted international action against them. So far, attempts to arrive at a common code in the United Nations have failed, and will continue to fail until all the nations which play a part in international air transport—or almost all—become so hostile to air piracy that they are prepared to treat any of their own citizens who do it as criminals. Peter Clyne, in a thoughtful and constructive book (10), goes further than this and proposes that all participating

nations should subscribe to an international "Air Crimes Commission" which would run its own international court and its own international prison. Members who broke its rules by condoning hijacking would be expelled from it and would be totally boycotted by the rest of the air transport world. All air traffic to the offending country would be cut off, and none of its own aircraft would be permitted to land on other member countries' airfields.

Whether or not the world will eventually be driven to accept such a plan—and the changing attitudes of Russia, Cuba and the Arabs suggest that one day it may—it is very far from accepting it at present. Few Arab countries would yet be ready to hand over an Arab who had hijacked an aircraft to any international court. The idea of handing hijackers over to the country of origin of the aircraft is even more unrealistic. Not only would the Arabs not do so but many European countries would also blench at returning, say, an escaping Czechoslovak to Prague, nor would India be likely to hand over an Indian hijacker to Pakistan.

For the time being, therefore, the world must guard itself against international terrorists of all kinds—including hijackers—in the best way it can. It has already been shown that the very small number of really fanatical terrorists will not respond to a rational deterrent any more than a poisonous snake will respond to a rational deterrent. They must instead be deprived as far as possible of the means and opportunity to kill. This will require much tighter security not only at airports but in urban life generally—and especially tighter control of weapons and explosives. It is perfectly practicable to do this, but it can only be done if public opinion becomes ready to accept the inconvenience and to co-operate not only with the national police forces but with other police forces in dealing with terrorists, even when those terrorists are compatriots. Most people are probably willing to do this but they will have to override vocal minorities.

There is more at stake than just saving lives. Carlos Marighella was no fool. He was correct in his assumption that the most likely response of society to terror is a backlash. Governments will be driven to be more oppressive, and vigilantes will take the law into their own hands. This can be a fatal disease for a free society—as was proved in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. The poison of international terror could kill a way of life, and if it did so there are only two substitutes—the totalitarian tyranny of the extreme left or of the extreme right.

Notes and References

(URBAN INSURGENCY, I and II)

(1) Robert Moss: *Urban Guerrilla Warfare* (Adelphi Papers, No. 79, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, August 1971).
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(2) Dennis J. Duncanson, "The South-East Asian Guerrilla after Detente", *South-East Asian SPECTRUM*, Bangkok, Vol. 2, No. 2, January 1974.

(3) *Editorial Note:* Marighella's "Minimanual of the Urgan Guerrilla" is printed in Moss, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare, op. cit*, and in Jay Mallin, Editor, *Terror and Urban Guerrillas* (University of Miami Press Coral Gables, 1971).

(4) Infantry Training (TT) Manuals are the basic tactical training books used by the British Army (Ed.).

(5) *Editorial Note:* The urban terrorism in Manila leading up to the imposition of Martial Law on 21 September 1972 is described in T.J.S. George, "The Philippines Under Martial Law: the Road Ahead," *Pacific Community*, Tokyo, Vol. 4, No. 4, July 1973.

(6) *Editorial Note:* On his return on 16 February from a nine-day visit to China, then Thai Defence Minister told newsmen that the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai , "stressed that the People's Republic of China does not want to export Communism. He admitted that in the past China had supported terrorists in Thailand to fight for freedom because the former Government was dictatorial and curtailed human rights. But Chou told me that now His Majesty the King has appointed a new Government and a new Constitution is being formed, it is not necessary for China to support the terrorists" (*Bangkok Post*, 17 February 1974). Air Chief Marshal Dawee said he had received assurances that China was not sending weapons to Thai terrorists and that the clandestine radio, *Voice of the People of Thailand*, was not operated from China. Other results of Marshal Dawee's visit included an agreement on sports exchanges and a Chinese commitment to sell 75,000 tons of high-speed diesel oil to Thailand—following up the deal made in December 1973 for China to supply 50,000 tons at November prices. "China is willing to buy all agricultural surplus like rubber and gunny bags from Thailand in order to help us not to suffer heavy trade deficit from the purchase of diesel oil," Marshal Dawee said.

(7) *Editorial Note:* A new dimension may, however, have been added to South-East Asian insurgency techniques when alleged Southern Thai separatists abducted two women missionaries—one British and the other a New Zealander—in Pattani Province on 23 April, and reportedly made subsequent financial and political ransom demands. *Bangkok World* (3 May 1974) reported that the Overseas Mission Fellowship and the Thai Ministry of Interior had confirmed that they had received a letter demanding "a ransom of 10 million baht (US$ 500,000) and a halt to alleged Israeli aggression against Palestinians and Arab countries" as preconditions for the missionaries' release." A second note, allegedly signed by Por Yeh on behalf of the "Pattani Liberation Front" and written in a Malay dialect, demanded, according to *Bangkok Post* (7 May 1974) that the U.S. and Britain "halt all military and economic aid to Thailand.... that the Government halt its 'persecution' of the people of Pattani and 'legalize' their struggle for independence; that Britain and its Second World War allies pay compensation for the families of Malays who died while helping the British defend Malaysia against the Japanese invasion in 1942; that the Government stop calling Muslims "Communists" and recognize them as Malay liberation fighters with a legitimate cause". (The predominantly Muslim provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat were ceded from Malaysia to Thailand in 1946 as part of a post-war agreement under which Thailand also gave 15,000 tons of rice to aid the Malayan population.)

(8) Sir Geoffrey Jackson, *Peoples Prison* (Faber and Faber, London, 1972).

(9) *Editorial Note:* China too, although it opposed the Soviet-and US-supported proposal put forward at the United Nations in November 1972 for an international convention against terrorism, is on record as denying support for acts of terrorism. The Chinese representative, Pi Chi-lung told the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly, during the debate on the proposed convention that: "The Chinese Government is opposed to assassination and hijacking of individuals as a means for waging political struggles and is also opposed to adventurist acts of terrorism by individuals or a handful of individuals divorced from the masses, because they are detrimental to the interests of the cause of national liberation and people's revolution. That has been the consistent stand of the Chinese Government". But China opposed the proposed convention because it would "allow imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, racism and Zionism to use such incidents (of assassinations and hijacking) to vilify and suppress the national-liberation movement and people's revolutionary struggles", Mr. Pi said.

(10) Peter Clyne, *An Anatomy of Skyjacking* (Abelard Schuman, London, 1973).

COUNTER-INSURGENCY: *The recent and dramatic return to the Government side of three-quarters of the insurgents in Sarawak shows the value of according primacy to political objectives in counter-insurgency programmes.*

Sarawak: An Insurgency in Retreat

Douglas Hyde

"A BIG step towards peace" in Sarawak's eleven-year guerrilla war was how the Press described the announcement made by the Chief Minister on 4 March 1974 that 482 men and women, representing 75 per cent of the guerrilla force and including most of their top military and political leaders, had laid down their arms and come out of the jungle.

It was indeed a big step, but it was more than that. The methods used by the Sarawak State Government, under the leadership of Chief Minister Datuk Abdul Rahman Ya'kub and backed by the Malaysian Federal Government, raise a number of points of considerable significance for other governments faced with the problem of insurgency.

Something of the distinctive character of the Government's approach is conveyed by the absence in official statements of any reference to victors or vanquished, winners or losers, victory or defeat. The term "surrender" was specifically ommitted and the world's Press, which had been invited to the capital, Kuching, for the surprise announcement, was asked to do the same and also to avoid the use of "Communist terrorists" or the by now familiar "CTs". Newsmen were told that no prosecutions would follow the ending of hostilities (despite the ambushes and assassinations carried out by the guerrillas in the course of the armed struggle). Nor would there be judicial action taken against those who had collaborated with the Indonesian Armed Forces at the time of Indonesia's "Confrontation" of Malaysia (1963-66).

At peace rallies following the first public announcement and held right across the country the main emphasis was on the progress and development which would now be possible in the new situation created by the end of hostilities.

"Operation Sri Aman", under which the terms of the peace were worked out, came as a direct consequence of the Government's switching from conventional counter-insurgency, with the military primarily responsible for dealing with the problem, to an entirely new approach in which the civilian Government headed an integrated effort with the military playing a subordinate, or supportive, role. It was a switch from a military strategy to a political strategy based upon the literal acceptance of the oft-repeated though rarely practised belief that insurgency cannot be ended by purely military means but only by winning the hearts and minds of the people.

To some it undoubtedly looked like a gamble, but it paid off—and with spectacular speed.

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OPERATION SRI AMAN itself really began on 13 October 1973 when Bong Kee Chok, top leader of the North Kalimantan Peoples' Guerrilla Force and Director and Political Commissar

of PARAKU* sent out from the jungle his younger brother with a letter addressed to the Chief Minister and his deputy Datuk Stephen Yong. It is worth quoting Bong Kee Chok's letter in full since so much flowed from it. It read:

Sirs,

For realization of peace in this State and cessation of war and to carry out reconstruction and development—a mission beneficial to the people, we hereby specially send WONG KEE KUAN, assistant to our peace-talk representative, and his companion to go to see you and to talk and negotiate with your representative (s) for making arrangements for a peace talk.

To enable smooth arrangement for the peace talk, we hope that you would issue them a safe conduct pass and to guarantee that no special agent would be assigned to keep them under surveillance.

With your promise in writing that our personal freedom and safety would be guaranteed, that our representatives would not be arrested nor intimidated by the army or the police or interfered by them in anyway throughout the duration of the peace talk and that they shall be allowed to leave the control of your army and police should the peace talk fail, our representative and myself are willing to try our best to talk with you for a peaceful conclusion.

To enable the peace talk to be carried out with hopeful expectation of success, we suggest that all arrangements in the early stage should be kept as top secret and should not be announced nor propagated.

Your early reply is desired.

BONG KEE CHOK
Director and Political
Commissar, PARAKU.
OCTOBER, 1973

It will be seen that although the Sarawak Coalition Government had been working for precisely the peace for which the Communists were now asking the first approach came from the Communist leaders themselves.

The temptation for a government in such circumstances would be to push its advantage and hold out for the toughest terms possible. It was a temptation which Datuk Abdul Rahman Ya'kub resisted, for to yield to it would have been in conflict with his peace strategy and would have negated the philosophy behind it.

Within three days Bong Kee Chok, along with two bodyguards, was out of the jungle with his safe-conduct pass and meeting the Chief Minister for talks. They did not meet as head of Government and leader of a Communist army and organization but as two men concerned to establish peace and open the way to development and prosperity.

There followed three days of socializing and informal discussion which ended with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in the presence of senior government officer, police chiefs and leading members of the Special Branch. The role of police and Special Branch had been an increasingly positive one which had enabled them to establish direct contact with the guerrillas in the jungle.

At no point were the military brought into the talks and pictures of the signing ceremony make clear that this was a purely civilian occasion.

For the Chief Minister the ceremony represented the achievement of a longed-for goal, for which he had worked and planned and for which he had broken with the accepted, conventional counter-insurgency pattern and made the winning of hearts and minds an end, not just a means to an end. He and those around him had rejected the very term "counter-insurgency", summing up his approach in "We don't just counter; we act, we don't react."

Understandably, therefore, the meeting was an amicable one with the two men getting on well together, each having his own good reasons for wanting to see a quick, honorable and lasting settlement.

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FOR the Chief Minister the issues were clear: above all else he wanted to see Sarawak with its still largely unexplored and unexploited re-

**Pasokan Rakyat Kalimantan Utara—North Kalimantan People's Force.*

sources forging ahead along the road of truly human development—not just a socio-economic rat race. The armed struggle, which Sarawak had inherited from its colonial past, was a major obstacle to this, wasting millions of dollars annually in military operations and punitive action, diverting men, expertise, materials, time and thought to negative, destructive ends when they could be so much better used to bring a good life to the people.

For the Communists peace had become desirable because, quite simply, the armed struggle no longer made sense even in Communist terms. One of the original motivations, the ending of colonial rule, had gone with the achievement of independence through the creation of Malaysia ten years ago. Doubts about the character of Malaysia itself, as a form of neo-colonialism, had been put into a new perspective by the pending establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Malaysia* which implicitly carries with it a recognition of Malaysia as such. The international situation had changed in the 12 years since the Communists first went into the jungle too. There had been the heart-rending conflict between Russia and China; the visit of President Nixon to the Chinese Communist leaders and with it the torpedoing of the concept of America as "Great Enemy Number One".

But the domestic scene had changed too—fundamentally. And this the Communists acknowledged was the work of the present Sarawak Coalition Government. The weaknesses in the administrative set-up, the social injustices and frustrations, the lack of grounds for belief in the culture which had led so many of the guerrillas to take to the jungle as youngsters were now visibly being tackled by government.

A direct consequence of this, which clearly had had a significant effect upon the Communists' thinking, was that in the process the vitally necessary public support which they had formerly enjoyed in decisively important areas and local communities had been swung over to the Government. Public opinion had changed from almost total alienation to a position of neutrality and from this to active confidence in and co-operation with the Government, its intentions, achievements and plans for the future.

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THE resulting Memorandum of Understanding is a fascinating document. Note first the title. It is not an agreement, pact or truce. It lists points raised by Bong Kee Chok and the Government's response to these. Each side states its position even though that may not be by any means identical to the other's. Each respected and accepted the other's position as being held in good faith. Both believed that it should be possible to work towards common goals within the Constitution but no attempt was made to achieve the all-too-familiar appearance of unanimity which in fact conceals deep differences. The Memorandum reflects therefore an acceptance of the proposition that it should be possible for people with different views to work towards their goals by constitutional means.

The Communists asked that the Malaysian citizenship status of PARAKU members be guaranteed and that members who were Indonesian nationals be granted Malaysian citizenship upon application. This latter point was important because a minority of those in the jungle were Indonesian Chinese about whose future the Communists were naturally concerned lest this should include the possibility of extradition.

The Chief Minister, the Memorandum explains, assured them that they would continue to enjoy the rights of citizenship under the Malaysian Constitution if they were already Malaysian citizens.

With regard to those who were Indonesian nationals wanting to become Malaysian citizens, the Chief Minister further explained that under the provisions of the Agreement between the Malaysian and Indonesian Governments, they should in theory be repatriated. However, he assured them that their cases would be taken up with the Indonesian Government with a view to their

**Malaysia officially announced on 21 May that agreement had been reached with China to establish diplomatic relations, and these were formalized ten days later during the visit to Peking of the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak (ed.).*

being allowed to stay in Sarawak, and that their application for Malaysian citizenship would be considered in the normal manner. All those who returned to society would be treated equally and fairly in the same way as any other citizens or other foreigners residing in Sarawak, as the case might be.

Another point—a potentially explosive one—raised by Bong Kee Chok and noted in the Memorandum of Understanding was "that consideration be given by Government to the legalization of NKCP" (North Kalimantan Communist Party).

The Memorandum records that the Chief Minister "explained under the present circumstances the Federal Government considered that it would not be in the interest of the country to permit the registration of any Communist organization. *Ketua Menteri* (Chief Minister) further explained that it would not be possible for the Federal Government nor would it be acceptable to the masses to change such policy. *Ketua Menteri* believed that within the existing framework of our Constitution, it would be possible for anyone to further the people's interest without prejudicing the country's security."

This answer, the Memorandum shows, did not deflect the Communists from their desire to bring the talks to a satisfactory conclusion for it is followed by a number of points on which the two sides agree.

The Chief Minister affirmed that a request would be granted that members of Bong Kee Chok's organization who wished to migrate to other countries would be given permission to do so. He welcomed as a "constructive proposal" the suggestion that a Pioneer Working Brigade "be established to assist the Government in the implementation of its development projects for the benefit of the general masses", noting at the same time that such a body with similar objectives was already in existence in the State. It will be observed that the Communists were thus giving implicit approval to the Government's development programme.

Finally: "Both sides agree that all the arms and ammunitions now in the possession of NKCP members shall be destroyed under the control and supervision of both parties."

The "Understanding" was recorded and reached at Rumah Kerja'an, Simanggang, henceforth to be named "Sri Aman" on 20 October 1973 and signed by Bong Kee Chok and Datuk Haji Abdul Rahman Ya'kub.

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THE talks at Simanggang are reminiscent of those which took place in December 1955 between Chin Peng, leader of the Communist Party of Malaya (MCP), and Tunku Abdul Rahman, Chief Minister of the new Malayan Federation, at the village of Baling, near the border of Thailand. Then, too, both sides were anxious to end the war. But, despite the friendly atmosphere in which the talks were conducted, they nonetheless broke down on the issue of Chin Peng's demand that the Communists should be free to operate as a legal political party in the new Federation.

Understandably, since he had come to bargain, Bong Kee Chok made an early demand in the Simanggang talks that the NKCP be permitted to operate as a legal party. As the Memorandum records, this was turned down on the grounds that no Communist activities or organization could be permitted under the Malaysian Constitution. Here is a fundamental difference between the situation achieved in Sarawak and that of Malaya, 1955. Sarawak's Communists returned to society knowing that whilst they are free to engage in political activity they will not be free to function as Communists. This—with every one of the "returnees" now personally known—should be safeguard enough for any anxious or suspicious security organization charged with combating subversion.

Bong Kee Chok had made his own position clear. His aims, he declared, were what they had always been. He had not suddenly changed his ideological position and nor had his followers. They had under the compulsion of the logic of events come to recognize that nothing was to be achieved by armed struggle, that it had become unnecessary and counter-productive, and that it was possible to work for fundamental change within the Constitution and under the Coalition Government.

One may have one's own thoughts about this. Having met Bong Kee Chok and other returnees I would certainly be of the opinion that a far

greater process of change is at work in their thinking than they themselves realize or, more probably, are prepared to admit to themselves or others. After all, it is never easy for a man to say that he has been wrong for a large slice of his adult life. Still harder for him to admit to himself that all that he endured in the jungle was meaningless, that his slain comrades died in vain. But their willingness to abandon their demand, of fundamental importance to Communists, that the Party be allowed to function legally suggests that a good deal of new thinking has already been done and, once out of the jungle and working positively within society, just building up a new life and, maybe, a new family, may well accelerate the process.

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BE that as it may, Bong Kee Chok and other leading members of the NKCP and the guerrilla force came out of the jungle and were before long working to bring out the largest possible number of their followers. By the time that the public announcement was made on 4 March 1974, nearly 500 had come out. In fact, the number was being changed almost day by day as others joined them and only a few days later a group of 60 were making their final decision to do the same.

By this time the remnant consisted of two main groups, one in a small isolated area in the First Division and the other, rather more scattered, within the Third Division some 200 miles away. To all intents and purposes communication between the two had broken down.

Those in the Third Division had been Bong Kee Chok's own followers and there was every reason to suppose that it was only a matter of time before all would return to society. Some however could not for the time being be reached because they were physically isolated by rivers which were in flood and rendering them totally inaccessible.

The remnant in the First Division was headed by Lim Woh Kwai (code name "M.C."). There is probably some degree of rivalry between the two leaders.

The Government recognized Lim's difficulties. A personal question to which he had to find an answer was, would he lose more face by coming out when Bong Kee Chok had already had so much publicity and had already established himself

outside or would he lose more face—and ultimately perhaps his life as well—by remaining in the jungle?

Another problem was that his bodyguard and immediate associates included a number of Indonesian Chinese. Where those around Bong Kee Chok were as eager as he was to abandon the armed struggle, those nearest to Lim Woh Kwai had therefore strong personal reasons for being very cautious. They and Lim were waiting to see whether the Chief Minister and his Government, and behind them the Federal Government, were in good faith. Would the authorities keep their promises? If their treatment of those who had already come out proved to be in accord with all that they had said then their word could be trusted and their assurances that Indonesian citizens would not be returned to Indonesia could be accepted.

Understanding this, the Government declared the two areas occupied by the remnants to be "frozen". This meant that for the time being, and so long as the guerrillas remained within those areas, no action would be taken against them by the security forces.

This understanding was put to an unexpected test—which it survived—when a unit of the police Field Force came across a boat-load of 24 of "M.C.'s" men breaking out of their frozen area in the First Division. Startled, the guerrillas opened fire which was returned in self-defence causing three casualties amongst the guerrillas. The Field Force, in accord with the general guidance not to go for kills if surrenders were possible, succeeded in cutting off the guerrillas' escape and acquiring 21 Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEPs) as a consequence.

Bong Kee Chok and the other Communist returnees, along with those whom they had been able to contact in the jungle, accepted that once the guerrillas were out of the frozen area the understanding no longer operated and that the Field Force had been entitled to act in the way it did.

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SIDE by side with Bong's very fruitful efforts to bring his followers out went those of a considerable body of SEPs who were working with the Government and had been doing so for some time in growing numbers and with increasing success.

At the time when the main emphasis was on all-out military orientated counter-insurgency the kills had tended to exceed surrenders and captures. With the switch to the new political strategy, and the consequent greater use of police and Special Branch working alone or in small groups with the military, the order was reversed and surrenders quickly outstripped the kills. The value of this became immediately obvious: each kill had in one sense been a loss for dead men can provide neither intelligence nor co-operation —quite apart from the contribution which those who died might conceivably have made to the life of the nation. The SEPs provided both intelligence and co-operation after a brief period of acclimatization and rehabilitation.

The ever-increasing flow of surrenders owed much to the Information Department's service aimed at hearts and minds in three main target groups:

- the general public who needed to know what the Government was doing and why
- the communities, mainly Chinese, from whom the Communists drew the support and recruits and upon whom they depended
- and, of course, the guerrillas themselves.

Messages from SEPs were broadcast by *Radio Sarawak*, taken in leaflet form by the Special Branch and others into the jungle, placed in polythene bags and attached to trees on routes known to be used by the guerrillas.

The SEPs also, along with the Information Officers, went into the Chinese communities, going from house to house as the Communists do, talking to people on their doorsteps—or into Iban longhouses, as the case might be—or addressing them at village gatherings. Always their messages were both personal and factual. Black propaganda was definitely out.

Particularly valuable was the defection of a husband and wife team in September 1973, just one month before Bong made his initial approach to the Chief Minister. The husband had been a military leader of the top rank, the wife a political

commissar. Both were close friends and *confidants* of Bong probably nearer to him than was anyone else. They had already done the rethinking which one assumes the 500 returnees are now doing. They were at once put to work writing appeals and messages to their former comrades and broadcasting to them direct in the jungle.

Their messages were moderate, sympathetic and understanding in tone, concentrating upon a description of what life was like in the new Sarawak rather than upon extravagant denunciations of Communists and Communism. They showed an intelligent respect for the people they were addressing. In short, whilst these might be termed psychological operations in the widest possible sense, they were not psychological warfare.

When psywar is conducted within a strategy conceived and operated by the Security Forces the winning of hearts and minds is, to put it baldly, an adjunct of the military operations. Hearts and minds are important to the extent that, and for as long as, they serve immediate military needs, but may equally be sacrificed without hesitation in accord with those same requirements.

This had been the case in Sarawak, as elsewhere, until the new political strategy went into operation. Now the winning of hearts and minds by direct, sympathetic communication between government and people and by positive achievement in terms of socio-economic development, became a primary aim. So the form and content of the propaganda directed to the various groups were changed accordingly.

The SEPs, like the Information Officers, worked all the more effectively because, not being limited to a sterile anti-Communism, they could still retain their idealism as they saw it being canalized into the drive for change and development. It also led to the interesting situation where the returnees who came out with Bong Kee Chok were prepared to gear their efforts in with those of the SEPs. SEPs who agree to be employed by the government are in my experience normally regarded with hatred and contempt by those who have not similarly surrendered and who have not permitted themselves to be "turned" and used.

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LEST a wrong impression be created I would stress that whilst the approach of the Chief Minister was throughout all the period leading up to Sri Aman understanding and conciliatory he nonetheless provided ample evidence that he was by no means "soft". A striking demonstration of this came in late September, 1973, when "Operation Judas" was launched by the Police in Sibu, which was at that time still a very "hot" area.

Among 28 people arrested and detained between 19 and 21 September were prominent citizens, businessmen, doctors, lawyers, owners of printing presses and respected members of parties within the Coalition Government itself. Under continuing threat to their lives they had been helping the guerrillas. Under pressure doctors had provided antibiotics, drugs and free treatment; sundry shop owners contributed rice and other foodstuffs; proprietors of bookshops and printing presses had handed over to the guerrillas paper and printing ink; big businessmen had contributed substantial cash donations of up to as much as M$10,000 in a single lump sum. Even materials for the manufacture of firearms had been provided.

Warnings by the Chief Minister that he knew what was going on, and appeals to those concerned to come forward, had met with no response. The arrests, which startled and excited the public, had the effect of quickly bringing admissions of their complicity from those arrested and led to other people coming and doing the same. The period of detention was brief for the detained men seemed to have experienced the same sense of relief that a man who has for long been blackmailed must surely feel when the whole thing is brought to a stop.

The fact that the 28 included long-time friends of the Chief Minister himself helped to bring home the message to people both in and out of the jungle that here was a man of very considerable moral calibre and a government which meant business and was above any charge of favouritism or of class bias.

In his 4 March announcement the Chief Minister said: "The Government has always recognized that only through the loyal support and the

co-operation of the rakyat* can insurgency be brought to a meaningful conclusion. This was achieved by the positive policies and actions of the Government towards the common good of the rakyat."

This is the very nub of what may be described as the "Sarawak approach".

Let me, by recapitulating and summarizing, and also by filling in the background on what preceded the introduction of the Coalition Government's political strategy, provide a basis for the reader to make his own independent judgement as to whether this approach is capable of application to other situations of guerrilla warfare elsewhere.

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ALTHOUGH Sarawak is one of many Malaysian States it is in fact rather more since it is almost as large as Peninsular Malaya itself. It has its own history, culture and people, quite distinct from that of the States on the mainland. It has a multiracial society, with the various ethnic groups at different stages of development and, in theory, open to be played off one against another.

Sarawak's terrain is ideally suited to guerrilla warfare in the sense that nearly 90 per cent of the mountainous country is covered with deep jungle; its population of approximately one million is scattered in small, vulnerable jungle communities; communications are bad, most transport being by river with jungle-covered banks providing perfect cover for those attempting to stage ambushes.

It was twice colonized in modern times, first by the British Brooks family who in the 19th Century established themselves as "white Rajahs"; then, after the Japanese Occupation of the Second World War, when it passed to the British Colonial Office. The British withdrew from the scene in 1963 when Sarawak was incorporated into the newly formed Federation of Malaysia.

In the days of the White Rajahs it must surely have been one of the most under-administered countries on earth. The period in which the British Colonial Office assumed responsibility for it was too short for any drastic change to be made.

In the days of the Brooks the quite considerable Chinese immigrant population had been left to its own devices whilst the Malay minority and the indigenous Ibans (largest of numerous indigenous groups) were given preferential treatment. It was a land whose human and material resources remained, like much of its terrain, largely unexplored and unexploited.

In the early 1950s Communist ideas were introduced by people of Chinese origin who had been influenced by, or had actually been involved in China's struggle against Japanese aggression and by the subsequent seizure of power by the Communists. From the start, Communist activity was underground. It would be inaccurate to describe it as illegal since there were seemingly no laws in existence which had anything to say on the matter of Communism.

There was a small police force but no Special Branch. So, with the eruption of trouble in the schools, it was with some astonishment that the authorities learned that a Chinese schoolteacher had succeeded in establishing the Sarawak Overseas Chinese Democratic Youth League in various parts of the country. From the start the League, shortly to be renamed the Sarawak Advanced Youths' Association, produced a prodigious number of publications, all circulating underground, which provided a basis for the formation of an increasing number of discussion groups.

The formation of the social-democratic Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP)—Sarawak's first political party—by two respected and very responsible public figures, Ong Kee Hui and Stephen Yong, provided the semi-fledged Communists with an opportunity to move over to political activity by infiltrating the new party. This they did with considerable success by doing much of the hard work and organizational pioneering required to put SUPP on its feet.

Then, in December 1962, came the Brunei Revolt. By no stretch of imagination could this be called Communist-inspired. It was a rising by Muslims intent upon putting pressure upon their Muslim ruler. No Communist was involved in

**Roughly translatable as "the popular masses", or "the common people".*

it. Nonetheless the British authorities in Sarawak, who still knew relatively little about the size of the Communist movement, reacted strongly to the point of over-reaction on the assumption that armed struggle in Brunei might touch off something bigger and more significant by the Sarawakian Communists.

What followed is all too familiar because it is a pattern seen in one colonial territory after another. Emergency regulations were rushed through, detention without trial was introduced, which meant opening a detested detention camp.

Something of a panic reaction by the authorities led to another on the part of those who actually or supposedly were threatened with arrest. Seeing respected, moderate members of SUPP sent into detention along with militant but non-Marxist leaders of newly-formed trade unions, young Chinese took to the jungle in their hundreds not with the idea of going over to armed struggle but rather to go into hiding to avoid arrest.

Once in the jungle they were now seen as insurgents rather than as subversives.

Like Communists everywhere Sarawak's had talked of revolution and, being Chinese, had studied the lessons of Mao's experience. I have met many of the Communist leaders of that period and I have yet to discover one who supposed that in the Sarawak of 1962 there was anything which, on the basis of Marxist analysis, could justify going over to armed struggle.

I stress these origins of insurgency in Sarawak not only because they are very relevant to the way in which it has been brought to an end but also because, in my opinion, Sarawak's experience typifies that of many others: what might at the start be no more than a situation calling for police action is by a process of over-reaction escalated into an insurgency which in time becomes self-perpetuating.

There are enough in-built problems which, if left unattended or inadequately attended to, can feed a revolutionary movement with recruits in almost any under-developed country today. Certainly that is what happened in Sarawak.

Violence having begun, the Army was sent in and then began the all-too familiar process of "kills", "curfews", food denials, compulsory resettlement, restrictions on movement and residence. The ill-equipped guerrillas, operating with home-made shotguns, engaged in minor ambushes as a means of arming themselves and of telling the world of their existence. The Army responded, as it was expected to do, in orthodox fashion, with all the accepted machinery of small-scale war. A spiral of violence built up.

The Security Forces attempted to deny the guerrillas the food supplies and logistical support essential to their survival. The insurgents then put pressure upon local populations. These in their turn were seen as "guilty" communities upon whom a counter-pressure was exerted by the Army. The insurgents became more ruthless, so did the Army. Anyone with experience of insurgency and counter-insurgency knows the form all too well.

In the early years Sarawak's little Communist organizations undoubtedly drew upon patriotic feelings and some at least of the youngsters who joined the movement felt that they were stepping into an honourable tradition which had also claimed its nationalist martyrs in the past.

The British colonial Power pulled out, Sarawak became part of Malaysia and it was not too difficult for those whose motivation had included a strong anti-imperialist element to feel that this was but a form of neo-colonialism.

Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia provided the inadequately armed and almost totally untrained youngsters with the opportunity to learn the art of guerrilla warfare. They crossed the border into Indonesian Kalimantan (Borneo) where they could have safe bases from which to operate.

With the fall of Sukarno Indonesia, from being a country which appeared to be moving almost inevitably towards Communism, became actively anti-Communist. The friendly border became very hostile indeed with the Indonesian Armed Forces co-operating with those of Malaysia in an attempt to wipe out the Communist border-crossers.

Sarawak's guerrilla force, by now much reduced in numbers, re-established itself nonetheless in the First, Second and Third Divisions of Sarawak. Counter-insurgency was left to the

Army and Police, with no strong lead coming from the civilian government of the time. Year by year the number of recruits to the guerrilla army exceeded eliminations (killed, surrendered and captured). The number in the jungle grew to some 600-800.

When the present Coalition Government under Chief Minister Datuk Haji Abdul Rahman Ya'kub was brought into existence in June 1970, insurgency had become to all intents and purposes a permanent feature of life in Sarawak, holding back economic development and limiting the practice of democracy in a variety of ways.

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THE formation of the Coalition immediately confused the situation for the insurgents in the jungle. For included in it, as one of the senior partners, was the Sarawak United People's Party, with Stephen Yong, its secretary, as Deputy Chief Minister. This was the party to the left wing of which many of those in the jungle had belonged. Moreover, the areas and communities upon which the insurgents had relied as support bases would also be ones which had voted solidly for SUPP. In retrospect one can see that this would in itself create a certain conflict of loyalties within those communities.

It also created a problem with which those combating insurgency on the soil of another country have not had to contend: the alienation of such communities by punitive measures conducted in the name of counter-insurgency would mean a loss of support for the government in power. In such a situation the battle for hearts and minds needs to be more than a war of words. It becomes of strategic, not just tactical importance if one is thinking in terms, as independent, democratic governments must do, of political strategy as opposed to military tactics.

From the start Abdul Rahman Ya'kub was concerned to try to find a way to end insurgency quickly and to get right ahead with ambitious plans for Sarawak's social and economic development.

By 1972 Sarawak had reached the crossroads. Either military measures were going to be built up to a point where there would be an all-out attack upon the insurgents, with no holds barred, or some alternative had to be found.

The Coalition Government under the vigorous leadership of the Chief Minister decided that the time had come to put the matter to the test. If military counter-insurgency was not the answer then the approach to hearts and minds had to be taken very seriously indeed.

A new, political strategy was devised. The whole effort would be brought under civilian leadership with the Chief Minister himself as Director of Operations. Every effort would be made to identify the environmental factors which perpetuated the armed struggle, root causes of insurgency, and the Government would seek the answers to these.

The security forces would provide the necessary screen behind which the Government could carry through its reforms but the political consequences of punitive action would henceforth be borne in mind. An obvious difficulty for the Army in such circumstances is that almost anything it does which is specifically military in character tends by its very nature to lose hearts and minds.

There was a moment when the Army declared its intention of bringing in gunships from Vietnam. This would have meant an immediate escalation of the conflict. The order was countermanded. Symbolizing the whole new approach, however, two little civilian piloted *Bell* helicopters were acquired. They took the Chief Minister, other Ministers in the Government, top Government officials and also agricultural, development, welfare, medical, and information officers into the most remote jungle areas wherever the need was greatest.

The Chief Minister went from one government department to another, from one section of the community to the next, conveying a sense of urgency to those who had too easily accepted the situation as it was, stimulating people to action, giving them a vision of what the successful realization of the State's development plans would mean in practice.

Parallel with this went a carefully planned campaign to ensure that people from top to bottom in government service should get the message. There were briefing sessions for Ministers, Residents, top civil servants; seminars for dis-

trict officers, school teachers, particularly those from the Chinese schools; separate seminars, too, first for heads of all government departments, then Police and Special Branch, then the Army. After that came ones at which military, police and heads of those departments most directly involved were brought together to share ideas, be made aware of each other's problems, see how their various activities dovetailed into each other.

It was at these that the Army in particular brought to light with considerable candour the difficult position in which it found itself when trying to combat insurgency by conventional, and often punitive means in an independent democratic State whose Government was anxious that nothing be done to alienate public opinion. Here was an organization trained to use the mailed fist in a situation where the Government required the velvet glove.

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THE Communist guerrillas in the Third Division, which has Sibu as its largest town and administrative centre, had been growing increasingly bold. They would enter a small jungle-town or village, take over a school for the day, instruct the students to destroy all evidences of "yellow" culture (which could mean the ritual destruction of most of their textbooks), harangue them and then leave. There was the occasion when they took over a college in Sibu town itself. Uniformed guerrillas carrying guns took cash collections on the streets. Police were ambushed within the town boundaries.

With the situation threatening to get out of control, this Division was singled out for special treatment. "Rascom", an integrated, civilian-led command (taking its name from the Rajang River) with the Chief Minister as Director of Operations, was established, with civilian, military and police of equal weight and importance within the "command". The concept of an integrated command was in itself important since it helped to emphasize that the task of finding an answer to insurgency was the responsibility of the civilian arm of government and the civilian population and not just that of the military.

Civic action teams, consisting of medical, development, welfare, agricultural and information officers were sent out to the most remote villages and longhouses, particularly in those areas where the Communists' influence was growing. The Communists had had this field pretty much to themselves ever since the departure of the Commonwealth troops at the end of Confrontation. Now the "CAG" teams moved in, often taking up residence in longhouses for a month or more, establishing a friendly base and what was hoped would be a continuing contact.

Without the formal "command" structure the same concept was adopted and applied in the First and Second Divisions as well. The number of curfews, and the length of their duration, were drastically reduced; joint military and police operations on a small group basis replaced the all-out military efforts of earlier days. Emphasis was put upon captures and surrenders, rather than on kills.

Numbers in the crowded detention camp were run down both by increasing the releases and also by reducing the period of detention. Often those detained were senior schoolboys and girls, still in their early teens and with little knowledge of Marxism or of Maoism, who had been drawn into peripherally subversive activities. Once inside the detention camp, they would rub shoulders with people with a far greater knowledge of Communism than they had ever met before.

In 1972 a new practice was introduced. Students who formerly would have been detained were held for, perhaps, 48 hours or at the most a week or two and given a talking to. In the sympathetic atmosphere most freely acknowledged that they had indeed been playing with fire. Their parents and schoolteachers would then be invited to a little ceremony at which the young students, often to the surprise of their parents, admitted their political involvement, promised to return to their studies and to be good citizens. It ended with a friendly talk from the Chief Minister and a celebration meal in which all participated.

The new, more sophisticated approach of government to people and to problems, demonstrated in so many different ways, filtered through to the guerrillas in the jungle. On the basis of visible and well publicized achievements, and the new, direct relationship between Government and people, a new mood was created among the public at large.

The consequence of all this was Operation Sri

Aman—Operation Lasting Peace; a peace the creation of which depended upon popular support and the continuation of which will rest upon the continuing co-operation of the people and their belief in the Government's intentions.

Meanwhile the fact is that at the end of 1972 the public—and the Army too—were still talking of the armed struggle lasting for another 20 years. By March 1974—15 months later—the big break-through had already come.

WORLD POLITICS: *This article, to which a postscript has been added, comprises part of a paper presented to the annual conference of the Pacific Institute* held in Hong Kong, 4 - 6 December 1973.*



South-East Asia's Global Strategic Context

Frank Mount

GLOBAL interactions between the major Powers had a considerable influence during 1973 on events in the South-East Asian region, as elsewhere. It is likely that this condition will persist for some time, and certainly through 1974.

The principal global factor has been the continuing decline of US power *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union at a time of internal irresolution, if not instability of a sort, within the US. It was in fact this, and America's drift towards isolationism, which, in one way or another, led to and now continues to generate, the "new" diplomacy between the US, USSR, China, Japan and Europe.

The most important and fundamental consequence of the US decline has been in the field of the US/USSR nuclear balance. This in turn has seriously affected the policies, attitudes, and in some cases, actions, of all the big Powers. How each of them views the likely future global, strategic developments or trends and how they assess the probable and possible reactions of the others, are going to have substantial repercussions across the globe.

Essential, therefore, to an understanding of the global position, and the events of last year, is at least a basic appreciation of the dynamics of the US/USSR strategic arms balance. An attempt at a very brief and noncomprehensive, but hopefully not over-simplistic, explanation of the present position and where it leaves the major powers, is hence necessary.

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THE Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT 1) between the US and USSR that concluded in 1972, produced an Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles and an ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty which covered defensive missiles. The Agreement in effect institutionalized, at least for the next five years, a roughly three-two Russian numerical advantage over the US in fixed land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), and SLBM launchers (submarines.) The Russians had built up this lead during the Talks and were rapidly increasing it at the time of their conclusion. The Treaty limited each side's ABM defences to two missile sites with 100 interceptor missiles per site. Without SALT 1, the quantitative gap between the US and USSR would have continued to widen at an accelerating rate for an indefinite period. The USSR had generated a considerable momentum, while the internal political climate in the US had retarded the American effort and would almost certainly have prevented the crash programme, with very heavy expenditures, that would have been necessary for the US to catch up. As Dr Kissinger pointed out, the US had "no program" at the time of the SALT negotiations for closing

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the gap. In fact, the US had not added to its ICBM or SLBM numbers for seven years.

The Russian quantitative lead is said to be offset by US advantages in other fields. A major part of this is America's qualitative or technological superiority, the most obvious manifestations of which are found in the US lead in MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicle) technology which enables the placement of up to 14 warheads on one missile; and its *Polaris* and *Poseidon* submarines and missiles (SLBM) (1). Another element, we are told, is the US forward-based strategic bomber force which if not a qualitative factor is certainly a quantitative one (since it carries warheads) whose geographical location, it is said, reduces the value of Russia's three-two missile lead. Mention should also be made of the projected or ongoing US B-1 bomber and long-range ULMS (Under-Sea Launched Missile System) programmes the latter now being known as "Trident."

But it should be pointed out, because of some possible misconceptions, that there is a very good argument that MIRV technology in itself does not confer any advantage; that multiple warheads are relevant only in relation to the size and nature of the missiles on which they are placed. Given missiles of equal accuracy or inaccuracy, the larger the missile the more effective it will be in the target area. America has relatively small, inaccurate missiles giving it in large part only a "counter-city" capability. MIRVs, it is said, simply add to the overkill, giving the US at present little real strategic gain over the Soviet Union (this argument excludes consideration of their value against other nuclear powers, especially China). Russia has very much larger and more inaccurate missiles than the US. But their size gives them a considerable counter-force capability (2). MIRVing Russia's missiles would greatly improve their strategic value. So the MIRV issue is not so much the advantage it gives the US today *vis-a-vis* the USSR, but the gain it would give the USSR tomorrow. The essential factors "equalizing" the present situation for the US are SLBMs and the ABM Treaty limitations, as discussed below.

"Equality" means that America has lost the clear strategic superiority it possessed until well into the 'sixties. Briefly, "equality" or parity means, in professional jargon, that neither side has a first-strike capability. A first strike capability means possessing a sufficient array of offensive and defensive missiles so that the damage incurred by the enemy's reply (3) to your initiating strike will be in the realm of what you consider "acceptable." At the moment either side's reply to the other's initiating strike would inflict quite "unacceptable" damage. In other words, in the present context of weapons deployed, and at the present time, parity means "mutual deterrence" or "mutual defencelessness." Other terms used to describe it are "mutual assured destruction," "stable deterrence" and "mutual vulnerability." It is not a comfortable posture. In my view, almost any alternative structure of "parity" would be preferable from the West's standpoint, and indeed that of the world generally. It is largely the former US Defence Secretary Robert McNamara's legacy to the world - the result of his doctrine of "assured destruction" in the 'sixties and his opposition to a large-scale US ICBM system. However, it is what we have now got. It is most important to point out that this structure of parity is maintained to a far greater extent by the limitations imposed by the ABM Treaty, than by the Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles. By reducing, if not minimizing, defences, each side allows the other a deterrent. However, the differing natures and deployment of each side's offensive missiles is equally important. The Americans possess an essentially "counter-city" force (because their comparatively small missiles have not the pin-point accuracy to hit underground missile targets), which includes a considerable number of SLBMs. Given the present state of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), SLBMs are relatively safe. The Russians for their part do not, at present, possess as effective an SLBM system although they have, or are allowed under SALT 1, a greater number of both submarines and SLBMs. But Russia's ICBMs, although less accurate than US missiles, have an impressive counter-force as well as counter-city capability because of their size and therefore payload. Their greater payload - about four times that of US missiles - enables them to destroy underground missiles. Without the SLBM factor, therefore, Russia's more numerous, bigger ICBMs would probably give it superiority and a first-strike capability since it could knock-out most of America's fixed land-based ICBMs in the initiating attack. This would certainly be true

if SALT 1 had not limited the number of Russian fixed land based ICBMs and will probably prove to be true even with SALT II. So a safe SLBM force is most important to the US position. It is probably only SLBM retaliatory power, and the ABM limitations, that provide parity.

Parity will probably not be maintained however, unless SALT 11, which will deal with both quantitative and qualitative or technological aspects of missiles, missile-launchers and other strategic weapons (including perhaps forward-based bombers) can be satisfactorily concluded within the next two-four years. Without a SALT 11 agreement, the Russians will probably reach a position of superiority giving them a first-strike capability. There are two aspects to this. The first, which is in the realm of certainty, is that Russia's advances in MIRV technology, in combination with their greater number of much larger and constantly improving missiles, would give them a considerable advantage in the number of warheads. The US Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, has estimated that without SALT 11, the Soviet Union by 1980 will have "both more warheads and more destructive warheads," than the US. The second, which many experts rate only a possibility, is that Russia's progress in ASW could enable it to reduce seriously the value of America's SLBM force. While this is admittedly a difficult field for the Russians, it must be remembered that SALT 1 has limited the US to a total of only 44 ballistic missile submarines (with a maximum of 710 MIRVed missiles) and the figure could be lower. It is for this reason that the US is extremely anxious to push on with "Trident" and other projects so as to keep US SLBM technology ahead of Russian progress in ASW, in respect of which US Navy strategists are said to be "alarmed" (4).

Over the next few years, therefore, each side's research and development (R and D) programmes could be critically important. At the moment, the USSR is spending far more and putting in a much greater effort than the politically hamstrung US. Not surprisingly, the Russian emphasis is on MIRVs, ASW, ABM qualitative techniques, and the development of "new principle" ABM equivalents or alternatives including mobile land-based ICBMs and civil defence, none of which are covered by SALT 1. The US effort, assuming that it can politically sustain one, would or should concentrate on SLBM, "Trident," bigger ICBMs to replace the *Minuteman*, missile accuracy, strategic bombers, ASW and ABM alternatives.

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ESSENTIAL to SALT 1 is the element of "goodwill" and trust. The ABM Treaty limitations, and major aspects of the Agreement as well, depend on Soviet "goodwill." The US does not have, and the USSR would not allow, any means of inspection of Russian ABM systems. Apart from the Soviet reluctance in this regard, which underlines the atmosphere of distrust, there are other reasons to doubt Soviet "goodwill" (if any are necessary after the Middle East War and Russia's unilateral breaking of arms agreements in the'sixties). Firstly, there was Russia's refusal to reveal any information at all on its ICBMs and ABMs during SALT 1. The entire SALT 1 Treaty and Agreement were negotiated on the basis of US Intelligence estimates of the number and nature of Russian missiles. The US needed SALT so badly that it was prepared to sit through that humiliation. In view of this, America's allies must ask whether or not the US has been taken for a ride. Secondly, Russia must contend with China whose nuclear credibility is markedly increased with the absence of US and USSR large-scale ABM defences. Russia has a choice. It can launch a nuclear strike (most likely in concert with a conventional invasion) against China taking out its ICBMs and lesser missiles before the Chinese have acquired an effective retaliatory force. That means, essentially, before the Chinese have developed and deployed an effective ABM system, or more likely its equivalent, to protect their ICBMs. How long the Russians have in which to do this is uncertain, but it is probably limited to the next two-four years. If the Russians forgo this opportunity they will face an indefinite future in which Chinese ICBMs can strike Russia with increasing effect. The only defence Russia could then have against a damaging Chinese strike (in the absence of a SALT-type agreement with Peking) would be a substantial ABM system to protect both its missiles and cities. It is possible that the Russians, having decided against a war, are clandestinely deploying SALT-proscribed ABM sites, or their effective equivalents, or alternatively are developing as rapidly as possible "new principle" ABM systems not proscribed by SALT 1. If

so, then as long as the US adheres strictly to the letter and spirit of SALT 1, and also refrains from either developing "new principle" ABMs or advancing into the next realm of effective nuclear technology, the Russians are moving towards a position giving them an overwhelming first-strike capability. US SLBM and ICBM retaliatory forces would possess a declining ability to inflict "unacceptable" damage on the USSR. It is pertinent in this regard that in commenting on the revelation that the Soviet Union was building four new missile systems, Dr Kissinger in early September 1973 said: "It is an interesting question why they think that should be necessary when neither side has this ABM." Interesting indeed.

If the US is convinced that the Soviet Union is in fact breaching SALT 1 (and in most cases it would know), it can- and has stated it will - declare the agreements void. Apart from the US having lost further ground to the Russians, such a declaration would be an embarassing political defeat for US diplomacy. More importantly it would almost inevitably mean, if a balance is to be preserved, a resumption of the arms race with the two super-Powers moving into the next range of nuclear weaponry. This the US, for a variety of reasons - not the least of them being its current state of internal weakness and the enormous financial costs involved, has striven to avoid. Indeed, it was these very considerations that led the US to give the original impetus to SALT, along of course with a genuine humanitarian concern to limit the race into increasingly destructive weapons. Has the US the political will to resume the race if necessary? Or would the Russians simply forge ahead?

The US and its allies - many of whom act as if they do not realize it - are in a most uncomfortable position. At the beginning of 1973, President Nixon faced a Soviet Union that was in effect saying to him, whatever it was actually doing: "We will abide by the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles, that is SALT 1, and we are interested in moving on to SALT 11, but this means that we must do something about China's rapidly growing nuclear force. We are contemplating a large-scale nuclear and conventional attack on China." This was the real issue at stake in the Nixon/Brezhnev discussions in Washington during June 1973. Opposing the war, without committing himself to any course of action in the event of it, President Nixon apparently struck a deal with the Soviet Party leader: the Soviet Union would refrain from attacking China in return for substantial US technological and economic assistance in both the strategic and consumer fields. There is no doubt of the Soviet leadership's great desire to improve Russia's position in at least the technological and strategic economic fields. Will the Soviet Union abide by this deal? Or, again, has it taken the US for a ride?

Assuming that the USSR does adhere to the deal, where does that leave it - and indeed the US, China, Japan and South-East Asia?

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IT leaves the Soviet Union in a position where it will: (I) Probably abide by SALT 1, with a heavy R and D emphasis on ABM technology, "new principle" ABM systems, bigger and qualitatively better ICBMs and SLBMs and ASW. However, we cannot completely dismiss the possibility of it discarding SALT 1 so as to erect current state-of-the-art ABM systems.

(II) Probably agree to SALT 11, but as with the less complicated SALT 1 which took three-four years to negotiate, it will prolong the discussions for as many years as possible in an attempt to reach at least qualitative equality with the US before signing an agreement. Whether it can achieve this will depend very much on American qualitative progress through R and D which in turn will depend on America's political will. Qualitative equality would give the Soviet Union clear missile superiority over the US. However, that in itself would not necessarily bring the USSR a first-strike capability, which undoubtedly continues to be its objective. (One must never assume that a "rationality" based on Western values prevails in Moscow. This is an aspect of the nuclear balance that cannot be considered here.)

(III) Perhaps give serious consideration to moving into the new, space technology of nuclear weaponry if it feels that is necessary to counter China and other prospective nuclear Powers. This would be done in spite of various treaties with the US and irrespective of what the US might do in this field.

(IV) Continue the development of its conventional military forces, which are already clearly superior to those of the US. Of particular relevance for the Soviet global designs are, of course, its air and naval power. The growing Soviet Navy is already of impressive dimensions and is stronger than that of the US which might be described as fast, powerful, ageing, outgunned and outnumbered. The US Navy is a declining force. Increasing Soviet naval influence can be expected in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, one of which is expected to be the main operating area of the new through-deck-cruiser, the *Kiev*. In regard to the Indian Ocean it should be said that naval influence cannot be assessed simply by counting the number of visible vessels there at any one point in time. That is naive. There is a whole complexity of factors involved. The future of the Suez Canal - a major consideration in the October Middle East War - will have a direct bearing on Russia's naval deployments and strategems in both Oceans.

(V) Intensify its efforts militarily and politically to defeat the US in as many areas or theatres of the globe as possible through a strategy of what is now almost classically called the Indirect Approach (which few understand and which, with the exception of the Soviet Union, has in recent decades unfortunately had few practitioners). Its objective, briefly put, is to maximize freedom of action at minimum cost, with limited application of force (preferably without firing a shot), through a succession of military, political and economic actions. We have seen the USSR achieve an almost total US withdrawal from South-East Asia through the application of such a strategy - pitched, of course, globally, the US itself being an important area of operations. Into the resultant Asian politico-military vacuum the USSR is now moving, its freedom of action considerably enhanced.There is no doubt that it hopes to achieve a similar result in Europe — "Finlandization" it has been called. The Middle East War of 1973 was not at all unrelated to that objective (5).

The conduct of indirect strategy is considerably enhanced if one is in a strong defensive position. This is the essential reason the USSR has striven to achieve nuclear parity, and, if possible, a first-strike capability. It has, presumably, no intention of unleashing a global nuclear war (although the question of "rationality" intrudes here), setting the world aflame and inevitably destroying itself. If Russia cannot be deterred by a nuclear threat, and parity assures that, it is free to press whatever advantage it has at the conventional, or any other level of conflict. This is precisely what it is doing. It is the major conventional Power in the world. We can quite confidently, therefore, expect further, if not a series of, regional or theatre political/military confrontations and perhaps wars - the China theatre not excluded. Parity, in short, makes regional conflicts and wars easier (6). Should Russia achieve a first-strike capability against its enemies, as it could do by 1980, the likelihood of wars will decline because resistance - politically and psychologically - will dissipate.

(VI) Continue its drive to encircle China, the important focal points in the future being the Middle East oil-producing nations; the Suez Canal; Baluchistan (Russia badly needs an Indian Ocean port); the Indian Sub-Continent; and South-East Asia, the pivotal point of reference being Indonesia. In respect of some of these places Russia has interests apart from those relating to China. But all of them relate to the objective of gaining effective leverage over Japan through direct or indirect control of both its oil supplies and oil supply routes. Controlling the supplies is of little use should another Power, in particular China, gain control of the routes. Effective control or "Finlandization" of Japan would not only result in Russian encirclement of China, it would - consideration of nuclear balances aside - make Russia the dominant global power.

Conversely, the Soviet Union believes rightly or wrongly, that should China and Japan ally militarily and economically, its own long-term regional and global ambitions could be seriously complicated.

(VII) Continue its effort to subvert the unstable Chinese leadership in the hope of bringing to power a pro-Moscow group or at least one prepared to do a nuclear deal. That may happen in any case following the deaths of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.

(VIII) Endeavour to maintain the atmosphere of "detente" which is a major tactical aspect

of its indirect strategy. "Detente" should also enable the Soviet Union to gain US, European and Japanese industrial and economic aid and trade as well as assistance in the development of its resources, especially in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. Its desire to develop these resources is not unrelated to its suspicions of China's ultimate intentions.

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AMERICA, providing President Nixon continues in office, will probably pursue a course aimed at:

(I) Qualitatively improving its ICBMs, SLBMs, and ABM alternatives (including perhaps mobile land-based ICBMs) as rapidly as possible. This means a far greater R and D effort especially in regard to MIRVs, Trident and ASW. In respect of US ASW it should be pointed out that the USSR has 110 nuclear submarines 41 of which are armed with SLBMs and the number is growing. Under SALT 1, Russia is allowed 62 SLBM submarines.

(II) Concluding SALT 11 before the USSR can close the qualitative gap.

(III) Keeping its options open so as to enable it either to expand and improve very rapidly its ABM systems or to move into the new range of nuclear weaponry.

(IV) Preserving as strong a forward position as possible in Europe which involves not only the US forces attached to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but consideration of the inter-relationship between US, French and Anglo-American nuclear forces. The Russians almost certainly will want to involve the Anglo-American nuclear forces, as well as forward-based US bombers, in SALT 11 discussions.

(V) Maintaining what it considers to be the minimum necessary presence in and about potential theatres of conflict that bear on America's "national interest" (whatever that might mean).

(VI) Reassuring its allies - or at least those it believes essential to the "national interest" — that in the crunch, the US will not abandon them. Whether any of the countries of South-East Asia fall into this category is open to doubt. Private and public statements, and in some cases actions, of a number of Americans including Dr Kissinger, have done little to allay the fears of South-East Asia in this regard.

(VII) Preventing Japan from moving into the orbit of either Russia or China. The eminently sensible European-US-Japanese Atlantic Charter concept is a useful step in this direction. It will help offset the damage done by America's off-handed treatment of Japan in 1971-72. However, insofar as it is proposed that Japan only be associated with the Atlantic partners rather than treated as an equal, it leaves a great deal to be desired.

(VIII) Consolidating relations with China, these being Washington's major source of leverage with Moscow, not excluding Russia's apparently great appetite for Western technology and economic assistance. Any strengthening of China's position is of great concern to Moscow. The possibility of a US - Chinese and, even worse, a US-Chinese-Japanese alliance against Moscow, literally boggles the Russian mind. The Russians are highly fearful of the future nuclear China. Whether that fear is justifiable or not is largely irrelevant.

America's ability to pursue the above course of action, which can hardly be honoured with the title of "strategy", might depend very heavily on it recovering its internal posture or self-confidence and reversing the present drift to isolationism. No one can have any confidence that this is likely to happen within the next five years. Whatever the hopes a year ago, Watergate and its aftermath have caused them to dissipate. Apart from having partly incapacitated the American decision-making apparatus, weakening Washington's authority at home and abroad, Watergate has exposed some of the unattractive faces of the present American condition. This is not the place for a long discussion of the American malaise and its outward manifestations. Suffice it to say that America—or at least the leadership echelons of American society—has lost its soul. Until there is a spiritual regeneration there seems little prospect of America regaining its internal balance.

This is not to say that America will be unable to conduct a "good-enough" external policy; that it will not be able to prevent Russia attaining global dominance. It may be able to maintain a position of nuclear parity with the Soviet

Union. And it might be able to carry through effective policies of support for what it considers to be its essential international interests and for those it believes are its essential allies. But it is going to be extremely difficult, and increasingly so. Whatever the US can do is likely to be conditioned more by the problems, weaknesses and needs of the totalitarian States and the conflicts between them, than anything the US has to offer. This is not to underestimate the resilience of the American people in times of great crisis. But the problem is that the USSR (presuming "rationality") is unlikely to present them with a "great crisis"; it can achieve all its objectives through the manipulation of constant, relatively low-level, pressure generated by a series of regional politico/military confrontations and their ancillary "tactical" operations. That is what indirect strategy is about. That was Russia's interest in fuelling the Vietnam war. It is its interest in Korea and Berlin. It is what the Middle East War and Russia's threat of unilateral military intervention in that war, were essentially about- the real target being not Israel, but Europe, Japan and the nerve or mind of the American leadership "elite". Similar comment can be made in respect of the Arab oil cutback which the USSR, if it is wise, and if it has the capability, will want to prevent assuming proportions of a "great crisis" for the US.

Given the American condition, there can be no grand or global US strategy of any kind, either offensive or defensive. Strategy demands clear objectives and coherent guiding policies, born of a unifying philosophy and thereby possessing a high degree of continuity. Such objectives and policies do not exist. Attempts at their development flounder and succumb because of the volatility of a philosophically bereft home political base. One might add that the Nixon/ Kissinger de-ideologization of American foreign policy-at its lower rather than highest levels-has contributed in some degree to this condition. In place of strategy, America will have "courses of action" and "policy positions" which will be essentially reactionary. In fact, this has been the basic situation for some years now. The Vietnam War illustrated it beautifully. There America had no strategy. Its "operation" was consequently labelled, quite accurately, "limited response" in which techniques in the application of increasing quantities of fire-power substituted for strategy. The resultant prolongation of the war played into the hands of Soviet grand strategy. Alternatively, consider SALT 1-an essentially defensive agreement needed and sought by the US in reaction to Russia's rapidly growing lead in ICBMs for which the US paid the price of agreeing to limit ABM deployment.

It is understandable if some of America's allies fear that in ten years, the US and the USSR might have reversed their relative global strategic positions of the early 'sixties.

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EQUALLY understandable is China's genuine fear of a Soviet pre-emptive nuclear attack and conventional military invasion through Manchuria. During 1973 China's leaders, notably Chou En-lai, repeatedly called the world's attention to this threat. Verbal clashes between Peking and Moscow intensified in both number and invective.

Peking understands the Russian enmity for the Chinese and the obsessional hysteria over China's growing power, for the feeling is mutual. It knows that Russia is concerned with China's ability to stir local nationalisms across the border in the Soviet Far East. It appreciates that Nixon's playing of Peking and Moscow off against each other is principally to Moscow's disadvantage and is causing it serious discomfort. Given the present nuclear realities and China's growing capabilities in that field, Peking fears that Moscow may attempt to break away from American pressures by attacking China. (With the Middle East War it must be somewhat relieved to see Moscow moving westwards rather than eastward.)

China's fears are intensified by the presence of 55 Soviet divisions on its northern borders, which for a considerable period have been deployed in offensive formations. Those divisions are backed up by 350 tactical nuclear missile launchers, with missile reserves; 1200 aircraft utilizing up to 30 air-fields; hundreds of artillery pieces and thousands of tanks and armoured vehicles. All told, the Russians are estimated to have about a million men on the border.

If Russia does launch an attack against China's nuclear installations it is not likely to be a clean, surgical strike. The indications are that it would be a very nasty war of probably uncertain duration. While China is a vastly inferior nuclear Power to Russia, it nevertheless

possesses somewhere between 50 and a 100 (Russia claims 200) liquid-propelled Intermediate and Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs and MRBMs) and has either recently, or will shortly, deploy a limited number of ICBMs. In addition to that, it has between 50 and 100 *TU/16/Badger* medium jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and probably a number of batteries of short-range tactical nuclear missiles. To take out China's nuclear armoury including its missiles, bombers, air-fields, the Lanchow production plant, the Lop Nor test site and other installations, the Russian attack would require the firing of at least 150 nuclear warheads. In reply, the Chinese would almost certainly be able to get in a few MRBM and IRBM strikes hitting valuable targets such as Vladivostok, Soviet Harbour and Irkutsk and, depending on the nature of its IRBM emplacement and the state of its small ICBM development, perhaps one or two areas in Russia itself. Its tactical missiles would undoubtedly score hits. The prospects for Russia's invading conventional ground forces would very much depend on their objectives. If these included Peking, as well they might, Russian forces would face considerable opposition from China's 2 1/2-3 million man Army and its air force, which with 4,000 aircraft is the third largest in the world although it is 10-15 years behind the Soviet airforce qualitatively. Taking all factors into consideration, Russia's ground war prospects might depend on its uncertain logistics capabilities across Soviet Central Asia, and its naval strength in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea which would be considerable. The odds are that it would be a long war.

While America has presumably assured Peking that the danger of a Soviet attack has been greatly reduced as a result of the Nixon/Brezhnev diplomacy, that is not likely to have any great effect on Peking's policies. It will continue trying to dissuade Moscow from attack by being seen to have cordial relations with Washington, and by encouraging NATO and a continued US presence in Europe. Moscow, it hopes, will be deterred by the uncertainty of the US reaction in the event of war and by the danger of being caught in a war on two fronts. There is no doubt that Peking badly needs Washington, perhaps more than Washington needs it. It should be noted in this regard that despite some misconceptions to the contrary, the "new" Peking/US diplomacy of 1971-72 was the result of Chinese, rather than American, initiatives (7). To strengthen the US link, Peking has been prepared to pay a small price- reducing its material support for Hanoi's war effort in South Vietnam. America, having agreed to Peking's admittance to the UN and indirectly Taiwan's expulsion, is happy to continue underpinning the relationship with trade, aid and diplomatic exchanges.

Apart from the dangers of a Russian attack, China faces the depressing prospect of being encircled by Russia, thereby having its freedom of action reduced, and its long-term objectives in East and South-East Asia-and perhaps further afield—cut down for decades to come. In its drive to prevent Russian encirclement (or containment), Peking is likely over the next few years to pursue three main courses of action:

(i) It will encourage the US to maintain a military presence in East and South-East Asia rather than leave the Soviet Union a more or less uncontested vacuum, as some highly placed US officials are in favour of doing. In respect of East Asia, Chou En-lai told the Japanese during 1973 that it was not inconceivable that China might lend Japan military support, alongside the Americans, if that was necessary for protection against Russia's "aggressive designs". He accepted a moderate non-nuclear growth of Japanese military forces and said he understood Japan's continuing need for the Mutual Security Treaty with the US. There is some evidence that China's feelings on the American presence in South Korea have similarly moderated, although in this case its concern over a US withdrawal is not only with the Soviet Union but also with the possibility of Japan gaining a military base on the mainland. Regarding South-East Asia, there is considerable evidence (including some of the recent comments of Prince Sihanouk) of a decline in Peking's support for Hanoi's war aims in Indo-China. Peking, it seems hopes that this might help the US retain a residual force in Thailand at least for a longer period than otherwise. Apart from wanting to retain an American counter to Russia, Peking does not want a Hanoi victory in South Vietnam, for reasons this writer has analysed elsewhere (8). Essentially, it would mean an expansionist United State of Indo-China dominated by Hanoi which Peking fears would be vulnerable to Moscow's influence.

(ii) It will attempt to attract Japan away from any possible alliance with Moscow. This was one of the original objectives of Peking's American diplomacy and it maintains its validity today. Some of the comments above are relevant to Peking's policy of attraction to Japan. To those should be added its endeavours to interest Japanese (and US) capital in the exploration of potential oil reserves along its South-East coast.

(iii) In South-East Asia Peking will continue its support (e.g. Burma) and in some cases, direction (e.g. Malaysia and Northern Thailand) of insurgencies and subversive movements. Peking fully appreciates that the great strategic prize in South-East Asia is Indonesia since it is through that country's surrounding waterways that flow 80-90 per cent of Japan's oil - a situation that is likely to continue for at least the next ten years. It knows that Indonesia is Moscow's ultimate objective in South-East Asia. Peking itself narrowly missed gaining this great prize in 1965. Had it done so, it would have undoubtedly settled the Asian balance of power in its favour for decades. But today Russia is in the vanguard in the race for Indonesia. However, while China is down, it is far from out.

Behind these policies, or courses of action, and concomitant with its efforts to prevent a Russian attack, Peking will continue the development of its strategic nuclear offensive and defensive weaponry as well as its conventional forces. China is presently constructing, if not deploying, ICBMs which, judged from their underground silo sites, are one-fifth as large again as the Soviet Union's *SS9*. It is estimated by US Intelligence that by 1980 China will have deployed at least 20-30 large ICBMs, some of them capable of covering the entire US The Russian estimates give a figure of 150 ICBMs by 1980, along with 200 IRBMs and MRBMs. China has recently put into service a new, and possibly nuclear, attack submarine which led *Jane's Fighting Ships of 1973-74* to remark that: "There seems no reason why China should not embark on a Polaris-type building programme". While China's nuclear capability will remain very much inferior to that of the US and the USSR for the next ten years and possibly longer it will in the absence of effective large-scale US and USSR ABM systems, have an increasing capability to inflict serious damage upon them. Apart from that, its psychological value will enhance Peking's political leverage in South-East Asia and among developing nations generally.

If over the next few years, China manages to stave off a Russian attack, and Russia fails to encircle China, Peking will most likely move from its present defensive posture to an offensive and expansionary strategy in Asia.

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CURRENT global interactions have put Japan in a position of being assiduously courted by the USSR and China. This has given rise to both opportunities and problems for Japan.

Japan fears a Russian attack on China little less than China itself, for winds are likely to carry nuclear fall - out from both Russian and Chinese warheads over Japan. The development of relations with China are therefore considered beneficial not only because of the potential trading opportunities they offer, but because it is thought that they might help deter a Russian attack, the operative factor being the perceived trip-wire effect of the Japanese/US Mutual Security Treaty. However, while the Russian nuclear threat (and Sino-American diplomacy) have given an impetus to Sino-Japanese relations, there are nevertheless problems standing in the way of their further improvement. One of them involves conflicting claims to areas of potential oil deposits around the Senkaku Islands. Another is Taiwan, which is of considerable economic and strategic importance to Japan. A third is South-East Asia where China's political and economic activities, especially among the Overseas Chinese, could adversely affect major Japanese trading interests. A fourth is China's ICBM deployment.

Russia, for its part, is trying to attract Japan with proposals for the joint development of Siberian resources. Both countries have a major interest in this. Japan, especially in view of current Arab (and Soviet?) oil pressures, is most concerned about future energy supplies and costs. Already the two countries are engaged in exploration for gas and oil around Sakhalin. The Russians want further to involve Japan (along with the US) in the joint construction of a 4,000-mile oil pipeline and road across Siberia from the Tyumen oil-fields to the Pacific coast. However, the Japanese are somewhat hesitant as this would considerably enhance

Soviet strength in the area. They realize that the Soviet interest is strategic as well as economic since it would ease the Soviet Union's logistic position in the border regions which at present is heavily dependent on the vulnerable Trans-Siberian railway. The Japanese, therefore, are probably not prepared to commit themselves to Siberia unless Moscow is prepared to sign a treaty of peace and friendship and return the four islands in the Kurile chain (lost by Japan to Russia in 1945). The latter the Russians, for understandable reasons, are not prepared to yield - as they apparently reiterated, quite bluntly, to the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Tanaka in Moscow last October.

Moreover, the Chinese are quite hostile towards any strengthening of the Soviet Union in that area, and no doubt this has been an additional factor in Japan's calculations. So too, one would expect, is the prospect of large oil deposits off the coast of China.

Whatever the complexities and difficulties of Japan's position in North Asia, its interests in the South-East Asian region are of equal concern. Through that region traverse the shipping lanes to some of the most important sources of Japan's oil, natural gas and raw materials. With the US withdrawal from South-East Asia, Tokyo is most concerned at the prospect of Russia (or China) moving into the vacuum. The prospect of effective Russian control of Japan's oil supplies either in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean or the Straits of Malacca and the Indonesian Waterways, is taken very seriously indeed in Tokyo. It is a major reason for Japan's interest in the projected Kra Canal in Southern Thailand; its continuing development of economic and hence political links in the region; its internal discussions concerning the need for expanded naval and air power with an option of going nuclear; and its interest in the idea of a loose defence arrangement between itself, Indonesia and Australia which it is hoped might develop a conventional strategic air and naval capability to protect the sea-lanes.

Overall, Japan's position is an extremely difficult one. It will probably be a long time before it is able to balance its relations with the Soviet Union, China, US and South-East Asia. Under pressure from all these centres, it could be in for a frustrating time - and with Japanese frustrations East and South-East Asia have had experience.

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THE South-East Asian region's strategic position essentially altered little during 1973, the overall picture being one of continued, and perhaps accelerated, US retreat with the Soviet Union, China and Japan competing for positions and influence. But, this broad picture took on a slightly different perspective with two developments which have been discussed in this review in other contexts. They were: Watergate, and the consequent weakening of Washington's authority, and the realization in many regional capitals that the Soviet Union had indeed attained strategic parity with the US and that quite likely the Soviet Union and not the US would be the major effective global power of the future. In this respect, some regional leaders began asking whether the world faced not so much a "generation of peace" as an era of Western defeat.

These developments - and the general strategic pattern - gave rise to a number of regional reactions during the year:

(I) A regeneration of a feeling of being left unprotected against the influence and possibly the military power of China. While a few, if any, believed that direct Chinese military action was likely in the near future, especially in view of China's fear of a Russian attack, it was, in some circles, again under discussion as a long-term prospect (9). In the short term the principal concern was the economic strength of the inter-locking South-East Asian Chinese business communities and the possibility of China improving its influence in those communities through economic and trade inducements. In other words, the problem was subversion and its offspring, insurgency and insurrection. With the future of Indo-China appearing to many even more uncertain following the Paris Agreement than before it, the year saw a rebirth of the unfortunately termed "domino theory." Unlike some of its Western intellectual detractors, South-East Asian leaders have always realized that the "domino theory" was not a military inevitability theory but a political probability in which the pressures of insurgency were a major factor.

The region's fear of China is the principal reason neither Thailand, the Philippines, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore nor Indonesia has established or resumed normal diplomatic relations with Peking. Malaysia, against the advice of its neighbours, has for some time been seriously contemplating recognition for trade reasons, but indicated during 1973 that it was approaching the matter with increasing apprehension (10).

If the various South-East Asian States do eventually open, or resume, normal diplomatic relations with China, it would most likely be an act of appeasement. By kow-towing to China, they would be hoping that Peking would discourage subversion and insurgency in their countries. But they know that Peking cannot be bought as cheaply as that - as Indonesia discovered in the mid-sixties. Only subservience to China's policies might achieve the desired result in Peking.

(II) A related reaction was the continued rise of Russian political and diplomatic influence in a number of countries in the region. This has largely been the result of a search for a new balance against China, and also, in some cases against Japan which some saw as a potentially expansive power of the future (11). But it was equally, if not more, a result of deliberate Russian policy to move into the vacuum being created by the US retreat, first with a diplomatic, trade and political presence and later with military power. Russia's proposed Asian Collective Security Pact would be the Trojan Horse.

Since late - 1972 Soviet political activity has been more openly visible than previously in some parts of South-East Asia. This can be said, for example, in respect of Malaysia and Thailand. With the US disengagement, the Russians can perhaps afford to be somewhat less discreet and clandestine than previously. In fact, it is possible that in their view, held rightly or wrongly, a more visible posture might help persuade local opinion that the future lies with Moscow.

(III) A realization of the need for the nations of South-East Asia to come together as one force and one voice in their various negotiations with the major economic and political Powers. Disunited, they run the risk of being individually swamped; united, they perhaps can bargain with strength and effect. The impetus to this has been their need to generate some countervailing power in economic negotiations with Japan. The idea had its first public expression during 1973 in the councils of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). This has probably been the most promising move to date towards effective regional co-operation. It is to be hoped that this approach will extend to fields other than the economic and in respect of Powers other than Japan.

(IV) A heightened awareness of the need for, and in some cases the acquisition of, greater individual defence capacities. Within a generally accepted framework - at least theoretically - of regional and bilateral co-operation, many South-East Asian nations have come to realize, rather belatedly, that ultimately they may have to stand alone. Some are arming themselves assiduously. They do not foresee an era of peace and international enlightenment. Long dead is the Bandung spirit of the 'fifties - if not some of its meaningless terminology.

The only country in the region to have lowered its defence shield was Australia, whose Government saw no prospect of any serious global or regional conflict in the foreseeable future and certainly not within the next 15 years. Its Defence Minister, Mr. Barnard, rather surprisingly reiterated this belief during the Middle East War.

(V) Finally, there was in some places an undoubted decline in the attractions of the concept of "neutralization" - although lip-service continued to be paid to it. The concept remains useful for domestic political purposes and will continue to be publicly respected - like "peace" -until a realistic, workable alternative can be adumbrated and agreed upon.

However, at the very time of clear signs of decline in the concept's appeal, the Australian Labour Government gave it an extended lease of life declaring it to be the cornerstone of Australian foreign policy. Canberra, anxious to assert itself as a new regional leader, appeared to be acting in the best tradition of the Bandung spitit.

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IF the foregoing survey represents the major trends and attitudes in the region, what can be said of the future?

The nations of South-East Asia, Australia and New Zealand have a choice. The first is to adopt, consciously or sub-consciously, an attitude of defeatism. This means that faced with the prospect of the region being either dominated by the Russians or divided up one way or the other between the Russians, Japanese and Chinese, or a combination of two of them, they do nothing. Shorn of its propaganda and verbiage, this is what the policy of "neutralization" really means. Even its most ardent proposers have seen the concept as an appeal of the weak and the defenceless to the predators for voluntary restraint. Others can hardly be blamed if they believe that to be naive.

Alternatively, the nations of the region can pursue, both individually and collectively, a course of action with the object of ensuring that they themselves hold the balance of power in the region. In a nutshell, that means that they – against the outside Powers – exert effective control over the Indonesian Waterways. Let us call it – for those who need slogans– "regional independence."

In this writer's view the latter is the course that must be undertaken, whatever the hardships and difficulties. If the first is chosen – the easier and more fashionable course – the result could be that, after 50 years of blood and sweat, the nations of the region will simply have swapped one kind of imperialism for another. The question usually asked at this point is: can the nations of the region achieve a position where they collectively, rather than any outsiders, hold the balance of power in the region? The answer is: perhaps, perhaps not. The point is that if the regional States are to maximize the chances of preserving their independence of action, free of the hegemony of major outside Powers, it is the only direction in which they can go – whether or not the objective is ultimately achieved. The next question is how could we move in the direction of this objective? Over the past few years, the Pacific Institute has gradually developed, in some detail, a long term programme or strategy which it believes to be worthy of serious consideration and discussion. It is not at all possible to do justice to that strategy in this review. Essentially, however, it involves a two-pronged approach in each of two main fields, the economic and the strategic/military. In the economic field it suggests:

- A common market between the South-East Asian States. One step in this direction should be co-operation giving them a united position and voice in negotiating with the major economic Powers and blocs. The latter has been Pacific Institute policy for over two years.

- Co-operation between Australia, New Zealand and Japan as associate members only of that common market, giving the South-East Asian countries economic aid, technological assistance, and preferential treatment for their goods in Japanese, Australian and New Zealand markets. There might also be an "off to the side" role for Canada and the US in this scheme.

The economic relationship suggested in this approach between the South-East Asian nations on the one hand and the developed nations on the other, was supported during 1973 by the Singapore Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, the Malaysian Minister of Home Affairs, Tan Sri Ghazali bin Shafie, who was formerly the permanent head of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, and indirectly by Indonesia's Major-General Ali Murtopo, a Special Assistant to President Suharto.

In the strategic/military field the Pacific Institute suggests:

- Co-operation between nations of the region within the existing groups of ASEAN; the Five-Power Pact; and perhaps in some respects SEATO, with the enlargement and interaction of these groupings, both in membership and functions. This in no way disadvantages bilateral security arrangements, and in fact should strengthen them.

- Co-operation between Japan, Indonesia and Australia in the fields of air and naval power, to secure the lines of communications which are vital to each and which affect the region as a whole. Japan and Australia would provide the military capability, while Indonesia

could act as the geographical pivot of the operation.

The strategy envisages that each nation within the limits of its capacity, should endeavour to reach a position where it is able to defend itself against all but the most exceptional threat, from either internal subversion or external aggression, without the assistance of foreign Powers.

A policy of defence self-reliance is therefore seen as running parallel with the development of economic, political, strategic and security agreements, arrangements and understandings between the nations of the region. The strategy does not exclude arrangements or alliances between countries in the region and major Powers outside it. But it does exclude – and indeed is designed to prevent – such alliances leading to the domination of the region by any of the major Powers, individually or in combination.

It is in the context of the global and regional strategic situations outlined in this review that internal developmentsin the various nations of the region should be viewed.

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POSTCRIPT on the Nuclear Balance, March 1974. Since the above article was written in November 1973, the US Secretary of Defence, Mr. James R. Schlesinger, has announced a new American nuclear policy which has been misleadingly described by the international Press as "the retargetting of US missiles".

Mr. Schlesinger and the US Government are clearly concerned about two principal and related developments:

(i) That the USSR's quantitative and technological progress in ICBM and SLBM development, including MIRVs and greater missile accuracy, and throw-weight is leading, far more rapidly than the US rashly anticipated at the time of the signing of SALT 1, to a position in which the USSR will be able to knock out all or nearly all US ICBMs in an initiating strike.

Referring to the Soviet Union's "truly massive" missile development over the last year, Mr. Schlesinger, in early March 1974, said that the Russians "apparently are considering the deployment of large numbers of heavy and possibly very accurate" multiple warheads, and that this "could in time come to threaten both our bombers and our ICBMs". During the past year alone, he said, the Russians have flight-tested four new ICBMs and developed their first SLBMs with multiple warheads. Mr. Schlesinger claimed that three of the ICBMs are so powerful that their throw-weight, combined with increased accuracy and MIRVs, could give the Russians "on the order of 7,000 one-to-two megaton warheads in their ICBM force alone". Further, he said, the USSR R and D programme in advanced strategic weaponry in "its breadth, depth and momentum as now revealed comes as something of a surprise to us" (12).

(ii) That the Soviet Union is making considerable progress in ABMs and ABM alternatives and equivalents, one of the most effective equivalents being the mobile land-based or airborne ICBM. It must be pointed out that neither Mr. Schlesinger nor any other US official have stated this specifically. However, there is no other satisfactory explanation for America's announced Manoeuvrable Re-Entry Vehicle (MARV) and small-cruise missile programmes. Both of these planned US developments are designed to give the US weaponry that will either dodge USSR defensive missiles (ABMs) or be able to target in on mobile ICBMs. Whether or not Russia is deploying current state-of-the-art ABMs in numbers contravening SALT 1 is unknown. If it is – and it would not be surprising – then Russia must be moving closer to achieving a first-strike capability against the US.

However, it is Russia's rapidly growing counter-force capability (point (i) above) with which Mr. Schlesinger appears most concerned (13). It is now realized that before a satisfactory SALT 11 agreement can be concluded, Russia is likely to have a clear capability to knock out all or nearly all US ICBMs in an initiating strike even were the US to start a crash ABM programme today. (It should be pointed out that all US ICBMs are land-based, fixed, and are concentrated in only six sites in the US North-West and Mid-West.) That would not give Russia a first-strike capability, for US SLBMs would preserve parity and will continue to do so as long as US SLBM technology remains ahead of Soviet ASW, and as long as the Soviet Union does not deploy a comprehensive and effective ABM system protec-

ting its fixed missiles. But it would give Russia a considerable psychological, political and indeed, strategic advantage over the US.

Mr. Schlesinger wants to alter that situation. He wants the US to develop a counter-force capability equal to that of the USSR. He wants the US to be able to knock out all or nearly all USSR ICBMs in an initiating strike, thereby bringing the US "true equality" or "essential equivalence" with the USSR. This is where the misleading term "retargetting of US missiles" has arisen. The term is misleading because if the US was simply to retarget those of its missiles presently aimed at Soviet cities on to Russian missile sites, which is how the international Press has interpreted the new policy, Mr. Schlesinger's objective would not be achieved. One of the reasons for this is that US missiles do not, at present, possess the capability to destroy Russia's underground missile silos. In other words, they have only a "counter-city" rather than a "counter force" capability. In fact it is almost certain that many US warheads have long been targetted on USSR missile sites, military installations, and other strategic possessions. But they are effective, in all but exceptional circumstances, only against above-ground objectives. Moreover, with Mr. Schlesinger's policy or approach, the US will not forgo the option of hitting Russian cities with most of its warheads, should it ever consider that to be necessary.

To have any prospect of achieving Mr. Schlesinger's "essential equivalence" or a counter-force capability equal to that of the USSR, America must vastly improve the accuracy and/or increase the size and throw-weight of its ICBMs. Preferably it should do both - as the USSR is doing. It is perfectly entitled to do this under SALT 1. However, Mr. Schlesinger has emphasized accuracy rather than the building of bigger missiles to replace the *Minuteman* and the larger *Titan*. This is not surprising. The US, for political reasons, has not built a new ICBM in nearly eight years. It has improved its missiles, for example, by MIRVing them, but it has not built, and at present appears unlikely to build new ones. The MARV programme can, in some respects, be described as one aspect of accuracy improvement.

Unfortunately, however, even if the US did build a larger number of much bigger, more accurate, highly manoeuvrable ICBMs - coupled perhaps with a declaration that SALT 1 ABM limitations are henceforth void - it seems most unlikely that it would or could achieve "essential equivalence". The reasons for this are Russia's ABMs and more importantly its ABM alternatives and equivalents, especially its mobile ICBMs. The MARVing of present US missiles and the projected cruise missile programme would reduce, not solve, this problem. The cruise missile, would of course not be a new ICBM, but in effect an IRBM, since it has a range of only 1,500 miles. It would be a low altitude or low trajectory missile fired by aircraft or submarines. It would fly below enemy radar, avoiding ABMs hopefully to deliver its warhead on target.

Soviet counter-force (and counter-city) weaponry does not have to face the problem of a large US ABM network or mobile US ICBMs (14). The US has no mobile ICBMs because they are considered "politically unacceptable" — whether landbased or airborne. They are deemed unacceptable just as a comprehensive ABM system was deemed "politically unacceptable" in the 'sixties.

Overall, SALT 1 and the period since its signing in 1972, have resulted in major Russian gains *vis-a-vis* the US and the West generally. Mr. Brezhnev must be very pleased indeed with the way "detente" is going. He is in no hurry to conclude a SALT 11 agreement that would be acceptable to the US. Moscow is clearly striving to attain the maximum strategic and political advantage over the US, if not outright nuclear superiority which would come with the achievement of a first-strike capability. Mr. Schlesinger's new counter-force approach is unlikely seriously to affect Russian progress towards these goals. While, unfortunately, his approach is without doubt the right one in the present undesirable circumstances, it does little more than strongly indicate to the Soviet Union that Washington is prepared to continue the arms race if a satisfactory SALT 11 agreement cannot be concluded.

Despite this partially re-assuring US posture, some observers remain concerned that under pressure, the US might sign a SALT 11 agreement which, like SALT 1, appeared satisfactorily and evenly balanced, but in fact proved to be weighted in favour of the Soviet Union.

Notes and References

1. Since the article was written, it has become clear that the USSR is seriously reducing the US qualitative SLBM lead.

2. The terms "counter-city" and "counter-force" have recently given rise to some misunderstandings. "Counter-city", in today's usage of the word, does not mean that a missile has a capability of hitting or being effective only against cities. "Counter-city" includes the capability of effectively hitting above-ground missile, military and other targets. But it does not include the capability of effectively hitting and destroying underground missile silos. The term "counter-force" is currently used to describe missiles with that capability. Of course, "counter-force" weapons will generally speaking be more effective against all military and strategic targets than "counter-city" weapons. And "counter-city" weapons would be able to destroy an underground missile site were two or three of them to hit on, or very close to, a target more or less simultaneous.

3. The "reply" to another side's initiating strike is sometimes called "second strike", and the ability to reply to an initiating strike, a "second-strike capability". Given the accepted, and indeed the only workable, definition of "first-strike capability", this is most confusing. A far better term is "first retaliatory strike (capability)" or "first-reply (capability)". For similar reasons it is preferable not to use the term "first strike" when describing what is referred to in this article as an "initiating strike".

4. Other US Navy strategists and technical experts maintain that Soviet ASW is not making rapid progress and that it is a decade behind US SLBM and submarine technology. See *Associated Press* despatch, 3 March 1974.

5. The effect of the Middle East War and closely related events on intra-European and US-European relations and co-operation has now become painfully visible to all. It has probably surpassed Moscow's highest anticipations. It remains to be seen how the resultant strains and divisions in the Western alliance will affect NATO and the outcome of future negotiations on force reductions in Central Europe (MURFAAMCE) and in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). But undoubtedly the Soviet hand has been considerably strengthened. Europeans in particular should be most concerned at the present trend of events.

6. It also makes the practice of blackmail by the Soviet Union easier. A suspicion that the USSR has been blackmailing the US was implied in parts of the article when it was written. That Dr. Kissinger should find it necessary publicly to ask the USSR to stop blackmailing the US and the West, which is in effect what he did in Moscow on 25 March 1974 dramatically underlines the real nature of "detente".

7. See Frank Mount, "South-East Asia 1972, Annual Review," *News Weekly*, (Melbourne), 10 January 1973.

8. See "The Situation in Indo-China," *Quadrant* (Sydney), Sept-Oct 1970 and "The Paris Agreement and the Future of Vietnam," *South-East Asian SPECTRUM* (Bangkok), April 1973. These articles also discuss why it is probable that Russia, as well as China, would prefer not to see a Hanoi victory in South Vietnam.

9. In January 1974, China forcibly occupied the Paracel Islands following a brief military conflict with South Vietnamese forces.

10. In early February 1974, senior officials of the Malaysian Foreign Affairs Department in Kuala Lumpur, assured this writer that an exchange of diplomatic representation with Peking would be agreed upon within three to four months. *(Editorial Note: Malaysia officially announced on 21 May that agreement had been reached with China to establish diplomatic relations, and these were formalized ten days later during the visit to Peking of the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak.)*

11. See *News Weekly* (Melbourne), 10 January 1973.

12. See *Associated Press* dispatch, 4 March 1974.

13. His new policy is also no doubt partly a result of US concern over China's growing counter-force capability.

14. Although it probably does or will have to contend with mobile Chinese ICBMs.

DEFENCE: *The phased withdrawal of Australian troops from Singapore by April 1975 will "mean little in the political context" of the highly sensitive and circumscribed ANZUK Arrangements. The military effect too will be minimal, the presence of infantry in Singapore representing "only an economic benefit" to the city-State. But "the air and especially naval unit activities are much more important and have not been reduced or removed".*

ANZUK and the Security of Singapore and Malaysia

Robert L. Rau

ON 10 November 1971, the Five-Power Defence Arrangements replaced the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA) which was negotiated in 1957 by the United Kingdom for the defence of Singapore and Malaysia.

The Five-Power Defence Arrangements consist of a consultative and co-operative partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore(1). The consultative nature of these Arrangements reflects the changing foreign policies of Australia, Britain, Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand. The high cost of maintaining bases, airfields and military personnel was also a determining factor. The interests of the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore further contributed to the switch from a defence treaty for Malaysia and Singapore guaranteed by Britain to a consultative agreement which is not binding on any of the parties and fails to ensure defence protection to either Malaysia or Singapore if attacked(2).

ANZUK (Australia-New Zealand-United Kingdom) is the title for the joint military force which was established in 1971, based in Singapore, which provides a limited military capability to assist the military forces of Malaysia and Singapore in repelling an attack(3).

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IN the early post-war period (1945-1948) British defence activity in the Singapore/Malaya area was confined to a limited garrison commitment which contributed to political stability and post-war reconstruction. Australia and New Zealand, while still supportive of Britain and active in Commonwealth affairs, continued to foster the security relationship already established during the Second War in the Pacific and in the occupation of Japan.

ANZAM: In 1949 the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom agreed to co-ordinate defence planning in the geographic area they called the "ANZAM" region. This area included the Australian and New Zealand home territories and the British territories in Malaya (to include Singapore) and Borneo(4). This agreement also covered adjacent sea and air spaces. Initially the agreement was established to protect the routes of communications and consisted of co-ordinative efforts between the military services of the countries involved. It did not encompass political commitments on the part of the Governments concerned. Later, in 1955 the ANZAM arrangement was expanded in concept to cover the defence of Malaya(5). In the spring of 1955, Australia and

**The author wishes to express his appreciation to the US Naval Academy Research Council for financial assistance in the research and writing of this paper, which was prepared for presentation at the Second Annual Conference of the Mid-Atlantic Region, Association for Asian Studies, Glassboro State College, Glassboro, N.J., U.S.A., 10 November 1973.*

New Zealand agreed to an enlarged military commitment in Malaya which joined British and other Commonwealth forces in counter-terrorist operations against the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) as well as forming the core of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve(6).

In September 1951, Australia and New Zealand and the United States signed the "Pacific Security Pact" or ANZUS Treaty(7). The ANZUS Treaty provided security protection for Australia and New Zealand in the event of future Japanese aggression. It also formalized the fact of United States interest and military support in the event of an attack on their metropolitan territory, island territories, or on their armed forces wherever they might be committed(8). The political and security implications of ANZUS provided the ANZAM group with additional political influence and potential military force in its dealings with the MCP.

Australian and New Zealand participation in ANZAM as well as in subsequent security arrangements with the United Kingdom relative to the Malaya area has been in the nature of loosely knit "understandings" which have provided Britain with selected military assistance when necessary(9). These commitments were accepted by both countries as concrete evidence of their concern for the security of maritime South-East Asia as well as proof of their backing of British policy in that area(10).

AMDA: Malaya attained its independence from Britain in 1957 and sought defence protection against subversion from within or from an external attack. Australia and New Zealand agreed to contribute limited air, naval and ground forces in support of this scheme. This relationship was formalized in the Anglo-Malayan Defence Treaty of 1957 (AMDA)(11).

AMDA was originally structured to apply only to Malaya. Singapore, in 1957, was the major British military base in South-East Asia and still a Colony of Britain. At this time Britain was reluctant to relinquish political control, and wished to retain the freedom to station troops in Singapore so as to ensure political stability in the city and also to house its strategic reserve forces which were committed to the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). AMDA did not permit Britain to station its strategic reserve in Malaya (see Article VIII) and required that permission be granted by Malaya to use British troops stationed in Malaya anywhere else in South-East Asia. The newly established Government of the Federation of Malaya, mindful that its population consisted of more than 40 per cent overseas Chinese, was careful to disassociate itself from the SEATO pact which was established to support the containment of the People's Republic of China. From the Commonwealth point of view, these restrictions limited the usefulness of troops stationed in Malaya and made the military facilities in Singapore that much more important.

AMDA worked satisfactorily for all parties concerned. Malaya was able to devote its fiscal resources to economic development, not having to allocate funds for defence purposes. Britain was able to maintain a security presence in Singapore/Malaya and the Straits of Malacca which protected its investments, provided training areas for its military forces and enabled it to continue to contribute its share in the maintenance of security in South-East Asia. Singapore continued to rely upon the bases not only for the semblance of security they provided but more importantly for the inflow of cash they represented in jobs and monies disbursed in the city by the British forces.

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IN 1961, during the initial stages of the negotiations which culminated in the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, the Governments of the United Kingdom and Malaya agreed that the AMDA Treaty of 1957 be extended(12). This extension included all the territories (Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore) to be included in the Federation of Malaysia. This agreement permitted the British to continue to station ground, air and naval units in Singapore for use in Malaysia or on a regional scale throughout South-East Asia.

The separation of Singapore from Malaysia in August 1965 left Malaysia protected under the Joint Statement of 1961 but placed Singapore in the undesirable position of not having a formal treaty for her defence(13). The British Government, however, indicated that Britain's defence commitments to Singapore remained unchanged in practical terms(14).

Singapore, nevertheless, continued until November 1971(15) without a formal defence pact. An unpublished agreement was negotiated between the Governments of Singapore and the United Kingdom in June 1967 which pledged the British to allow Singapore a definite say as to the number and strength of British troops which Singapore regarded as adquate for Singapore's defence(16). The Governments of Britain and Malaysia concluded a like agreement in July 1967(17).

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THE British Government's decision ultimately to reduce significantly or withdraw completely its military forces from Malaysia/Singapore was evident in 1966. A series of annual Command Papers outlined British defence objectives and explained the economic realities which demand the reduction or elimination of its defence burden in South-East Asia. The January 1968 announcement of the British withdrawal of all forces by 1971 left Malaysia and Singapore with little time to arrange for a rapid build-up of their small military forces and other means of defence assistance(18). The withdrawal also implied the cancellation of the AMDA defence treaty(19).

Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaysia, in August 1967 suggested that a Five-Power Conference be held to discuss mutual security concerns(20). Australia, Britain, New Zealand and Singapore agreed to enter into discussions in August 1967. However, it became apparent that little unanimity existed among the Powers as to what commitments might be undertaken in the place of AMDA(21).

The British Labour Government's decision to retrench in Asia and concentrate on its interests in the European Economic Community (EEC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) left Australia as the only viable military Power able to take up the British security commitment. Neither Australia nor New Zealand had ever embarked upon a military operation or a promise of future military support without the benefit of a treaty relationship, the existence of a military threat or joint participation in active military operations with British or US forces e.g., the Second World War, the Emergency (1948-1960), Korea (1950-1953), Confrontation (1963-1966) or Vietnam (1965-1970)(22). The extent of possible US military support for Australian/New Zealand military operations in Singapore and/or Malaysia is complex. The ANZUS Treaty (1 September 1951) signed by the US, Australia and New Zealand binds the US to come to the military assistance of either Australia or New Zealand under conditions involving an armed attack on "its armed forces" wherever the attack might occur(23). In 1969 at the ANZUS Ministerial Meeting in Canberra, the US reportedly expressed interest in ANZUS taking a leading role in the defence of Singapore/Malaysia after 1971. ANZUS in this role would enjoy the support of the US but not its active participation(24). The Nixon Doctrine precludes the use of US ground forces in support of a defence relationship such as ANZUS. It does not, however, forbid other kinds of diplomatic and military/political overtures(25).

Representatives of the Five-Power group met formally in Kuala Lumpur in June 1968. This meeting represented an expression of interest in developing methods of future co-operation by all concerned. The ground-work was laid for the replacement of AMDA at the meeting when the following substantative matters were agreed upon:

- Singapore and Malaysia stated that the defence of both States was indivisible. They resolved to do their utmost to improve their individual defence postures. This declaration was welcomed by the other three Governments(26).

- Singapore outlined its plans to raise an air force which would supplement the integrated air defence system being established by Five-Power arrangement for the protection of the Singapore/Malaysia air spaces.

- Australia promised air support to the integrated air defence system up to 1971. In June 1968 it was evident that Australia had not yet determined whether or not it would preserve a defence commitment in South-East Asia after 1971 let alone assume a major share of the security responsibility upon the departure of the British(27).

- The conference also agreed to hold joint ground exercises in the Singapore/Malaysia area after 1971. It was also agreed to establish a joint exercise planning staff and a

jungle warfare training school on a multinational basis(28).

- Britain stated that a major exercise should be held in 1970 which would be the forerunner of joint exercises to be held regularly after 1971. These exercises would enable Britain to test and refine its ability to deploy troops rapidly from the UK to Singapore if necessary after 1971(29).

Response to the conference by Singapore and Malaysia was guarded with concern being voiced that Australia and New Zealand would only "take into account" the conference discussion in arriving at their long-term defence policies(30).

After considerable intra-governmental debate and consultation, Australian Prime Minister John Gorton on 25 February 1969 made the following statement regarding Australia's post — 1971 defence plans for Singapore/Malaysia: Australia would maintain "forces of all arms in that area after British withdrawal — without setting any specific terminal date"(31). On the same date the Prime Minister of New Zealand Keith Holyoake stated that New Zealand would maintain its forces in Singapore and Malaysia after 1971(32). New Zealand's forces would be integrated with the Australian contingent for supply and other administrative purposes. For this and other reasons the Government of New Zealand's policy on this topic was tied to the Australian decision.

Mr. Gorton qualified the Australian/New Zealand commitment by stating that Australian forces would not remain in that area unless their presence continued to be desired by Singapore and Malaysia. Australian forces would be available for use against externally promoted and inspired Communist infiltration and subversion, subject to the prior consent of the Australian Government. The forces would not be used for the maintenance of local law and order (i.e., in the suppression of communal riots or in any confrontation between Singapore and Malaysia)(33). He pointed out that if, in the future, a threat to the region were to develop which was incompatible with Australia's ability successfully to support the local forces, then allies outside of the region would have to be relied upon for additional assistance(34). Finally, Gorton added that the use of Australian forces was always a matter for decision by the Australian Government "and that decision will be made in the light of our judgement of all of the circumstances at any given time"(35).

Mr. Gorton's statement was highly significant in that it cleared up existing doubts as to Australian plans for the post-1971 period. The qualifications and stipulations as outlined, however, limited the Australian commitment and raised doubts as to Gorton's convictions and future co-operation in the Five-Power group.

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THE May 1969 communal rioting between Malays and Chinese and later on Malays and citizens of the Indian community in Kuala Lumpur further threatened the establishment of the Five-Power defence group.(36)

Communal riots in Malaysia or Singapore have always affected racial relations in the other State. The May rioting in Kuala Lumpur had immediate consequences in Singapore. Limited numbers of Chinese and Malays were arrested in Singapore and incidents in that city were restricted by quick riot-control procedures and impartial and strict administration of justice towards all violators regardless of race(37).

Australia perceived the possible stationing of its troops in Singapore or Malaysia as inviting their involvement in possible future communal disturbances. A possibility such as this had, of course, been stipulated against in the Gorton policy statement of February 1969.

In June 1969 high-level representatives of the five nations met in Canberra for further discussions. The meeting was overshadowed by the May riots in Kuala Lumpur as well as the advent of the Philippine claim to Sabah in East Malaysia. Australia desired complete neutrality in any regional dispute involving other nations in South-East Asia. In the opening address to the Conference, Mr. Gorton created turmoil by discussing the Australian promise to defend Malaya — not Malaysia(38). His statement appeared to question the concept of the indivisibility of the defence of Singapore and Malaysia. The credibility of Australia was also open to question if it were true that Australian troops would be used only in Malaya. Singaporean and Malaysian reaction was caustic(39).

Military aspects of the developing Five-Power relationship proceeded smoothly. Advisory Working Groups had been established soon after the 1968 conference and were focusing on logistics, force levels and a large-scale joint exercise to be run in the spring of 1970 which would give the British an opportunity to test their ability to airlift troops from Britain at short notice. Other topics of importance involved the operation of the Jungle Warfare School at Ulu Tiram in the southern part of Malaysia(40). Discussion also centred upon the question of billets for Australian and New Zealand troops. Both countries insisted that their units be moved from Terendak, near Malacca in Malaysia, to Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, stated that Australian forces would be better employed in West Malaysia as a token of Australian commitment to maintain "forces of sanity and stability there"(41). This remark was in reference to the plight of Chinese living in Malaysia who suffered considerable losses in the May 1969 riots. It is probable that the Australian/New Zealand decision to move to Singapore took into consideration the possibility of involvement in communal conflicts as well as cost factors and facilities. The ANZUK States continued to encourage continuing Singapore-Malaysian defence co-operation, including the scheduling of joint training exercises. The prevailing mutual distrust in the Singapore-Malaysian relationship, however, precluded that form of joint defence relationship.

The Australian decision to move its troops to Singapore, plus its public vacillation as to its desire to defend all of Malaysia, moved Tunku Abdul Rahman to state in August 1969 that the "Five-Power defence arrangement (was) useless now as far as Malaysia is concerned"(42). He went on to say that Malaysia would upgrade its relations with its neighbours (Indonesia, Thailand and to a limited extent, mainly in the internal security area, Singapore). Malaysia had been in the process of quietly establishing bilateral security arrangements with Thailand and Indonesia. Relations with each of these countries involved co-ordinating and providing logistics assistance in joint campaigns on their common borders against Communist terrorists.

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COMMAND problems continued to be unresolved. Britain desired to relinquish her predominance as senior partner and declined to appoint a Commanding General during the planning phase. Australia reluctantly agreed to provide a senior officer for the unified air command.

The political events of the autumn of 1969 in Australia added further uncertainty for the future of the Five-Power concept. Prime Minister Gorton's Liberal-Country Government escaped defeat by a division of three votes on 25 November. Mr. Gough Whitlam's Labor Party began behaving like a government-designate. Labor Party officials stated that once they were in power all Australia's troops would be removed from Vietnam and, soon after, Australian military units stationed in Singapore and Malaysia would be returned home(43).

In April 1970 the Five-Power nations staged a joint military exercise in the north of Malaysia named *Bersatu Padu* (Malay for "complete unity")(44). Approximately 25,000 troops of all five countries participated. Political necessity overshadowed military reality when the exercise scenario called for the Five-Power forces to repel invasion of Malaysia by conventional forces from the mythical State of "Ganesia"(45). Threats to the security of Malaysia and Singapore lie in an active insurgency against the Malaysian Government by the MCP conducted from sanctuaries in southern Thailand and the possibility of communal hostilities between Malays and Chinese. *Bersatu Padu's* scenario reflected the desire of the ANZUK nations to avoid committing their troops to any operation other than an external attack.

The exercise was judged to be a success from the tactical and logistical points of view. Britain airlifted units of infantry, artillery and helicopters in record time from the UK to Singapore, and the exercise was important in confirming the British Labour Government's interest in rotating units to this area for training after the conclusion of the withdrawal in 1971.

Singaporean and Malaysian units worked together in this exercise with troops from Singapore being permitted to operate in Malaysian territory for the first and last time.

The relative success of the exercise encouraged future political and fiscal support by the Governments of the Five-Power nations.

The electoral victory of the Conservative Party in Britain in June 1970 had a rejuvenating effect in every respect on the planning for the Five-Power arrangements. Prime Minister Edward Heath's view of the British defence role "East of Suez" differed from that of the Labour Government it succeeded.

The Conservatives believed that a continued British presence in South-East Asia in the form of equal troop, naval and air units would achieve the following objectives: it would encourage Australia and New Zealand to assume greater responsibility than if there were no British participation in the defence of Singapore and Malaysia; it would buy time for Malaysia to resolve its internal communal problems; it would represent a more effective representation of British interest in Asia; it would not cost much more than Labour's plans to rotate units for training in and out of Singapore/Malaysia(46).

Britain agreed to participate as an equal in Five-Power planning but only at the same level of support as the other ANZUK States. The Conservatives also refused to halt the withdrawal of British units still remaining in Singapore and continued to hand over bases and other facilities being vacated(47).

The British decision to participate in Five-Power arrangements after 1971 provided leadership and impetus for further co-operation within the group. The ultimate agreement to "consult" on future security threats to Singapore/Malaysia as opposed to any iron-clad guarantees of support was more acceptable to the other ANZUK States.

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ON 21 April 1971 all members of the Five-Power group agreed on a set of defence arrangements to come into effect on 1 November, (48). The agreement stressed that in the event of any form of armed attack, the member countries would hold "immediate consultations" and would decide what measures would be taken "jointly or separately" to meet the threat(49).

It was clear that no country was committed to come to the aid of Singapore or Malaysia. The continuing "indivisibility" of Singapore and Malaysia for defence purposes was noted as well as the slowly evolving defence co-operation between the two States.

Co-operation and progress in the integrated Air Defence System and in the Naval Force were mentioned, as well as the establishment of an Air Defence Council composed of one senior officer from each of the Five Powers to be responsible for the functioning and operational readiness of the system. A joint consultative council was established to provide a framework for political discussion in a time of crisis as well as a forum for senior level consultation on defence matters.

Unofficially, differences of opinion remained on housing arrangements for ANZUK units in Singapore and the operation of the Jungle Warfare Training School in Johore, Malaysia, which was to continue to be run by the British until November 1971(50).

On 1 November 1971 letters were exchanged between Britain and Malaysia terminating AMDA. Letters were also exchanged by Australia and New Zealand with Malaysia terminating their association with the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement(51).

In lieu of a signed treaty, letters were exchanged between the ANZUK States and Singapore and Malaysia setting out the arrangements which would apply in the post-1 November period.

ANZUK forces numbered approximately 6,000 men(52) with Australia bearing the brunt of the manpower load(53). The ANZUK military force as established in 1971, included three battalions of infantry, five to six destroyers or frigates, two submarines and supporting air contingent of fighter bombers, helicopters, long-range reconnaissance and transport aircraft. This force when backed up with infantry, amphibious personnel carriers, tanks and artillery from Singapore and Malaysia was adequate as a symbol of the interest and desire to help on the part of the ANZUK States. It was probably inadequate to defend either Singapore or Malaysia from an external attack(54).

The military components of the Five-Power

group were divided into three categories: ground, air and naval. The ANZUK ground units were limited in their effectiveness because of the scarcity of training areas and their circumscribed mission. They represented the non-utilitarian aspect of the Five-Power pledge(55). In the event of an attack on either Singapore or Malaysia they would either be reinforced or withdrawn.

The air component (integrated Air Defence System) has experienced more difficulty in making progress because of the highly technical aspects of its mission. Both Singapore and Malaysia are rapidly approaching competence in the development of their air and missile systems. ANZUK units working in this area are rotated into Singapore and Malaysia from home airfields.

The ANZUK naval contribution is the most pragmatic and functional. Its ships patrol the Straits of Malacca and adjacent waters, showing their flag and limiting the amount of pirate and smuggling activity already rife in this area.

The ANZUK forces operate to a large extent independently of the military forces of Singapore and Malaysia. Small groups of instructors function within the various units of the Singaporean and Malaysian military, but with the exception of the *Bersatu Padu* exercises, little joint training has been accomplished.

Politically, the Five-Power arrangement was limited from its inception in 1971. It has been marked by clashes of national interest and vacillation, compounded by the inability of Singapore and Malaysia to develop a genuine co-operative relationship for joint defence.

The Five-Power pact does, however, serve several useful purposes. The possibility of confrontation between Singapore and Malaysia, which might be generated by further communal riots, has been reduced. Western investments are given a moderate degree of protection. The ANZUK presence also provides support for US security policy in maritime South-East Asia. The presence of the ANZUK ground and naval contingents limits the activity of Soviet naval activity in the Straits of Malacca.

The elections in Australia and New Zealand in the autumn of 1972 which brought Labour Governments into power brought on a series of political and military problems for the Five Power relationship. Both Labour Parties, before the respective elections, threatened to withdraw their troops if elected.

In response to these statements, or by coincidence, Malaysia at the same time stated that it would dissociate itself from the Five-Power Arrangements in the future as a part of its foreign policy advocating the neutralization of the Straits of Malacca area (56). Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew stated that as long as the US stayed in Asia the "Five-Power pact can go" (57).

In the spring of 1973 Australia announced that it would withdraw its ground combat troops by the end of 1973 and its support troops by 1975(58). New Zealand elected to retain its units already committed to the Five-Power Arrangements in Singapore(59).

The projected Australian pull-out necessitates restructuring within the ground and ultimately the air units in the Five-Power group. It means little, however, in the political context.

To this date all five Powers continue to agree that the Five-Power Arrangements are of worth to them in one way or another. The Five-Power Arrangements represent a symbol of interest by the ANZUK countries in the future of Singapore and Malaysia. The presence of substantial numbers of infantry represents only an economic benefit to Singapore. The air and especially naval unit activities are much more important and to this date have not been reduced or removed.

The Five-Power Arrangements represent a mid-point model in security pacts between ironclad treaties such as SEATO, and the bilateral security relationships recently developed in maritime South-East Asia. This description of a highly problematic and political attempt at regional security co-operation highlights the lesson which the smaller States of South-East Asia are learning. Each State must provide its own security within the limits of its ability. Reliance on neighbour States is possible (Malaysia's co-operation with Indonesia and Thailand on mutual problems with Communist insurgents) but de-

manding in terms of concessions made. Reliance upon former colonial relationships may be the most comfortable but also includes political pitfalls as well as economic benefits. Reliance upon the major Powers is politically difficult but in the case of Singapore and Malaysia may represent the only final guarantee of support in a crisis.

Editorial Note: The new minority Labour Government in Britain, formed following the General Election of 28 February, has announced that it will undertake a comprehensive review of Britain's defence commitments and spending (June 1974).

Notes and References

1. *Five Power Defence Arrangements* (A.R. Shearer, Government Printer, Wellington, 1971), p. 6.

2. See *Article 5* of the "Communique Issued at the Conclusion of the Five Power Ministerial Meeting on the External Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, London, 15-16 April 1971" in *ibid,* p. 7. Hereafter cited as "Five Power Communique."

3. The defence of Malaysia and Singapore has always been considered to be "indivisible." Contingency planning for an external attack is predicated upon the use of both States in the defence of either one. A far more difficult problem arises for the ANZUK partners if conflict erupts in either or both Malaysia and Singapore because of racial riots, Communist insurgency or, as a worst case, relations between Malaysia and Singapore deteriorate to warfare. A discussion of ANZUK may be found in T.B. Millar, "The Five-Power Defence Agreement and Southeast Asian Security," *Pacific Community* (Tokyo), Vol. 3, No. 2 (January 1972), pp. 344-345.

4. See Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Collective Defence in Southeast Asia* (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1956), p. 20.

5. During the early phases of the Emergency (1949-1955) both Australia and New Zealand committed small air units in support of the ground forces deployed by the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries See Derek McDougall, "The Evolution of Australia's Defence Policy in Relation to Malaysia-Singapore, 1964-1971," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,* (Singapore), Vol. III, No. 1 (March 1972), p. 97; Keith Jackson, "Because it's there... A consideration of the decision to commit New Zealand troops to Malaysia beyond 1971," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,* (Singapore), Vol. II, No. 1 (March 1971), pp. 22-23.

6. The Commonwealth Strategic Reserve force was established as a task-organized mobile force to be used on a regional basis and in support of SEATO contingency plans. It was to have included military units from all of the Commonwealth countries in South-East Asia and Australasia. It failed to develop into the type of organization originally envisaged. The British, Australian and New Zealand units remained tied up in the campaign against the Communist Terrorists (CTs) in Malaya until 1960. See Keith Jackson, *op. cit.,* pp. 22-23.
7. See Royal Institute of International Affairs, *op. cit.,* pp. 175-177.

8. See *ibid.,* Article V.

9. See J.D.B. Miller, "The Mutual and Shared Commitments of Australia and New Zealand," *Australian Outlook,* (Australian Institute of International Affairs, Melbourne) Vol. 22, No. 1 (April 1968), p. 15.

10. *Ibid.*

11. See *Agreement on External Defence and Mutual Assistance Between the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Federation of Malaya,* Command 263 (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, October, 1957), pp. 4-10. Hereafter cited as Command 263.

12. See *Annex B to the Joint Statement by the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Federation of Malaya,* Command 1563 (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, Nov. 1961), pp. 3-6. Hereafter cited as Command 1563. This agreement is also included as Article 6 of *Malaysia, Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore,* Command 2094 (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, July 1963), p. 2. Hereafter cited as Command 2094.

13. See *Straits Times* (Singapore), 29 October 1965, p.3.

14. *Ibid.*

15. The Five-Power Defence Arrangements went into effect on 1 November 1971.

16. See *Guardian* (London), 24 November 1967, p. 2.

17. See *ibid,* and *Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), 19 July 1967, p. 1.

18. See *Straits Times* (Singapore), 17 June 1967, p. 12.

19. The United States and Australia responded to British announcements of retrenchment when first communicated in 1967 by pressuring Britain to postpone reductions in South-East Asia until after Vietnam was stabilized. Both countries feared the creation of a vacuum in maritime South-East Asia, *Straits Times* (Singapore), 2 June 1967, p. 2.

20. Mr. Harold Holt, Prime Minister of Australia, announced on 17 August 1967 that there would soon be a six-Power review of defence matters in the Malaysia/Singapore area. The US was to be included in the discussions. The US did not send representatives to the discussions held after this date and never formally joined this defence group. See *Straits Budget* (Kuala Lumpur), 23 August 1967, p. 17.

21. Mr. Gough Whitlam, as Australian Opposition Labor Party leader visited Singapore in July 1967 and stated that Australia would not be playing "just the same role" once the British withdrawal had taken place. See *Straits Times* (Singapore), 6 July 1967, p. 9.

22. See Justus M. van der Kroef, *Australian Security Policies and Problems* (National Strategy Information Center, New York, 1970) pp. 12-14; Derek McDougall, *op. cit.,* p. 105.

23. See Sir Percy Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy—The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan* (New York University Press, New York, 1969) pp. 14-23.

24. See "Regional Co-operation," *1970 Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook,* (Hong Kong), p. 37.

25. A detailed discussion of some probable US military/political policy tactics and overall strategic objectives

in maritime South-East Asia may be found in Tom Engelhardt, "The new half-nelson," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (Hong Kong), Vol. 80, No. 14 (9 April 1973), pp. 25-28.

26. Singapore/Malaysian relations had been marked by hostility and distrust prior to 1968. Singapore had been a member of the Federation of Malaysia (1963-1965) and had been expelled from the Federation because of partisan political activity in Malaysia as well as racial incompatibility. In part of the 1965 Separation Agreement, Singapore and Malaysia had pledged to co-operate in defence matters. Little co-operation and consistent low-level bickering had occurred up to the shock of the British announcement to withdraw its military forces. The ANZUK States were relieved to see Singapore and Malaysia showing evidence of defence co-operation. Instituting a joint defence command with all of its inherent political aspects would have been impossible with two of the members hostile to each other.

27. For a discussion of the alternative defence schemes being debated in Australia during 1967 and 1968, e.g. fortress Australia; forward defence; an alliance strategy, etc., see Joseph F. Flader, *Prospects for Continuation of Australia's Forward Defense Strategy* (Institute for Defense Analysis, Arlington, Va., October 1969), pp. 21-48.

28. See *Straits Times* (Singapore), 12 June 1968, p. 1.

29. *Ibid.*

30. See *Current Notes on International Affairs*, (Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra), Vol. 39, No. 6 (June 1968), pp. 249-250.

31. See Prime Minister Gorton's statement to the House of Representatives reprinted in *Current Notes on International Affairs*, (Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra), Vol. 40, No. 2 (February 1969), pp. 41-44.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

34. It is generally understood that the United States is the country referred to in the context of "allies," *ibid.*, p. 43.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

36. A detailed discussion of these riots and their political and social complications may be found in Derek Davies, "Some of Our Best Friends...," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. LXIV, No. 26 (26 June 1969), pp. 700-705, and Dr. Felix V. Gagliano, *Communal Violence in Malaysia, 1969: The Political Aftermath* (Ohio University Center for International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, Athens, Ohio, 1970).

37. See *Observer* (London), 8 June 1969, p. 1; *Times* (London), 9 June 1969,,p. 2.

38. Malaya or West Malaysia is the predominant of the three States in the Federation of Malaysia. The other two States, Sarawak and Sabah, are located on the island of Borneo. Gorton's reference to Malaya implied reluctance to become involved in any dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah. Gorton was also concerned about possibly becoming involved in any future security operations on the Sarawak-Indonesian border which might pit Australians against Indonesian soldiers. See *Current Notes on International Affairs* (Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra), Vol. 40, No. 6 (June 1969), p. 300.

39. A Singapore source (probably Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore) commented: "While Britain remained in the Far East, Australia had always been in the role of the deputy sheriff. But now that Australia had accepted the sheriff's badge, she was showing that she did not know how to draw a six-gun." See *Canberra Times*, 21 June 1969, p. 2.

40. See *Bulletin* (Sydney), Vol. 91, No. 4658 (21 June 1969), pp. 22-24.

41. See *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 June 1969, p. 2.

42. See *Straits Times* (Singapore), 2 August 1969, p. 4.

43. See *Times* (London), 22 October 1969, p. 2.

44. See *Bulletin* (Sydney), Vol. 92, No. 4703 (9 May 1970), pp. 29-30.

45. During the exercise, Communist terrorists of the Malayan Communist Party ambushed a patrol of Malaysian rangers and killed seven members of the unit. *Ibid.*

46. See *Straits Times* (Singapore), 22 July 1970, p. 10.

47. See *Straits Times* (Singapore), 2 August 1970, p. 3.

48. See the Communique issued after the April meeting in London, reprinted in *The Mirror* (Singapore), Vol. 7, No. 18 (3 May 1971), p. 8.

49. *Ibid.*

50. The argument over housing for the Australian and New Zealand troops began quietly in 1969 and continued until October 1971. The dispute centred upon Singapore's feeling that these troops might have been better employed in Malaysia as well as having prior plans for the bases being vacated by the British. The dispute was finally resolved with Australian and New Zealand units moving into rent-free quarters in camps they had not chosen and Singapore being extended an invitation to train her artillery and tank units in Australia. See reporting in *Straits Times* (Singapore), 29 October 1969, p. 1, and *New Nation* (Singapore), 24 June 1971, p. 1; 30 June 1971, p. 1; 23 December 1971, p. 6.

51. See *Straits Times* (Singapore), 17 April 1971, p. 3.

52. Australia in 1971 had approximately 3,000 men; Britain had 2,000, and New Zealand 900. See Millar, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

53. See *ibid.*

54. See *ibid*, and *The Military Balance 1972-1973* (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1972), pp. 46, 52, 53-54.

55. Singapore's ground units are in a continuous training cycle which functions to give young men basic military skills and quickly places them in a reserve category. The Malaysian ground contingent has been operating against terrorists in East Malaysia (Sarawak) and

Communist insurgents in West Malaysia. These units are employed differently from the ANZUK forces.

56. See *Straits Times* (Singapore), 3 October 1972, p. 14.

57. See *Straits Times* (Singapore), 8 December 1972, p. 1.

58. See reporting in *The Mirror* (Singapore), Vol. 9, No. 28 (9 July 1973), p. 5.

The Australian Minister for Defence, the Hon. Lance Barnard M.P., announced the details of the phased withdrawal of Australian forces from Singapore on 4 July 1973.

Mr. Barnard said that a minimum of 1,250 Australian personnel, including all combat elements in the ANZUK brigade, would return to Australia by the end of February 1974.

This would leave no more than 600 personnel, from all three services in Singapore. Their return to Australia would be completed by April 1975.

After that date, Mr. Barnard said, the only Australian personnel that may be posted to Singapore would be those required to implement the Government's technical assistance and other defence aid schemes, to facilitate programmes of combined exercises, and to support those engaged in such projects. These personnel would number up to about 150.

Mr. Barnard said the Australian Cabinet had taken no decision regarding the timing of withdrawal of the *Mirage* squadrons from Butterworth, Malaysia, but would review this question no later than March 1975.

Mr. Barnard reaffirmed that Australia would honour the full terms of the Five-Power Arrangements. Those arrangements did not require the permanent stationing of Australian forces overseas, he said.

59. Australia attempted to convince New Zealand to withdraw its units at the time of the Australian withdrawal. See "Pressure on NZ to quit ANZUK," *Christ Church Star*, 27 April 1973, p. 2.

LAW OF THE SEA: *From the viewpoint of developing countries, a major task of the International Conference on the Law of the Sea in Caracas, Venezuela (June—August) should be to clear up the ambiguities surrounding the legal status of straits. The following analysis was first presented last March at a Bangkok meeting of the External Section of the Hague Academy of International Law.*

An Asian Viewpoint on the Status of Straits

Phiphat Tangsubkul

A "Strait" may be defined in various ways. Its principal characteristic, however, as recognized in existing international law, is that it consists of a narrow space or passage connecting one part of the high seas, either with another part of the high seas, or with the territorial sea of a State.

But within this most generalized of definitions a strait may be subject to unique historical and geopolitical factors. Consequently, the juridical base of its defined status may differ from case to case, ranging from tacit understanding to multilateral treaty.

For the purpose of this paper the question of Straits, in spite of several legends which run through Mediterranean history from the Trojan War to the 18th century, should be studied from the Treaty of Kuchuc Qaynarjah of 1774 (1) to the Lausanne Convention of 1923 and the famous Montreux Convention (1936).

Between the 18th century and the eve of the Second World War, the problem of Straits essentially referred to the Black Sea, including the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. These Straits are a means of maritime communication, in which all the littoral Powers of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean have a general interest. Complications first arose when the shores of the Black Sea ceased to be controlled exclusively by Turkey.

Since the Black Sea was a closed body of water, Turkey as the sovereign State in control of its shores could prevent entrance into the Straits and access to the Black Sea to ships of foreign nations. But this state of affairs ended when the Russians, compelled by various religious, economic and political reasons, advanced southward against the Turks, gaining a foothold on the Azov and Black Seas. As a result, Russia declared its right to freedom of navigation on the Black Sea and freedom of passage through the Straits to the Mediterranean. Eventually, Russia succeeded in making treaties with Turkey to that effect.

This situation aroused the disapproval of other Powers, especially Britain which quickly sought acceptance of the principle of equal treatment. Thus, the principles of "the Closed Straits" and "Freedom of the Straits" were, according to the exigencies of the moment, pleaded from time to time by Russia and Turkey and by the Powers which became associated with one or the other.

But beyond the interest of these two Powers there were the interests of many other Powers; interests which could not be satisfied without acceptance of the principle of equal treatment for all nations and therefore "Freedom of the Straits" assured to all without discrimination.

With regard to the regime of the Straits as

established in the Treaty and the Convention of Lausanne of 1923, the fundamental principle is affirmed in Articles 1 and 23. Article 1 reaffirms the general principle of freedom of passage and navigation through the Straits as formulated in Article 23: "The High Contracting Parties agree to recognize and declare the principle of freedom of passage and navigation by sea and by air both in time of peace and in time of war in the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus according to the provisions of the special Convention concluded today relative to the regime of the Straits. This Convention shall have with regard to the High Contracting Parties, the same force and value as though it were part of the present Treaty." Freedom of passage and navigation through the Straits was also guaranteed by Article 2 of Section 1 of the Montreux Convention of 1936.

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THE definition of a Strait contained in paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone* is broadly drawn to include straits "between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State" (2).

At the present time there is still no uniform agreement on the geographical classification regarding the width of straits. For example, Magellan Strait (Lat. 53° 00'S Long. 70° 35'W : bounded by : South of Chile and Argentina) is only one mile wide while the passage between Cape Verde Islands and Africa (Lat. 15° 00'N Long. 20° 00'W : bounded by : East - Senegal and West-Cape Verde Islands) is 305 miles wide and has been also classified as a strait by some geographers. Since no international agreement has been reached on the width of territorial waters, the juridical aspect concerning "Straits" remains sensitive, complicated and open to continuing interpretation.

The interpretation of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone could suggest that straight baselines should be used in localities where the coastline is deeply indented, or where there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity. This principle of straight baselines had been borrowed from the Anglo- Norwegian Fisheries Case of 1951. The original purpose was to allow coastal States to draw one or several lines along their coasts, according to the unusual geographical configurations, for protection of their natural resources and national security purposes.

But during the last decade, some coastal States have adopted a new method for drawing straight baselines. Thus straight baselines are being used now not only for joining the fringes of islands *along the coast* but also for grouping rocks, islets, isles and islands by linking the outermost points of the outermost islands, for example with regard to coastal archipelagoes. This concept now seems to have become general practice. When this method is applied to Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone which stipulated that.... "the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to *be subject to the regime of internal waters,*" several straits in Asia are automatically found, juridically speaking, to be inside *internal* waters. Therefore, in legal analysis, the juridical status of straits defined by Paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the same Convention becomes ambiguous and possibly outdated as a result of this generalization regarding the method used for drawing straight baselines.

With regard to outlying archipelagoes, the following States have applied the principle of treating the archipelago as a unit : the Philippines; Indonesia; Fiji; Ecuador; Iceland; Faroes (Denmark).

In the application of the archipelago principle, the States mentioned above differ in several respects, e.g. in the purpose and method of delimitation. Only two of them, the Philippines and Indonesia, can be said to apply archipelago delimitation for all purposes; the others applying

**Editorial Note:* The contiguous zone: "the zone, beyond the territorial sea but less than 12 miles from the coast, where the coastal State may claim, not full sovereignty, but jurisdiction for certain purposes, such as security, sanitary regulations or immigration" (Evan Luard, "The Law of the Sea Conference", *International Affairs*, London, April 1974, p. 270).

the straight baselines system for the protection of resources. The Indonesian case differs from the others in that it has detailed provisions on the innocent passage through the waters of the Indonesian archipelago contained in Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Presidential Act No. 4, 18 February 1960 (Act Concerning Indonesian Waters).

This new concept of State practice relating to the protection of territorial integrity, but also affecting the regime of straits used for international navigation, is embodied in recent legislation adopted by the Philippine Government. The National Territory Act (Article 1, section 1) stipulated that "The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all the other territories belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title, including the territorial sea, the air space, the subsoil, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and the other submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. *The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, irrespective of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.*" (3).

This practical concept, reaffirmed by the United Nations paper "Archipelagic Principles"(4), has also been submitted to Sub-Committee II of the **Sea-Bed** Committee* at its first session this year by Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius and the Philippines.

These "Archipelagic Principles" have been divided into three paragraphs :

* An archipelagic State, whose component islands and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, and historically have or may have been regarded as such, *may draw straight baselines* connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago from which the extent of the territorial sea of the archipelagic State is or may be determined.

* The waters within the baselines (regardless of their depth or distance from the coast), the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof, and the superjacent airspace, as well as all their resources, belong to, and are *subject to the sovereignty of the archipelagic State.*

* Innocent passage of foreign vessels through the waters of the archipelagic State shall be allowed in accordance with its national legislation, having regard to the existing rules of international law. Such passage shall be through sea-lanes as may be designated for that purpose by the archipelagic State.

In this situation, any study should be based on the concept mentioned above because this new State practice has clearly changed the characteristics of straits as recognized by the 1958 Geneva Convention. The new regime of Straits will be not only a narrow space connecting two parts of the high seas or one part of the high seas and the other part of the territorial seas but, in addition, it will be found inside the internal waters of a State. It remains to be seen if the international community will accept this new concept relating to the "Archipelagic Principles" which, if employed, would close at least ten Straits in Asia.

* * * * * * *

THERE are in Asia more than twenty straits used as major shipping routes and alternate routes. These are listed in an annex to this paper.

Following the straight baseline principle and taking the concept of 12 miles as the international delimitation of the Territorial Sea (5) including that of islands, these 25 principal Asian straits can be classified into at least three categories:

— Straits connecting two parts of the high seas
— Straits connecting one part of the high seas and another part of the territorial seas
— Straits found inside the internal waters of a sovereign State.

**Editorial Note:* The UN Sea-Bed Committee was set up in 1968 and has since 1970 been engaged in preparing for the Third International Conference on the Law of the Sea.

FIGURE I

Straits connecting two parts of the high seas	Straits connecting one part of the high seas and another part of the territorial seas	Straits found inside the internal waters of a foreign State
Formosa Strait	Balabac Strait Korea Strait La Perouse Strait Luzon Strait Malacca Straits Osumi Strait Palk Strait Strait of Hormuz Sibutu Passage Singapore Strait Tsugaru Strait	Basilan Strait Chiungchou Strait Mindoro Strait Gaspar Strait Karimata Strait Lombok Strait Strait of Makassar Surigao Strait Ombai Strait San Bernardino Strait Sapoedi Strait Sunda Strait Verde Island Passage

Among these 25 straits only 12 (found in categories 1 and 2 of Figure I) relate to paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the 1958 Geneva Convention. The other 13 straits (found in category 3 of Figure I) become affected by the regime of internal waters, which means that every foreign ship which wants to use or pass through the latter Straits has to enter into the internal waters of a foreign State (6). And there is an important distinction in the existing international law between the regime of territorial seas and that of internal waters (7). In accordance with the Indonesian Law, (8) the "Archipelagic Principles" and the "Draft articles on navigation through the territorial sea including straits used for international navigation submitted to Sub-Committee II of the Sea-Bed Committee by Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines, Spain and Yemen" (9), innocent passage shall be guaranteed but foreign vessels in national waters have to respect and follow the national legislation of the coastal States. The question here is: how is such national legislation by coastal strait States to be determined?

In accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 16 (1958 Geneva Convention), "there shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through Straits," and there should not be such suspension for Straits which are used for international navigation "between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State." In the case of straits within internal waters, the question arises whether or not the term "*no suspension of innocent passage*" will be contained or accepted in such national legislation? Furthermore, how can the right of passage be guaranteed in time of war or quasi-war?

This study seems to have progressed one step beyond the work to date of the Sub-Committee II of the Sea-Bed Committee which is still dealing (May 1974) with questions of innocent passage or free transit through straits bordered by territorial seas. *Ipso facto*, it might be considered untimely to talk about the passage through straits within internal waters, when the question of passage through straits within territorial waters has not even reached an international agreement.

On the other hand, avoidance of the recognition of the existence of straits inside internal waters is totally divorced from reality. (At the base of this situation lies the more general and difficult problem of ascertaining a logical and scientific definition from the international community of the future status of straits, which cannot be touched upon here). Indeed, the absence of any direct proposal so far (May 1974) relating to the status of "straits within the internal waters of a foreign State" — either before Sub-Committee 11 or the Caracas Conference — could boomerang and jeopardize the chances for a new law regarding straits. Under the one man/one vote system the developing countries would easily obtain a majority although, of course, the major Powers could always reserve such an item or even refuse to ratify new Conventions. It is regrettable that *raison d'etat* should prevent the tabling and reasonable resolution of this issue, after the expense of much time and money on the convening of an International Conference.

It is the view of the writer that a compromise on this subject would have been possible if the user-States had recognized the right of coastal States to regulate and perhaps to restrict passage, within international standards, through straits within territorial seas and national waters. It would then be the duty and obligation of the straits States to recognize that there shall be "no suspension" of "innocent passage" through their strait area zone for all vessels.

The question of military vessels could be assigned to a "special commission" to classify the power of destruction of each type of warship. It is suggested by this writer that some types of mass destruction, such as nuclear submarines, should have to ask for prior consent to pass through straits.

As to the passage of super-tankers, this should be worked out within an international standard. In other words, control regulations regarding the prevention of pollution occurring from the passage of super-tankers should be assigned to Sub-Committee I of the Sea-Bed Committee.

* * * * * * *

STATES which are concerned with the question of the re-establishment of the juridical status of straits in Asia can be classified into three broad categories.

(1) The industrialized nations, particularly the nuclear Powers whose interest, in effect, centres on excluding straits from any agreement on the width of territorial waters and on preventing the closure of narrow seas to jumbo-tankers, and nuclear submarines warships. USA, USSR, United Kingdom, Japan, the Netherlands and Canada fall into this category.

(2) The Straits States, most of which are developing countries—the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Fiji.

(3) The Peoples Republic of China, the position of which is entirely different from that of the other nuclear Powers. Although this country, economically, still remains a developing nation, in military capacity it is another nuclear Power.

This classification is useful in emphasizing those countries which have a similar basic approach as user-States on the one hand, and as Straits States on the other. It does not imply that there is a uniform position among States in each category.

The discussions on all draft articles and submitted proposals can be used to analyse the basic principles underlying the position of each group and each country.

In group (1), the basic principle was supported by two draft articles: on the breadth of the territorial sea, straits and fisheries, submitted to Sub-Committee II by the United States (A/AC.138/SC. II/L.4 and Corr.1), and on straits used for international navigation submitted by the USSR (A/AC.138/SC. II/L.7).

The position of the second group had been supported by two other documental papers: Archipelagic Principles as proposed to Sub-Committee II by the delegations of Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius and the Philippines (A/AC.138/SC. II/L.15); draft articles on navigation through the territorial sea including straits used for international navigation submitted to the Sub-Committee by Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, the Philippines, Spain and Yemen. (A/AC.138/SC.II/L.18).

The general position of countries in group (1) can be analysed in two respects: firstly in terms of their status as developed or industrialized nations, and secondly as nuclear Powers.

As developed or industrialized nations, these States: sought maximum assurance for ships and aircraft in *de facto* freedom of passage through and over straits;

Wished to emphasize that the right of "free transit" through and over such straits should enjoy the same freedom as on the high seas;

Considered that the right of "freedom of transit" through and over such straits should extend to their warships and military aircraft;

Considered the problem of transit through straits, not only from the military stand-point but also from that of trade;

Recognized liability for any damage caused to the coastal States as a result of the passage through or the overflight of straits;

Emphasized that straits should be opened to free passage by any vessel under the principle of the equality of all flags.

As nuclear powers, they opposed a linkage of a new juridical status on narrow territorial seas to the question of straits which would either close straits to nuclear submarines, or would require submarines to traverse the passage on the surface.

"However, it is important for the nuclear strategy of both sides that submarines stay submerged once on station. If a submarine's position is known, the submarine can be easily destroyed in any first-strike nuclear attack"(10). The major concern regarding nuclear submarines is to maintain maximum maneovrability. This implies complete freedom of movement on

the high seas including free transit through straits. This is why the nuclear powers, especially the USA and the USSR, could reach an accord in this respect (11).

It became clear that the maritime nations were seeking the right of free transit for reasons of trade and so-called national security.

States bordered by straits were concerned to reduce any risk of damage by vessels in the area of the sea-passages. Their basic principles, generally opposed to those of the user-States, were:

That a strait was an integral part of the territorial waters of a coastal State, whose sovereignty must be fully safeguarded;

That the right of "innocent passage" through straits within territorial waters would be respected;

That there is a distinction between the right of innocent passage of merchant ships and fishing boats and that of warships (including nuclear submarines);

That the right of innocent passage over straits by aircraft should not be included in negotiations;

That the concept of "free transit" through straits as *de facto* on the high seas was unacceptable.

That the right of coastal States to regulate and perhaps to restrict passage through straits within their territorial seas must first be acknowledged.

The People's Republic of China's position *vis-a-vis* the status of straits is based primarily on its own State practice and on its attitude toward the international community.

According to the State practice of China, the Chinese Government is, firstly, aware of the prevailing legal position concerning "straits normally used for international navigation between two parts of the high sea" (12).

However, in accordance with Paragraph 2 of the Chinese Declaration, China claims the Chiungchou Strait (Hainan Strait) as inland waters.

"The Chiungchou Strait : near the southern end of the Chinese coast, separates the Luichow Peninsula and Hainan Island and links the South China Sea with the Gulf of Tonkin. It is about 50 miles long and from 9.8 to 19 miles wide. The Strait bas been the main shipping route between Hong Kong and Haiphong and will probably become part of a major highway for international traffic for a much broader area, since China has been building a major port at Chankiang on the Luichow Peninsula to serve South-East Asia and the route to Europe" (13).

From the juridical aspect, China's claim to the Chiungchou Strait as its inland waters is, of course, the result of the application of the straight baseline method. However, China has not treated Chiungchou Strait exactly as inland waters. It, has, for instance, permitted foreign non-military vessels to pass through the Strait, although under very strict conditions (14).

From an international viewpoint the People's Republic of China has since becoming a member of the Sea-Bed Committee, stated several times a position which can be understood to offer a counterweight to that of the other super-Powers.

The Chinese analysis regarding the Law of the Sea is that for several centuries the benefits from the sea have always been enjoyed by the big Powers, even in the key articles of the Geneva Convention of 1958 which favour the big maritime countries. Today, with the application of the "one State one vote" system (which has been employed by the Sea-Bed Committee) and with many small and developing nations attaining independence, it is in the interests of a Power to join with the developing States in a joint position with regard to the adoption of a new law of the sea. China's position *vis-a-vis* the question of straits reflects its general position regarding the new law of the sea and supports the position of developing countries which are straits States.

Firstly, China considers that "Straits lying within the territorial waters of a coastal State still came under the national sovereignty of that

State, even if they were often used for international navigation" (15). Secondly, from the Chinese point of view it is entirely justified and reasonable to require that prior consent should be obtained before foreign warships and military aircraft pass through or over straits. Finally, it found that the demand for "freedom of transit" and "freedom of overflight" was only made because the super-Powers were seeking to treat the territorial waters of other countries as the high seas.

With regard to the draft article proposed by the Philippines and seven other countries (A/AC. 138/SC. II/L.18) China considered that it might be taken as a basis for discussion by the working group of Sub-Committee II of the Sea-Bed Committee. Furthermore, Peking emphasized that this draft article has basically reflected the legitimate aspirations of the straits States to safeguard the sovereignty of their territorial seas, while paying due regard to the conveniences of international navigation.

It must finally be observed that the question of straits is closely linked with the delimitation of the breadth of the territorial sea and the position of each country in each group mentioned above could, of course, change as a result of diplomatic bargaining or political pressure.

* * * * * * *

AMONG the 25 principal straits in Asia, the Malacca Straits, serving as the major shipping route between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, is one of the most important and heavily travelled (16).

With regard to geography, the term "Malacca Straits" refers to a tremendous sea-area from its northwesternmost entrance between Diamond Point (at 5°15' latitude and 97° 30' longitude in Indonesia's Sumatra) and Ko Lawi and Ko Ladang (Batong Group, at 6°50' latitude and 99° 20' longitude to the south-west of Thailand), to the southeasternmost entrance between Tahan Datok (at 1° 20' latitude and 104° 20' longitude in the Malay Peninsula) and Pergam Coast (at 1° 10' latitude and 104° 20' longitude on Indonesia Bintan Island) or at the Singapore Strait's entrance.

The Malacca Straits thus encompass the shared borders of four littoral South-East Asian States: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.

Every ship from Europe or from the Middle East going to the Far East must pass through the Straits along Indonesia's Sumatra. Ships from Calcutta bound for the Far East will go along the south-west coast of Thailand and the west coast of Malaysia.

Some writers, such as Professor K.E. Shaw (17) have claimed that the west entrance of the Straits in the Indian Ocean is found between Pulau Perak (Perak Island, at 6° latitude and 99° longitude in the Malay Peninsula) and Diamond Point (at 5° 15' latitude and 99° longitude and 97° 30' longitude in Indonesia's Sumatra).

But this is a purely juridical analysis, because Perak Island, which lies at the middle of the west entrance of the passageway, was only the outermost point (a juridical means) used by Malaysia to draw the straight baseline. In this situation every vessel that passes between the Pulau Perak and the median lines (18) would be inside the Malaysian territorial sea, while ships that travel between this Island and the Malay Peninsula would be inside the internal waters of Malaysia (19).

Analysis of the status of Straits - as with all points of international sea law - should start with an examination and consideration of the geographical situation. Applying this to the Malacca Straits, the west entrance would lie between the outermost points of the two opposite coasts. It would thus lie between Diamond Point (at 5°15' latitude and 97° 30' longitude in Sumatra) and Ko Lawi and Ko Ladang (at 6° 50' latitude and 99° 20' longitude, off south-west Thailand).

But any legal definition of the status of the Straits based on an international standard should correspond also with the political, economic and technological realities as these have developed over the years.

From an analysis of the historical background (20), it is clear that there has been no definition of the status of the Malacca Straits *stricto sensu*, despite the fact that in 1641, the Dutch took over control of Malacca and exercised *de facto* sovereignty in the Straits, and in 1824, a boundary treaty was concluded between Britain and the Netherlands regarding

the separation of the influence of the two Powers in the Straits area in terms of coastal trade. Nevertheless, there were always huge portions of high seas in the Straits zones.

But because of the extensions of the breadth of the territorial seas up to 12 miles recently claimed by Indonesia and Malaysia (21) vessels that travel through the Straits must enter the territorial waters of either Malaysia or Indonesia.

Since the making of these claims, nearly all key-straits in this area have come under the jurisdiction of these two littoral States.

Members of the international community, especially Japan, the USSR, the USA, the United Kingdom, and other key European countries and even two other straits States, Singapore and Thailand, bave called into question the right of Indonesia and Malaysia to take this action.

At the present time, the Malacca Straits is the shortest waterway lying between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans (22). The common position of user-States, such as Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, is to keep the Straits open, although the fundamental interest in the use of the Straits is different for each country. This is why the American and Russian proposals in general are similar in using the legal term "free transit" applied to the Malacca Straits for all kinds of ships, including nuclear submarines, and why they have been supported by the Japanese and the British.

Nevertheless, the closure of this passageway could do more harm to Soviet naval strategy than to that of the United States, because the Soviet Union is on the way to increasing its maritime power in the Indian Ocean. The needs for fuel and food supplies from the port of Vladivostok oblige the Russian warships to use the Malacca Straits as the shortest route.

The blockade of this waterway could vitally affect the Japanese economy, since Japanese tankers use the Malacca Straits for the transportation of the nation's petroleum requirements—at least 500 million tons a year.

On the other hand, for the United States there is the need to keep the Straits open for manoeuvres of the Seventh Fleet from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean. Since US political influence in the Straits zone remains stronger than any other maritime Power's, the American policy regarding the "Straits used for international navigation" could be more flexible than that of the other maritime Powers. During the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, for which the concept has been adopted of separating the status of military vessels from that of merchant ships in relation to the right of innocent passage through straits, it is quite certain that a bilateral agreement for the US Navy to pass this waterway could be obtained.

But in the area of environmental protection, the discussions on the term "free transit through and over straits" produced a compromise position among the industrialized nations and the nuclear Powers. The reason behind this compromise was clear: lack of solidarity from any one industrialized State could jeopardize the western group's bargaining position at the Conference. For example, were the Americans to accept the juridical condition that US submarines must pass through the Straits on the surface (even though passages under-sea are hardly practicable, with the Straits reaching less than 10 metres in depth at the shallowest point), this would amount to a reaffirmation of the international principle regarding the separation of the juridical status of military ships from that of merchant and fishing vessels.

Every Asian State is concerned about the future juridical status of the Malacca Straits, but Singapore and Thailand have special interests.

As an international port, Singapore's economy depends essentially on the circulation of ships through the Straits. The juridical closure of the Straits would therefore, affect that economy directly. Indirectly, too, the 12-mile claim by two inner strait States, Indonesia and Malaysia, will stimulate the Japanese as well as the Americans to consider more seriously the project for the Kra Canal (23). If the Kra Canal were built, obviously the new waterway as the shortest passage linking the Indian Ocean and South China Sea would reduce significantly the number of ships using the Port of Singapore.

Thailand, is the other outer strait State

whose coast is bordered by two seas, its West coast by the Andaman Sea and its East coast by the South China Sea. The only connexion between both sides of her coasts is the Malacca Straits. Her position *vis-a-vis* this passage-way since the last century has accordingly been to keep it open.

The situation now is, therefore, that two inner Straits States look to the juridical closure of the Malacca Straits for reasons of pollution control and national security, while two outer Straits States wish to keep the Straits open for economic and military reasons.

The political atmosphere resulting from the Straits controversy is not hopeful unless the four Straits States are capable of working out together an approach which could be endorsed by the majority of the participants at the Law of the Sea Conference.

In the author's view:

- The Malacca Straits should be opened for free navigation by commercial shipping and for overflight (in general)
- Tankers or super-tankers should enjoy the freedom of passage under the control of a special committee composed of representatives of the four Straits States.
- Warships of the four Straits States should enjoy full right of innocent passage.
- Other warships including nuclear warships and submarines should enjoy the right of passage under regulations agreed by the four Straits States.

It is clearly imperative that a special committee of the four littoral States be set up to deal with the Malacca Straits questions before any international agreement on the Straits' status is drafted.

Annex

ASIAN STRAITS

1) *Balabac Strait*
Lat. 7° 49'N *Long.* 117° 9'E
Bounded by: North and West — Balabac Island, Philippines
South — Sabah (Borneo), Malaysia
Width: 17 miles
Length: 38 miles

2) *Basilan Strait*
Lat. 6° 49'N *Long.* 122° 30'E
Bounded by: North — Mindanao, Philippines
South — Basilan Island, Philippines
Width: 6.5 miles
Length: 44 miles

3) *Chiungchou Strait*
Lat. 19° 75'W *Long.* 110° 50'E
Bounded by: North—Luichow Peninsula
South — Hainan Island
Width: 19 miles
Length: 50 miles

4) *Cuyo East Pass and Mindoro Strait*
Lat. 12° 00'N *Long.* 121° 00'E
Bounded by: West — Mindoro Island, Philippines
East — Various Philippine Islands
Width: 15 miles
Length: 176 miles

5) *Formosa Strait*
Lat. 24° 30'N *Long.* 120° 00'E
Bounded by: West — China
East — Taiwan
Width: 67 miles
Length: 200 miles

6) *Gasper Strait*
Lat. 3° 65'S *Long.* 107° 50'E
Bounded by: East — Billiton Island, Indonesia
West — Bangka Island, Indonesia
Width: 14 miles

7) *Karimata Strait*
Lat. 2° 55'S *Long.* 110° 00'E
Bounded by: North-East—Borneo, Indonesia
North — Kepulauan and Karimata Islands
West — Belitung Island
Width: 15 miles

8) *Korea Strait*
Lat. 34°00'N *Long.* 129° 00'E
Bounded by: East and South — Japan
North-West — Korea
Width: 23 miles
Length: 217 miles

9) *La Perouse Strait*
Lat. 41° 50'N *Long.* 142° 0'E
Bounded by: North — Sakhalin Island, U.S.S.R.
South — Hokkaido, Japan
Width: 19 miles
Length: 30 miles

10) *Lombok Strait*
Lat. 8° 40'S *Long.* 116° 00'E
Bounded by: East — Lombok Island, Indonesia
West — Bali Island, Indonesia
Width: 11 miles
Length: 35 miles

11) *Luzon Strait*
Lat. 21° 00'N *Long.* 121° 0'E
Bounded by: North — Taiwan
South — Luzon, Philippines
Width: 24.5 miles (Balintang Channel);
24 miles (Bashi Channel)
Length: 175 miles

12) *Strait of Makassar*
Lat. 0° 30'S *Long.* 118° 40'E
Bounded by: East — Sulawesi (Celebes), Indonesia
West — Kalimantan, Borneo, Indonesia
Width: 52 miles
Length: 140 miles

13) *Malacca Straits*
Lat. 3° 00'N *Long.* 100° 25'E
Bounded by: North and North-East — South of Thailand
North and North-West — Indonesia
North-East — Malaysia
South — Indonesia, Singapore
Width: 8.3 miles
Length: 500 miles

14) *Mindanao Sea and Surigao Strait*
Lat. 10° 00'N *Long.* 125° 00'E
Bounded by: various Philippine Islands
Width: 10 miles
Length: 204 miles

15) *Ombai Strait (Water Passage)*
Lat. 8° 30'S *Long.* 126° 00'E
Bounded by: North-East — Wetar Island, Indonesia
South-East — Timor Island, (Portuguese), and Indonesia
North-West — Alor Island, Indonesia
Width: 16.5 miles
Length: 58 miles

16) *Osumi Strait*
Lat. 31° 00'N *Long.* 131° 00'E
Bounded by: North — Kyushu Island, Japan
South — various Japanese Islands
Width: 16 miles
Length: 50 miles

17) *Palk Strait*
Lat. 10° 00'N *Long.* 80° 00'E
Bounded by: South-East — Ceylon
North-West — India
Width: 4 miles
Length: 108 miles

18) *Persian Gulf (Strait of Hormuz)*
Lat. 25° 00'N *Long.* 52° 00'E
Bounded by: North — Iraq
North-East and East — Iran
South — Trucial States

West — Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait
Width: 21 miles
Length: 500 miles

19) *San Bernardino Strait*
Lat. 12° 25'N *Long.* 124° 00'E
Bounded by: North-West — Luzon, Philippines
South-East — Samar, Philippines
South-West — various Philippine Islands
Width: 3.1 miles

20) *Sapoedi Strait*
Lat. 7° 00'S *Long.* 114° 75'E
Bounded by: West — Semarang Island, Indonesia
East — various Indonesian Islands

Width: 5 miles

21) *Sibutu Passage*
Lat. 4° 52'N *Long.* 119° 40'E
Bounded by: North-East —Tawi Tawi Islands, Philippines
South-East — Sabah (Borneo), Malaysia
Width: 18 miles
Length: 18 miles

22) *Singapore Strait*
Lat. 1° 17'N *Long.* 103° 55'E
Bounded by: North — Singapore and Malaysia
South — Sumatra, Indonesia
Width: 2.5 miles
Length: 48 miles

23) *Sunda Strait*
Lat. 6° 05'S *Long.* 105° 30'E
Bounded by: North — Sumatra, Indonesia
East — Java, Indonesia
Width: 1.75 miles
Length: 48 miles

24) *Tsugaru Strait*
Lat. 41° 30'N *Long.* 40° 35'E
Bounded by: North — Hokkaido, Japan
South — Honshu, Japan
Width: 10 miles
Length: 69 miles

25) *Verde Island Passage*
Lat. 13° 50'N *Long.* 121° 40'E
Bounded by: North — Luzon, Philippines
South — Mindoro, Philippines
Width: 3.8 miles

Notes and References

1. With the treaty of peace known as the Kuchuc Qaynarjah of 21 July 1774 victorious Russia succeeded in obtaining recognition from Turkey of the right of free navigation for Russian merchant vessels in the Black Sea and the Straits. Article 2 of that treaty states in this regard: "For the common advantage of the two empires, freedom of navigation shall be established for the merchant vessels of the two powers in all the waters bordering them and the *Subline Porte* grants to Russian merchant vessels, freedom of entrance in its ports and at all its shores on a footing equal to that of other powers, to trade in the White Sea (The Aegean Sea) and the Black Sea, and access to all the coasts, bays, passages and canals which unite these two seas".

2. This represents a significant departure from the 1956 draft of the International Law Commission, which applied only to straits connecting two parts of the high seas. The change in the 1958 Geneva Convention was based on a proposal submitted to the Conference by the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom.
   The 1956 draft of the International Law Commission read: "There must be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits normally used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas (Article 17, paragraph 4); See, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C 1/L. 71; Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, First Committee (Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone),,p. 231.

3. The new Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, effective 17 January 1973.

4. U.N. Doc. A/Ac, 138/SC. II/L. 15.

5. The International point of view regarding the delimitation of the territorial sea expressed by the majority of member States, in the past session (first session 1973), of the Sea-Bed Committee is in favour of the concept of 12 miles. The United States had submitted draft articles which called for an agreed maximum breadth of the territorial sea of 12 miles, coupled with transit provisions which retain essential transit rights for straits users (A/AC. 138/SC. II/L. 4 and Corr. 1). Japan , United Kingdom and the other key European countries agreed with the United States.

6. The geographical aspect of this study has been based on Map 1 (Precisional Edition) on "Relation of Major Currents, Major Shipping Routes and a 200 Nautical Mile Pollution Zone;" issued by the Office of the Geographer, Department of State, USA.

7. In accordance with Article 14 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, "Right of Innocent Passage could be the foreign ships *only in the territorial sea* and without entering internal waters."

8. The Presidential Act No. 4, 18 February 1960.

9. Documental paper (A/AC. 138/SC, II/L. 18) submitted to the Sub-Committee II of the Sea Bed Committee, on 27 March 1973; Article 1 of Sub-Section A in Section I stipulated that "Subject to the provisions of these articles, ships of all States, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea". Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Indonesian Act concerning Indonesian Waters states that "innocent passage through the internal waters of Indonesia is open to foreign vessels". Is the word "foreign vessels" to mean all vessels including military vessels? Is the word "open" to mean no suspension?

10. See, John A. Knauss, *Factors influencing a U.S. position in a future law of the sea conference* (Occasional Paper No. 10, Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island, U.S.A., 1971), p. 3.

11. At the 28th meeting of the Sub-Committee II (24 March 1972), Mr. Podserob of the USSR explained his delegation's position on the subject of straits used for international navigation: "His delegation felt the United States proposal on freedom of passage of ships and aircraft in straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas (A/AC. 138/SC.LL/L. 4, Article II) could be used as the basis for an article on straits".

12. Tao Cheng, "Communist China and the Law of the Sea", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 63, 1969, p. 61.

13. *Ibid.*

14. According to the "Regulations Governing the Passage of Foreign Non-Military Vessels Through Chiungchou Strait" proclaimed by the State Council on 8 June 1964, no foreign military vessel is allowed to pass through the Strait and foreign non-military vessels may do so only by permission, requested 48 hours in advance, and only in the daytime.

15. Chinese delegation's statement on 24 July 1972, submitted to Sub-Committee II of the Sea-Bed Committee.

16. An interesting listing of strategic waterways, including both straits and canals, has been attempted by Major George Fielding Eliot. In the category of maritime highways between two of the great oceans, he placed the Malacca Straits as one of the most important. See, "The World's Strategic Waterways" *United Nations World*, Sept. 1947, p. 30.

17. K.E. Shaw, "Juridical Status of the Malacca Straits in International Law", *Japanese Review of International Law.*

18. The Governments of Indonesia and Malaysia signed an agreement on 17 March 1970, delimiting the territorial sea boundary between States in the Straits of Malacca. The treaty came into force on 10 March 1971; See, International Boundary Study, Series A, No. 50, *The Geographer*, Department of State, U.S.A.

19. *Ibid.*, No. 50 and No. 1.

20. K.E. Shaw, *op. cit.*

21. International Boundary Study, *op. cit.*, No. 50.

22. The Kra Canal, however, if and when constructed

through the southern part of Thailand, will link the Andaman Sea, in the Indian Ocean, with the Gulf of Thailand, in the South China Sea; see Phiphat Tangsubkul, "La Politique Thailandaise de mise en valeur du Golfe du Siam," *These Droit*, Universite d'Aix-Marseille, France, 1972, p. 127.

23. This project requires very large investments which several great Powers have offered to the Thai Government since the 19th century. At the present time, the project is being reconsidered by the Thai Government and semi-intensive research is being conducted.

REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE: *This review of the literature on the First Indo-China War attempts to separate fact from the mythology of the Viet-Minh's victory over the French.*

The First Indo-China War: Political versus Military Strength?

S. D. Campbell

IN his "Primer for Revolt",* the leading ideologist of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Truong Chinh, in 1946-47 briefly analysed the respective strengths and weaknesses of the warring French and Viet-Minh. "Most of the Vietnamese strong points are political", he wrote, "most of the French strong points are military."

On the military side, Truong Chinh's assessment is clearly simplistic, too broad and not a little fallacious. Apart from in the early stages of the war, the French were in no way substantially superior, in material terms, to the Viet-Minh. They obtained the initiative in early 1947 but within a year had dissipated whatever advantages they had possessed. Thereafter French tactical and strategic weaknesses made their military situation progressively untenable.

But Truong Chinh's comment on the Viet-Minh's political strength is valid. His selection of Unity, Morale, Independence and Popular Support as key issues could have been supplemented by a consideration of propaganda, terror and other means of mass control. And Ho's readiness to compromise on principles to gain short-term advantages was a crucial factor in the Viet-Minh's success. Nevertheless, it remains true that the Viet-Minh were possessed of superior political control and understanding of the mood and exigencies of the time. Their political infrastructure in all areas of life was comprehensive and all-pervasive.

Conversely, the French ability to detect flaws within their own approach appears to have been restricted, and they never underwent the periodic rigorous self-examination that characterized the Viet-Minh approach. They proceeded along well-worn ways with respectable but irrelevant notions drawn from the Second World War. Under the criminally mediocre direction of their political and military leaders, the French appear to have had no understanding of the nature of the fighting and, although they possessed a vastly greater military potential, they rarely gained a clear-cut advantage in military terms and usually fought at a disadvantage (and it reflects well on the French that, despite this, they continued to fight bravely for so long). They learnt their lesson in Algeria and accorded greater priority to seeking the support of the population there, but the realization came too late to affect the outcome in Vietnam.

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*Incorporating *The August Revolution* and *The Resistance will Win.*

EVEN considering that at the time he wrote his "Primer for Revolt" the war was still relatively young and the Viet-Minh still a developing entity, Truong Chinh's capsule assessment of the two opponents' military capacities appears specious. Numbers of arms and men are not the only criteria in assessing military strength. The Japanese in 1941, for example completely outwitted and outfought a composite force of British, Indians and Australians nearly three times their number in the Malay peninsula. It is tactics, terrain, supply system, morale, popular support and a myriad other elements, and not just the weaponry, that so often win the war. The real basis of military comparison includes the number of arms and troops only as one among several aspects.

Truong Chinh sees three of the Viet-Minh's weaknesses as..."few and rudimentary weapons ...," few and inexperienced troops, and poor military organization (1).

The first doubts about this statement are aroused when, some 130 pages earlier, an editorial note (2) tells us that as early as August 1945, the Viet-Minh had seized 35,000 rifles, 1,350 automatic weapons, 200 mortars, 54 cannon and 18 tanks from the surrendering Japanese. A year later, when war broke out, the Viet-Minh were more than prepared, Vo Nguyen Giap having assiduously built up the regular forces from 30,000 to 60,000 (3) with almost 40,000 regional and guerrilla forces.

Though at first their equipment on a man-for-man basis with the Viet-Minh was undeniably superior, the French made an initial mistake in seeing the adversary as a band of irregular guerrillas. In fact the latter were soon using "the tactics of a fully trained and equipped regular army, supported by regional and local units...exploiting the elements of surprise and flexibility of operation given by a fine intelligence system"(4).

These attributes admittedly did not stop the French from driving the Viet-Minh out of the major cities by early 1947 and around these limited areas (Hanoi, Haiphong, Nam-Dinh, Hue) (5), French material superiority was instrumental. But, just a few months later in September, the French offensive against Thai-Nguyen, Lang-Son and Cao-Bang, though initially successful, fell victim to the same logistical problems that were to plague them for the rest of the war and most of the captures had to be abandoned (6). Already, on a purely material assessment, the Viet-Minh were proving almost impossible to defeat. O'Neill even claims that the evacuation by the French of their captured towns in late 1947 "gave the Vietnamese a vital respite, sufficient to allow them to develop an overwhelming strength."(7)

From this time on, most accounts agree that the material strength of the Viet-Minh increased prodigiously with Giap having 32 Regular Battalions and 137 Regional Battalions by April 1949.(8) Strength was up to 117 Regular Battalions and 37 Regional Battalions by June 1951.(9) Nor was this all. The Viet-Minh forces were organized on the three levels of Regular, Regional, and Guerrilla or Popular forces, each with its own function, so that General Navarre estimated in 1953 that he was fighting 125,000 Regulars, 75,000 Regionals and about 300,000 village militia (Guerrillas) (10), not to mention any assistance that the populace was able to give the Viet-Minh war machine.

This takes on decidedly sinister connotations when it is noted that it was mainly the Regionals who ambushed and harassed the enemy and trained recruits, and the Popular forces who performed the essential services of collecting intelligence, guarding key bases and fortifying villages. This raises the question of the role played by Regular forces. The answer appears to be that the Viet-Minh had an elite, well-trained, mobile and superbly co-ordinated force whose sole purpose was to invite combat on their terms, being basically unconcerned about logistics. To borrow from Navarre, the Viet-Minh utilized *Une Pyramide Vivante* — "a human pyramid, the foundations of which were driven deeply into the country"(11). The Regulars formed the tip of this pyramid with the ancillary forces forming its flanks and base. From such a state of affairs emerged the perplexing *Guerre sans Front (12).* With an estimated one million porters backing the Viet-Minh and taking into account Truong Chinh's earlier comment that "our troops abandon their uniforms, combine with the people, distribute a part of their arms to them, organize militia forces, and arm the entire people, using every means to fight the enemy" (13), his remark that "our troops are not numer-

ous"(14), looks excessively modest and somewhat inconsistent. Though he was writing at a time when much of the Viet-Minh's strength was embryonic, he plainly recognized the people's potential and admits to the Viet-Minh using it as early as 1947.

For the later stages of the war, Fall produces statistics on weapons that tend to dispel images of ragged battalions armed with shovels and staves. By 1954, the Viet-Minh had acquired some 1,000 *Molotova* trucks ideally suited for the jungle while the two preceding years saw the delivery of "excellent new Soviet anti-aircraft guns and 120 mm mortars (15)", along with Chinese fire-control teams.

Two training camps across the China border churned out thousands of stereotyped infantrymen superbly equipped and trained and these were fed into Giap's burgeoning Divisions. Fall gives an informative battalion-to-battalion analysis of both sides showing that the French were clearly outgunned in automatic weapons, mortars and recoiless cannon (16).

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THE French, at the time of their 1947 offensive, had over 115,000 men in Vietnam. But they were scattered and spread thinly. For an offensive the then Commander-in-Chief, General Valluy could muster a maximum of only 16 battalions — about 15,000 men — to locate and destroy a compact and mobile force of 60,000 (17). There were even then "so many points that had become vital to the security of French rule that the Army was spread too thinly over the country to be able to cope with the local concentrations of Viet-Minh" (18).

Towards the end of the war, "the French could muster the equivalent of only three divisions, seven *Groupes Mobiles* and eight parachute battalions" to oppose the enemy striking force of six divisions (19). There were, by March 1953, 500,000 French Union men (Nationalist included) in Vietnam but over 300,000 were tied down in the tedious routine work carried out by their opposite numbers in the popular forces. Tanham, realistic as ever, noted that in 1950, "the military capability of the French was suffering increasingly from the lack of reinforcements, from dispersion and from logistical difficulties" (20).

Simply, the French, in pursuing their oil slick strategy, had overlooked the fact that a clearly superior ratio of Government to enemy forces, expanding continually in favour of the Government, is required. The French were hard put to maintain a 1:1 ratio and, as a result, in their zeal for holding the populated centres, they effectively emasculated their offensive capacity. McCuen estimates that over 100,000 French were needed to defend the Red River Delta, *within* the De Lattre line, from the depredations of 30,000-40,000 Viet-Minh regulars (21).

Without French air supremacy — the paratroop transports, the B26's, and the fighter-bombers — the war is likely to have ended much sooner in a complete debacle for the French. The Vinh-Yen Slaughter is a good example of this. But there were never enough of any one type of aircraft at any one time, and in any case there were few good airfields. Aircraft were also totally inoperative at night when the Viet-Minh moved supplies and launched attacks (as *Groupe Mobile 100* in Central Annam quickly discovered). But Dien Bien Phu epitomizes the limited influence of French air-power. Every available aircraft was deployed but, because of massive anti-aircraft fire and low visibility, the fortress's fall was delayed for only a few weeks.

French mobility and mechanization were often advantageous in carrying out rapid interdiction strikes. But their movement was consequently limited to exposed roads passing through ideal ambush terrain (22), and their perceived advantage prevented them from ever thinking in terms of beating the Viet-Minh at their own game of using the jungle instead of avoiding it.

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MAO TSE-TUNG wrote of the inferior side being able to wrest the initiative, and victory, from the superior side "by securing the necessary conditions through active endeavour in accordance with the circumstances (23)." This advice was followed to the letter by the Viet-Minh.

Giap's general strategy was the "concentration of troops to realize an overwhelming superiority over the enemy where he is sufficiently exposed, in order to destroy his manpower (24)." This was the core of two essential aims. First Giap pursued a policy of swamping

French posts and forts by sheer weight and then retreating when threatened by heavy French reinforcements, for he only believed "in attacking when success was certain, refusing to give battle when losses were likely, or to engage in hazardous actions (25)." Secondly, "the main objective is the destruction of the enemy manpower and one should not exhaust oneself by trying to hold or occupy land (26)."

Herein, lies the basic conceptual difference in the opponents' attitudes to the war. The French appear to have believed in the value of "Positional Warfare" as opposed to the "Mobile Warfare" (to borrow from Mao) which the Viet-Minh so patently followed. Consequently, locked away in their mountain retreats or cities, the French were forced to let the Viet-Minh run riot over the country and "before long, the situation in the government's base areas had become so bad that almost all of their troops were tied down trying to keep the situation there under control" (27). Having reached this stage, French reaction and strike capacity was further reduced by the guerrillas' ability to disappear into vast tracts of jungle. As a result the Viet-Minh had a field day in sabotaging communications and installations, as well as launching frequent offensives (28). This obsession with retaining land quite literally made the French posts (especially the string of remote little fortresses in the mountains) into islands of authority and their destruction by attrition became inevitable, particularly as the Viet-Minh would go to fantastic lengths to ensure a complete victory, often observing a garrison for weeks on end, noting their weaknesses and exploiting them in the assault (29).

It would be a gross misjudgement, however, to regard the French as completely outwitted in tactics. As the Viet-Minh tied down some 100,000 French troops in the Delta, so the French formed the *Groupements de Commando Mixtes Aeroportes* and, later, the *Groupements Mixtes de intervention — GMI.* These comprised small, airborne teams of soldiers who parachuted behind the enemy lines and organized the Meo, Muong and other hill-tribes, into effective fighting forces against their traditional plains enemy, the Viet-Minh (30). A notable success was the creation in 1947, in the border regions inhabited by ethnic Thais, of two Thai battalions and an autonomous Thai State. The Thais proceeded to defend their area of land vigorously against Viet-Minh infiltration, exemplifying the principle that the territorial imperative is the strongest. "The alliance aided the French considerably in maintaining political and military control over a sizeable, if not populous piece of Indo-China" with the minimum of resources (31).

At one stage, the G.M.I. had over 15,000 effectives operating behind enemy-lines in a fashion that, according to O'Neill, required only 200 tons of supplies a month as opposed to Dien Bien Phu's requirement of 200 tons per day (32). Yet they managed, on a man-for-man basis, to hold down more enemy personnel. This was guerrilla war at its most effective, yet the French never devoted enough effort to it, and the attempt was too late to affect the enemy's fortunes significantly.

De Lattre also formed his *Groupes Mobiles* — units of approximately 3,000 men possessing their own armour, artillery and vehicles whose sole purpose was to act as a form of combat "Firebrigade" (33). These forces achieved many successes but, again, there was only a limited number of them and they could not be everywhere at once, with the consequence that they left the Red River Delta more vulnerable to infiltration.

McCuen suggests that the situation might have been more favourable had the French given prority to the clearing and securing of the Delta while the war was still nascent, thereby establishing a strategic base. Certainly the Delta would not then have proved, as it became, the Achilles' heel of the French but Giap's expanding army would have been given even more time to grow and consolidate elsewhere while preparing, unhindered, for an offensive in force against the Delta (34). As it was, Giap could claim that "we took advantage of their exposed disposition of troops to get our divisions to strike direct blows at their rear in the Delta" (35).

Another branch of Viet-Minh strategy was the painstakingly patient policy of accumulating "thousands of small victories" (36); of being prepared for losses, both morally and physically and "for long retreats during which they (the Viet-Minh) may temporarily grow even weaker"(37). The discipline of a mind that could accept that "it was only by long and hard

resistance that we could wear out the enemy forces little by little while strengthening ours, and progressively turn the balance of forces in our favour" (38), is truly impressive and pays tribute to Giap's adherence to the right strategy, with the sole exception of the Vinh-Yen battles.

It also explains why the French, who saw the war initially as a mere rebellion and wanted it over with as soon as possible, increasingly found themselves drawn into a bloody morass, apparently without end. No amount of speed and surprise could destroy an enemy that had little interest in securing real estate and who was prepared to disappear at the blink of an eye, reappearing at some later juncture in overwhelming strength. In this way, the Viet-Minh captured and retained the advantage, ensuring that the French were "mentally one step behind the Revolutionaries—reacting rather than initiating" (39). This was fatal for troop morale, public support, propaganda and military success as the French tended to appear in the light of a clumsy hunter usually arriving on the scene too late for the fox. It could be argued that with their limited resources, the French had no other options which would not have given either all the land, or all the people, to the enemy. But as it was, "isolated and immobilized, they usually did not control either the ground or the population around them" (40).

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POOR morale does not appear to have ever afflicted the Viet-Minh. The most important factor was that they were fighting for the tangible cause of national self-determination. They also had the omniscient Party machine behind them, (discussed below p. 87) constantly reminding them of their ultimate utopian objective and warning them to expect defeats as a matter of course. And the "strict observance of the military doctrine of never engaging the enemy save with the advantages of surprise, speed and immediately overwhelming strength was a tremendous source of confidence among the men" (41).

The French were not so fortunate. Lacking any really tangible reason for fighting, they found themselves increasingly tied down to numerous posts and bunkers so as to preserve a static defence line. Defensive warfare is never exhilarating. It becomes positively depressing when there are anything up to 60,000 enemy roaming around in the so-called "safe" zone in the rear.

Uncertainty in political circles and public disquiet at home (discussed in the next section) clearly undermined morale at the Vietnam front and caused many soldiers to wonder what they were doing there. Successive governments failed to reach agreement, and in seven years, eight different Commanders-in-Chief were appointed to the Expeditionary Corps (42) — a reflection as much of the changing political scene in Paris as of the competence of the respective officers — with consequently radical changes in policy and strategy. In 1948, the French Government actually reduced the Expeditionary Force from 115,000 to 90,000 (43), because of "the increasing unpopularity of the war in France and the fact that it was psychologically impossible for the Government to send conscripts to Indo-China" (44).

In these circumstances it is not surprising that, as an American journalist put it at the time, "The French officers and men... cannot be counted upon to fight a dangerous, dirty, inconclusive war which is to end in the abandonment of French interests in Asia" (45).

To make matters worse, the French Army, always proud of its *esprit de corps*, in 1949 found itself embroiled in a serious political scandal, the Revers Report affair. This was a frank report on French weaknesses and problems, drawn up by General Revers who, apparently seeking a full generalship, leaked it to the Press in France and Vietnam, in return for political help from a certain M. Peyre. The Viet-Minh jubilantly printed and distributed thousands of copies with the dual affect of making the soldiers realize that French secrets were not so secret and that one of their number had been responsible and, moreover, had questioned their reliability (46).

Throughout the war, the all-pervasive Viet-Minh propaganda machine was deployed against French morale with some success. Captured French soldiers were regarded as useful tools. Ho commented that "we must treat (enemy soldiers) generously... we must show to the world that we are intelligent people, more civilized than the homicidal invaders" (47) and later, in a direct address, he appealed to the enemy soldiers as ordinary, decent people, foolishly led astray by grasping, profit-hungry colonialists (48).

These sentiments, successfully used by the Japanese during the Second World War and spread by the Viet-Minh in radio bulletins and leaflets, would not have affected the core of the army but, as Kelly points out, some troops are politically naive and will respond to this type of propaganda (49). Others, such as the sizeable German component in the Foreign Legion would have had weaker allegiances to France and several hundred did desert, along with nationals from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania (50).

This, of course, was seen by the Viet-Minh as a successful propaganda ploy and, having offered free repatriation to deserters, thay claimed that 300 prisoners-of-war (French) appealed to their brothers to abandon the French cause and to join the D.R.V.N. which "undertakes to awaken through correct and convincing explanations, the men deceived by the propaganda of the French Colonialists" (51). This inevitably arouses a strong suspicion that the Viet-Minh employed intensive brain-washing on captured soldiers, with partial success.

For their part, the French, with "no adequate organization for psychological warfare or reception of surrendered personnel" (52) neither made inroads on the high morale of the enemy nor offered an effective counter-propaganda for their own forces. It remains doubtful, however, that the extra edge lost by the low morale of France's armed forces was critical to the final outcome of the struggle.

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TRUONG CHINH isolated three main political points leading to Viet-Minh success. Two seem decidedly apposite: that "the entire Vietnamese people are closely united to wage a long resistance war" (53); and that "the French people will more strongly oppose war day after day and rise up to overthrow the reactionaries" (54).

Yet he only touches on it when he speaks of public disquiet in France. He could, of course, have had no idea of just how involved the French political scene was to become, but this aspect was to be as important as French public feeling.

It is axiomatic that a nation, wishing to embark upon a war of conquest or re-conquest should have at least a strong element of public support at home, and a foreign policy with a series of defined goals. The French had neither. General Navarre, in hind-sight, bemoaned the fact that, "We had no policy at all... was it to hold onto French positions? If so which ones? Was it simply to participate under American aegis in the containment of Communism in South-East Asia? Why them should we have kept on applying so much effort, since our interests had practically disappeared" (55).

Giap reckoned one of his main advantages to be that "he (the enemy) was internally divided, not supported by the people of his own country and did not enjoy the sympathy of world opinion" (56).

The politicians at home appear to have played a futile game of opposing their opponents' ideas and blocking the formation of any coherent policy. Dedicated Gaullists saw the goal as the preservation of Nationalism and France's glory (57), while the Colonial lobby desperately advocated protection of France's cultural and economic interests, and others favoured the "containment of Communism" theory. To top it all, the Communist ministers in the Government appear to have volubly aired within the ruling circles the growing public hostility to the war (58). They and the Socialists represented the view that negotiation and peace were to be sought. Chesneaux, however, blames them more for being a restrictive influence on the Governments of the day, bargaining their support for repeated peace overtures and thereby diluting French effort (59). The French lacked a direction. They had "no plan of operations and, no cause worthy of the struggle" (60).

Government manoeuvres of the day were tragi-comic. When negotiation appeared feasible to the Ramadier administration in 1947, the ruling parties split over the question of with whom to negotiate. The Socialists and Communists naturally suggested the Viet-Minh but the M.R.P. and Left Rally would not entertain the thought while the Gaullists were patently uninterested. Two years later, it was the turn of the Communist and Socialist leaders to fall out over how the conflict was to be stopped (61).

Initially totally unconcerned, French popular reaction at home turned slowly into confusion and finally disgust. The war started to receive extensive publicity only after the return of Bao

Dai and the formation of a National Government obviously disgruntled about its complete lack of powers. After 1949, when the principle of Unity and Independence had been conceded, the French found themselves thinking that "having 'given up' the reason for starting the war, there was no valid motive for continuing it" (62). The disaster at Cao Bang in 1950 however, aroused "some public remorse at the shabby treatment which the Expeditionary Forces had received" (63). Public revulsion appears to have manifested itself also at the corruption and inefficiency of the Bao Dai regime and the final straw came when in September 1953 a Nationalist Congress, convened in Saigon, demanded complete independence and withdrawal from the French Union. France realized it was fighting for an independent Vietnam in which it would have no role to play (64). Ironically the French public and Government, split for so long, at last united in the desire to withdraw as quickly as possible.

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AT best, the French stand towards the Vietnamese was hesitant and conservative. Initially, in 1946, the whole affair had been regarded as a colonial pacification exercise with the Viet-Minh seen as a psychotic fringe group. Some even saw them as a group of renegade prisoners from the Poulo Condore convict settlement (65). Such an attitude would not lightly admit of such a *volte-face* as to grant them independence. Here the French made a colossal miscalculation. They failed to recognize the country-wide desire for self-determination and, instead, interpreted it as a feeling of discontent exploited by a group of malcontents. All the old platitudes about autonomy within the French Union and limited independence were brought out and re-aired to an audience that was rapidly growing more disillusioned and alienated (66).

Commissioner Bollaert, politically hamstrung and virtually powerless, was sent out to Vietnam in March 1947 in place of the martinet Admiral D'Argenlieu, with vague plans to incorporate all three Indo-Chinese States within the French Union. At the conclusion of the first bout of haggling in September, Bollaert had conceded autonomy in most areas except Foreign Affairs and Defence; but, this was not enough for the Nationalists and the humiliating spectacle of the French Government holding discussions with ex-Emperor Bao Dai in Paris completely undercut Bollaert's position. This also made the Nationalists even more wary, and their mood was soon exacerbated by the arrogant creation of a Thai people's federation carved out of Tonkinese provinces.

Another series of talks was held, and General Xuan (following his election as President of the Central Government), Bao Dai, and Bollaert reached an agreement at the Bay of Along in June 1948 whereby Vietnam was to have total independence, apart from membership of the French Union (67).

Now it was the French Government's turn to protest and they promptly destroyed the painfully cultivated veneer of trust by disclaiming any agreement that reduced France's special status in Indo-China. As a result "every French effort which now bore on the anti-Communist theme with emphasis on the creation of a National Government was also received with suspicion and the distrust of French intentions became even stronger than it had been before" (68). It was due partly to this factor and, partly to the fact that it took the French over two years to appreciate the necessity for a rival national symbol to Ho Chi Minh, that many of the Nationalists turned to Ho (as had many of the Catholics thanks to a realistically flexible Viet-Minh policy towards them in the opening stages of the War (69)).

By May 1949, however, a Nationalist Government in South Vietnam had been created with Bao Dai at its head, but there were inherent problems in this move. The theory of an alternative focus of loyalty was sound but the Vietnamese people and intellectuals tended to remain aloof and "it was among these that Bao Dai had to organize a following if he was to compete seriously with Ho Chi Minh" (70). Bao Dai was starting too with the handicap that in abdicating his throne, fleeing overseas and then returning as a French appointee, he hardly appeared as the paragon of heroism. It remained with the French to render him credible.

The French however, were determined not to accede to demands for total independence for "Bao Dai was valuable to the French only if he did not insist on obtaining as much as Ho de-

manded" (71) (which, of course, was complete independence). Against his better judgement, Bao Dai did compromise with the French and lost the much-needed support of Diem, one of the few Nationalist leaders of some standing (72). One writer claims that he was so blatantly a French pawn that most of the Nationalists left him and the only serious support that he had left was from the politico-religious sects such as the Binh-Xuyen, the Hoa Hao and the Cao Daists. Even they "accorded only a very nominal recognition to the authority of Bao Dai's Government. They were practically autonomous and the Bao Dai Government could not so much as raise taxes in their zones" (73).

Dependent as it was on "gallicized Vietnamese wealthy landowners, traditionalist village notables" (74), the Administration also found itself thwarted in introducing reforms (75) so urgently needed to counteract the propaganda value of Ho's own reforms. The French appear to have, on the whole, aggravated the situation for "nothing was done to encourage the formation of Nationalist organizations whose support could make Bao Dai into a real political leader" (76). They also deprived him of any vestigial status by completely controlling all important areas of his administration, including the national army of which it has been remarked that none of the three Generals and 20 Colonels could initiate any action whatsoever (77).

Not surprisingly, the Bao Dai experiment attracted little respect and loyalty.

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THE quixotic comment of the French Overseas Minister, Paul Coste-Floret, in 1947 that "we will fight to the final victory" (78) eiptomizes the politicians' failure to understand a war that could not be "won" by a smashing victory nor even by arms alone, but rather by a subtle manipulation of intangible forces that no bullet could destroy.

They never appear to have grasped fully the concept that counter-guerrilla warfare must be underpinned by an optimum effort to enlist the support and participation of the people. McCuen comments on the absolute necessity for a firm political foundation: "the only real source of strength in Counter-Revolutionary warfare is popular support; strategic bases should be built mainly on population concentrations" (79).

In failing to build this foundation the French ignored one of the key tenets of Revolutionary Warfare according to Mao Tse-tung: "we must make full use of this move, political mobilization, to get the better of (the enemy)," he wrote "this move is crucial; it is indeed of primary importance, while our inferiority in weapons and other things is only secondary. The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy" (80). He then explained the three steps of political mobilization: telling the Army and the civilians of the political aims of the war; explaining how these are to be achieved; and by what means the population's political consciousness is aroused (81).

Having no real ideological answer to the Viet-Minh's Marxist-flavoured Nationalism, the French were thrown back on the negative propaganda approach of picking holes in the Viet-Minh's arguments. They offerred no alternative political future for the Vietnamese, (having refused to grant independence), ignoring that, as McCuen points out, "the backbone of effective psychological action is a clear, well-publicized National programme for the future of the country" (82).

Mention has been made of the absence of an adequate French psychological warfare organization (83). The "pacification" programme in the latter stages of the war did involve air-dropping of leaflets, broadcasts by air and mobile "patriotic" truck units—complete with band! These efforts enjoyed limited success (84) but were hamstrung by the lack of a "Cause" and were nullified by the Viet-Minh propaganda network of permanent cells and cadres in each village and district (see below, p. 87).

Efforts to arouse a pro-French political consciousness among the Vietnamese by other means seem similarly foredoomed. Their training of Nationalist administrators and District Officers, although conceptually sound, petered out before the depredations of the Viet-Minh "Armed Propaganda" units, with the result that the French were never able to recruit adequate cadres for local government (85).

Their later conciliatory policy towards the

national minorities bore fruit in the mountains but the plain-dwellers tended to be sceptical. This was understandable because French behaviour towards the peasantry had not hitherto been calculated to win its support. Initially, in the interests of securing a quick victory, the misery of the peasants was simply not considered. Even later, when the French *Group Mobiles* appeared to be effective, the French further alienated the population, "by sowing more and more ruin and hatred and by increasing the burden of the war upon the people" (86), and concomitantly sent the masses into the arms of the Viet-Minh.

There was, at best, only a half-hearted attempt to improve the living conditions of the people by carrying out reconstruction work, repairing physical damage or by promoting normal trade and food-deliveries (87). Tanham marks it as a fatal error that regular administration and services were not re-established in so-called "pacified" regions, following a military success (88), and McCuen notes that, given inadequate support and low priority, "progressive" aspects were ineffective (examples are the poorly armed and motivated militia and the re-orientation programmes) (89). This failure can again be traced back to lack of direction and understanding in Paris.

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THE Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam (D.R.V.N.) was never, of course, subject to the sort of pressures and considerations that caused the French endless headaches. Public Opinion was moulded and guided, not heeded, while political compromise was unnecessary once the war was underway. Furthermore, there were no additional distracting military or political commitments other than the goal of a Communist Vietnam.

Politics for the Viet-Minh were paramount and basically unproblematical. Ho advised that "greater importance should be attached to the political side than to the military side" (90), and for him "the war was, first of all, political and consequently total. All available resources were carefully mainpulated and applied toward a unified end" (91). But just what do these cryptic remarks mean, for surely Ho and his Politburo had no budgetary limitations, no politically restrictive mandate and no accountability to the masses?

The answer lies in Ho's exhortation to "rich people, soldiers, workers, peasants, intellectuals, employees, teachers, youth, and women who warmly love your country! At the present time national liberation is the most important problem" (92). Later he praises Unity, "because Unity is strength and only strength enables us to win back independence and freedom... in the Front our compatriots march side by side without discrimination as to age, sex, religion or fortune" (93). Truong Chinh puts it more explicitly when he writes: "the Vietnamese people are waging a sacred war to win freedom and independence, to defend the territory handed down to them by their ancestors" (94).

In contrast to the French, the Communist leaders never lost sight of their ultimate objective: the complete control of a homogeneous and self-sufficient Vietnam — and were prepared to trim their sails accordingly. Unlike the French, they saw the value of the people's support, and hence "the Viet Minh, putting Nationalist objectives first, attracted the support of Vietnamese and tribal peoples, of peasants and townsmen, Buddhists and Catholics" (95).

For total control, however, the loyalty of both the Civilian and Military links of the nation was needed and the "means to this end included an understanding of their political preconceptions and their social customs, of their needs and aspirations" (96). The Viet-Minh sought this understanding in several ways.

Following the First World War, a growing number of French-educated Vietnamese returned from France, imbued with an awareness of National self-identity derived, ironically, from France's own principles of freedom of the Press, speech, assembly, association, equal representation and the like. The situation in Vietnam was vastly different, the whole country being enmeshed in a tight parochial circle of privileged colonists and with a system of discriminatory laws directed against the Vietnamese. Nationalist societies such as the Phuc Viet, *Jeune Annam*, were formed, culminating in the creation of the Viet-Minh in 1941 (97). Originally a Nationalist, anti-Japanese movement, the Viet-Minh was able even then to utilize a strong

undercurrent of National feeling. Later, against the French, the organization's leaders employed this skilfully, realizing that its "Marxist slogans were of very little importance in comparison to its appeal to the National pride and traditional xenophobia of the Vietnamese" (98).

The Viet Minh's protagonists emphasized nationalism, Truong Chinh claiming that "our people are fighting the reactionary French colonialists in order to regain freedom and independence, to defend and liberate ourselves; therefore our resistance war is a revolutionary war, a people's war of self-defence (99)," and therefore, "we enjoy the material and moral strength drawn from the inexhaustible resources, of the people, from the progressive character of the war" (100). The veracity of these statements can only be questioned on the basis of whether the Vietnamese really were interested in independence, and unfortunately not enough evidence on this is available. But there are strong indications that there was a National awakening and, once this is accepted, the inescapable logic of Truong Chinh's reasoning is plain.

Ho's list of the Revolution's four main points included two emphasizing Independence (101). "At the present time" he wrote, "National Liberation is the most important problem" (102).

It was almost as if "Doc-Lap" (independence) was the magic word at the sound of which the Nation would rise as one. Devillers believes that virtually the whole Nation was willing to fight for the cause, although Ho probably comes closer to the truth when he refers to the French as "invaders" (103), for most Vietnamese would see the indigenous Viet-Minh as liberators, compared to the polyglot army of French, Moroccans, Algerians, Germans and Tunisians that made up the French Union forces (104).

But jingoism was not the only method of winning over the people. Giap remarks, "in the political field we had, at home, to increase the education and mobilization of the people, unremittingly strengthen national solidarity and endeavour...while...in the economic field, great efforts had to be made to build a War resistance economy, increase production, realize self-reliance and self-sufficiency" (105). In other words, to win the hearts of the people by exciting ideas was not enough; their minds had to be persuaded as well. An obvious method was to bestow material and other, less tangible benefits such as courtesy and assistance on them.

"When mobilizing the people," Ho admonished the Army, "we must see to it that their contributions do not exceed the requirements in order to avoid waste. We must avoid anything that is prejudicial to the people's life. To know how to assist the people is also to respect them" (106). In practice, this may well have been reduced to a mere deterrence from mass rape, for the Viet-Minh certainly took what they needed. But its importance lies in that it was a vital part of fighting the War in the eyes of the Viet-Minh leadership.

It would also be wrong to derogate from the real achievements of the Viet-Minh. Ho could honestly claim that, under D.R.V.N. aegis "the number of schools rose from 2,712 in 1950 to 3,591 in 1951, with an attendance of 293,256 and 411,038 respectively" (107), in spite of the lack of facilities and the necessity to change school sites frequently and to hold classes at night.

The Viet-Minh also helped with the harvesting of crops, with emergency relief and the rebuilding of schools, irrigation dykes and roads wherever possible (108) and, although most of it was done by the ubiquitous coolie, the work was excellent Viet-Minh public relations. Truong Chinh, in 1946, posed the rhetorical question: "how can the peasants' living conditions be effectively improved if they have not enough land to till? Therefore, the question of the people's happiness is basically one of giving land to the peasants for this reason, the regime of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation must be abolished and ...land to the tillers must be realized..." (109). The Viet-Minh did increase the amount of irrigated land by 16 per cent between 1947 and 1951 in their area and, achieved an incredible 725 per cent increase in cotton production from 1945 to 1947 through land rationalization (110). (The latter figure must be suspect, however, not only because it reveals the previous system to have been unworkably inefficient but also because land-use was probably converted from other crops to cotton, with a consequent reduction in the production of those crops.)

According to Chesneaux, 90 per cent of the

population owned 30 per cent of the land in 1952. Ho proclaimed a mass mobilization in December that year to "blot out" the remains of the feudal system, to reduce rents and redistribute land among the poor peasants (111). It is doubtful whether the result was utopian. Evidence from Viet-Minh zones is elusive, but there was a fair movement from these areas to the higher standard of living in the French-controlled areas, and the 700,000 refugees who poured into South Vietnam after the armistice further indicate a degree of disilusionment with the Communists.

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AFTER the disolution of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party (I.C.P.) in 1946, the Marxist Study Group held sway (until the emergence of the Lao Dong Party in 1950). It set up a highly centralized command structure with a Permanent Central Executive Committee controlling party affairs and the country's administration. Radiating from this centre were regional committees, then provincial or municipal committees, with village committees under them and, finally, cell groups (112). This system "of vertical echelons of command extending from the highest headquarters to the remotest village came to be efficiently articulated" (113) and allowed Ho rigid control of the people in a rapid transmission of information both up and down the chain, and effective ability to discipline malcontents. The strength of the D.R.V.N. lay in its committees.

Having established this control system, the Viet-Minh were able to remedy one of Ho's main complaints that "the laws of propaganda are limited to writing slogans, hanging flags and banderoles, embellishing the information houses and setting up tribunes for form's sake, but they never go to the people to give them explanations, to help them thoroughly understand the policies of the Organization" (114). Through the intricate cell system this "personal" touch was available, as well as constant supervision by the local Party cadres of each cell member as he was being led along the road to "enlightenment". The system enabled a widespread application of the directive "to propagandize is to mobilize and to educate the population so as to make it hate the enemy, so that it shows ardour in national reconstruction and is fully confident of the final victory" (115).

Five Viet-Minh radio stations bolstered the propaganda effort to control the people's political awareness (116). The *Voice of Vietnam* directive, cited above, was broadcast nationwide to ensure that most people heard it and then discussed it in their cell group. *The Voice of Bac-Bo* similarly broadcast an instruction on 1 October 1953 to "concentrate our thoughts and deeply meditate upon our misfortunes, upon the way we have been oppressed and pilfered and, when we have discovered the bottom of our misery, we shall feel an even deeper hatred" (117).

Finally, where the population proved obstinate or "traitorous", there was always terror to fall back on. Duncanson tends to over-emphasize it by saying that, "this manipulation of fear as a disincentive...to the pursuit of individual inclinations is the key to the "masses mobilization" by which the Viet-Minh transferred its centre of gravity from astride the country, into the village communities" (118). Nevertheless, the Viet-Minh made no secret of their euphemisitically styled "Armed Propaganda" groups comprising some 20 men and two or three commissars whose main mission (119) was to intimidate and slaughter local village notables and supervise "the liquidation of traitors and suppression of activities of evil-minded persons" (120).

Another, more prevalent, form of intimidation appears to have been to implicate the population in anti-French activities to the point where the fear of reprisals became sufficient for the people to support the Viet-Minh as the only practical alternative (121).

The population in enemy territory received from the Viet-Minh similar treatment to that meted out to civilians in "free" zones.

To ensure the allegiance of the Army the regime bestowed a more concentrated version of Party control on it. The Viet-Minh was uniquely a twentieth-century creation for the reason that "political work is the soul, the sinews of the Army" (122). Giap's aim was nothing less than a military machine with strict political controls, centralized authority, and uniform territorial organization" (123). As a result, for each link in the military command structure there was a corresponding political commissar whose sole purpose was the correct ideological

indoctrination of the soldiers and, "the integration of military action with political objectives" (124).

In the event of a conflict between the military commander of the unit and the Commissar, it was generally the latter, political viewpoint that won the day. Dangerous though this may seem, it was consistent with the doctrine of vesting ultimate control in the Party. The Viet-Minh appeared to have suffered little from tactical blunders made by assertive but inexperienced commissars.

Each division had its group of political committees for administration, political instruction, recreation, preparation of battlefield propaganda and Party affairs.

Furthermore, all company-sized units and above, had a full-time commissar, while the platoons made do with cell groups. At the top, the Party's central echelon had three controlling commissariats which together supervised all areas of the military, from the general political directorate, through intelligence and the G.H.Q., to Quartermaster's Depot and Medical Services.

Each commissar attached to a unit had a full-time propaganda section at his disposal. This section prepared speeches and pamphlets, explained directives, and performed other similar tasks for the troops. As a result, "political work had a great effect on the raising of the ideological level, educating and consolidating the class stand of the officers and the men" (125). It was the unit commissar's propaganda section which was charged with the conduct of psychological operations against enemy troops.

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A FINAL factor in the success of the Viet-Minh was that Ho, unlike most Communist leaders, was prepared to extend his pragmatism even to the temporary denial of fundamental doctrines and aims.

As early as 1939, he commented that "the Party must assume a wise flexible attitude with the Bourgeoisie, strive to draw it into the Front, win over the elements that can be won over" (126). Eleven years later, in the 14 January Declaration of Independence in 1950, he declared that Vietnam "is ready to establish diplomatic relations with the governments of all countries which respect the equality, territorial sovereignty, and National Independence of Vietnam" (127). These remarks, although on different subjects, clearly reveal Ho's capacity and ability to compromise inconvenient principles and subordinate them to the demands of the moment.

A case in point is Ho's unprecedented dissolution of the I.C.P. in March 1946, thereby weakening his power base in the eyes of many, and its replacement by a low-key study group. This move must have caused some loss of face. But it facilitated his negotiations with the potentially dangerous group of Nationalists and may well have mollified the French sufficiently to persuade them to concede to the D.R.V.N.'s status as a free State with its own government and army (128).

Fall sees an additional rationale. "The old I.C.P.", he writes, "was too doctrinaire, too abstract, to become a good tool for mass control" (129). While the Viet-Minh's power base could not yet be regarded as unshakeable, and unity was essential, "agreement was maintained between the Viet-Minh, the Catholics, moderate Nationalists, Socialists and Democrats" (130). The Viet-Minh restrained its inherently Communist infrastructure and appears to have followed the policy of gaining the support of the existing social system (using it, rather than destroying it). "In every area of public life, the Viet-Minh moved to conciliate the largest population groups by adapting itself to their wishes" (131).

As each "group" outlived its usefulness it was exterminated politically. The Nationalists disintegrated in 1946, but it was not really until after 1951 that Viet-Minh policy turned against the Catholics. Until then, the Catholics, being the most educated segment of the population, had been assiduously courted. But once Communist hegemony had been established, this attitude changed and one can read reports of repression and murder (though possibly exaggerated) in the newspapers of the time (132).

Ho was plainly prepared to temper his demands for total independence by accepting, in a letter to the French people and Government in January 1947, an independent status, "within the

framework of the French Union" (133). Obviously full independence could wait for the time being. What hope, therefore, had a hesitant French Government against the Viet-Minh's "regime of operators, practitioners of the job of building the first socialist state in South-East Asia."? (134). The latter never lost sight of their ultimate objectives and were prepared to experience any number of setbacks to achieve them. For the Viet-Minh, the end did always justify the means.

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